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Abstract 
 
 
The availability of data systems is one of the greatest challenges companies face today. 
Keeping a high level of availability is not a trivial task: 
 
Security technology may be deployed incorrectly and does not give a company an effective 
protection against security threats. Security measures must be incorporated and assessed to 
protect data systems and company infrastructures against a massive range of threats and 
vulnerabilities that affect availability of data systems. 
Businesses today must be responsive and change very rapidly. Their supporting software 
systems must change equally rapidly. The change in the system architecture may lead to 
change in system availability. This should be addressed quickly. 
The threats and vulnerabilities are not standardised, but are situation dependant. This is why 
organisations and companies have to assess risks to the availability of a data system regularly. 
A regular availability risk assessment may be very costly for a company. 
 
This thesis presents Model Driven Availability Risk Analysis (MODA), a methodology for 
identifying, assessing and treating risks to availability of data systems. MODA aims to take 
one step in the direction of addressing the challenges sketched above and aims for improved 
time efficiency, cost effectiveness, and usability.   
 
To successfully analyse system availability, we need to know all the key areas of risk to 
system availability. We identify these key areas and define four sub classes of availability, the 
so-called availability aspects: Network availability, Software availability, Hardware 
availability, and Human availability. Further, we decompose each availability aspect into 
more basic entities, define the relationship of each aspect to other availability aspects and 
identify the assets that can be affected by its denial. 
 
The risk assessment community makes use of a structured approach to address risks – the so-
called Risk management process. The MODA risk management process is based on AS/NZS 
4360:1999 Risk Management [6] and CORAS [5] and we decompose it into sub-processes for 
context identification, risk identification, risk assessment, risk evaluation and risk treatment. 
We present MODA in an example-driven manner in the form of a small case study. Further, 
to evaluate the suitability of MODA we conduct a larger case study using MODA to assess 
the availability of a chat service. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
“The only truly secure system is one 
that is powered off, cast in a block of 
concrete and sealed in a lead-lined 
room with armed guards – and even 
then I have my doubts.” 
 
Eugene H.Spafford 
 
 
 
1.1 Characterisation of the problem  
 
 
Progress has given to humanity many useful things, but the same progress has given people a 
lot of problems. It is hard to imagine a modern company that runs business without 
computers. An active use of the Internet is now one of the most important factors that 
contribute to the business success. The number of computer systems that process different 
kinds of information is increasing every year. These data systems are made to perform 
information services. If an information can not be accessed by service consumers, the result 
can be the reduction of competitive ability and reputation of service provider as well as 
financial losses for both service provider and service consumer. Many companies now are 
realizing that their prosperity, new markets penetration and customers satisfaction are very 
much dependent on the availability of services that these companies offer to their clients. In 
many industrial countries people can choose among tens or hundreds of companies that offer 
services based on the 24X7 concept. This means that a service is available 24 hours per day, 7 
days per week.  
 
Business has opened thousand doors inviting employees and clients to either complete a 
business process or place online orders. But this openness has its cost. Today, information 
security is the one of the greatest challenges companies face in the world of e-commerce and 
growing use of Internet for business needs. Their infrastructures are exposed to a massive new 
range of threats and vulnerabilities that affects availability of data systems. The number of 
financial losses that are caused by computer crimes, and number of hacker attacks on data 
systems are growing every year. As a result of this, companies use more and more money on 
security and the number of security technologies applied by companies is steadily increasing 
every year. In spite of this fact, the press release of American Computer Security Institute [1] 
shows that the number of companies that detected computer security breaches, increased 5 % 
from the year 2001 to the year 2002. This fact shows that security technology does not 
necessarily give a company an effective protection from security threats. One major reason 
for this phenomenon is the fact that security technology is often deployed incorrectly. 
 
The importance of availability can be exemplified by a management system that optimizes 
production on a factory or controls parameters of important components of an airplane. 
Vladimir Galatenko and Igor Doroshin note in their article “Availability as an element of 
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information security” [2] that an operator on a chemical factory is able to perceive less than 
1% of the information of the technology process. The denial of availability of this kind of data 
system can have very serious consequences. Less serious, but also very unpleasant – both 
materially and morally – may be the result of long-term unavailability of a data system 
offering services used by many people. While the denial of availability of the data system of 
an Internet bank or travel agency can affect tens or hundreds of thousands of people, the 
denial of availability of the data system of a national bank can affect the national security of a 
country. 
 
People can be divided in two categories: those who use computers at work or at home and 
those who don’t. While the number of people in the last category is reducing every year, the 
number of people in the first category is steadily increasing together with user demands to 
their “cybernetic friends”. We all want to have the fastest Internet connection, immediate 
response from application programs and 100 percent uptime of the system. But our wishes 
brutally collide with reality. Today we live in the world where terrorist attacks are happening 
in countries that were hard to imagine as terrorist targets ten years ago. The heart of the 
modern computer world – the Silicon Valley in California, experiences planned power 
blackouts and the most popular operating system is famous for something called The Blue 
Screen of Death. The modern world is also characterized by uncompromising competition 
among companies. The new software is expected to have more features and as result this 
increased complexity. 
 
IT systems are getting more and more complex and this fact is itself a serious threat. Many 
data systems are so tightly integrated that it is almost “impossible” to keep an overview of 
their structure – which is an obvious precondition to obtain a highly available data system. 
Liberalisation and demonopolisation of infrastructures further increased information exchange 
with the help of the Internet between private persons and between organisations and 
companies. This fact in turn brings on to the necessity of integration of data systems that were 
physically separated. After the integration or development of a data system, developers can 
discover new security breaches that need complicated, expensive and time-consuming 
solutions. One way to reduce development costs can be the assessment of consequences of 
system changes in the design phase. It is much cheaper to make changes in the design of a 
system then to make changes in a developed system. Many companies know this rule, but are 
still faced with additional work after development of the system. One of the problems is that 
availability is often considered first after integration or development of the system. 
 
It is also very important to have a good balance between the level of security and the 
accessibility and user friendliness of the data systems. What we have here is a paradox. On 
the one hand, we as computer users, expect more functionality and availability from software 
products, and on the other hand, software producers provide lower and lower levels of 
availability as their products increase in complexity, and delivery times gets shorter and 
shorter. The case of deployment of the VISA SET [3] standard for secure use of credit cards 
for net shopping shows that millions of dollars were spent to develop the system which was 
not widely accepted. The system software was too “heavy” and complicated, and maybe too 
secure. Now, VISA is concerned with just being “secure enough”, and has announced the new 
pay solution for Internet - 3D Secure. This fact shows that too much security can make the 
system impossible to use or in other words – too much security can negatively affect 
availability of the system. 
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Unreliable software is not the only reason for the reduction of availability of a data system. A 
serious threat to availability of a data system is the so-called Denial of Service Attack (DoS) – 
an attack that breaks the functionality of a data system by sending much more requests than 
the data system is able to process. For example, as a result of DoS attack [4] in february 2002, 
the normal work of Internet service providers (ISP) in U.S.A like ShiffOut, TheDotComplete, 
The DogmaGroup and Firenet, was affected. The DoS attack SYN Flood [4] in December 
1996 had the effect that the web server of the American Internet provider Web 
Communications LLC, could not give internet access for more than 40 hours to more than 
2200 corporate clients.  
 
Reduced availability of a data system also can be caused by application software that is 
attacked by computer virus. For example, after the epidemic of the computer virus Code Red 
in August 2001, the American ISP Qwest DSL [4] had to pay a lot of money to its customers 
as compensation for lost Internet connection caused by functionality problems of company 
equipment affected by the virus. Along with hacker attacks and problems with software, the 
availability of a data system also depends on the proper functioning of hardware. It is not hard 
to imagine how effective an air traffic operator can be if the monitor of his computer does not 
work.  
 
We as system developers cannot consider a technological system separate from its users and 
the company in which it is supposed to work. System developers have to carefully study the 
environment of the system’s deployment, the system’s future functionality, and the external 
and internal infrastructures of the organisation in which the system is to be deployed. Hence, 
availability cannot be handled by analysing technology alone. The most advance and 
secured data systems can not function effectively without people updating its software and 
hardware. Incompetent and irresponsible employees also can cause a lot of damages to data 
systems and company businesses. The use of Internet for personal purposes is now a serious 
problem faced by many companies. An army of clerks and managers equipped with keyboard 
and mouse is surfing on the Internet waves day-by-day and week-by-week. During the work 
time, people send personal email, read anecdotes, play games, download music, films and 
unauthorised software, and chat with friends. All these inappropriate user actions directly 
affect the productivity of employees and the availability of services that a company offers to 
its clients. Aleksei Lukatski in his book “Attacks identification” [4] shows that every 
company loses about 825 dollars per year as a result of use of Internet of one employee for his 
or her personal purposes. 
 
Software developing companies use different methods and techniques to support availability 
risk assessment. Their ability to understand and manage these methods and techniques will be 
crucial to protecting brand image, developing customer confidence and achieving long term 
success. Keeping availability of a data system at a high level costs a lot of money. It is not 
enough to have firewall, update software and hardware regularly or use powerful antivirus 
software. Personnel have to regularly attend courses to keep their knowledge updated and the 
company has to test all data system components regularly. Today, the threats and 
vulnerabilities are not standardised, but are situation dependant. That’s why organisations and 
companies have to assess availability risks regularly. But availability risk assessment is 
costly, and many companies do everyday exercises in balancing cost against the threats. 
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1.2 Model Driven Availability Risk Analysis 
 
The problems that we have highlighted so far show that we need risk and availability 
assessment methodology that will be effective, sufficiently cheap, and easy to use by the risk 
assessment practitioners in the early stages of the development process. This methodology 
should support people participating in the availability risk assessment in gaining a better 
understanding of the system environment and assists their communication by presenting 
information in an understandable manner.  The objective of this thesis is to take one step in 
this direction by proposing an availability risk assessment methodology called MODA 
(Model Driven Availability Analysis).  
 
The MODA methodology can be seen as a specialization of the CORAS model based security 
risk assessment (MBRA) methodology [5] targeting availability. CORAS builds on the 
concept of applying systems modelling when specifying and describing the systems to be 
assessed as an integrated part of the risk assessment. The practical use of models in the risk 
assessment is motivated by several factors: 
 
• Risk assessment requires proper descriptions of the assessed system, its context and all 
security features. The modelling technology improves the precision of such 
descriptions. Improved precision is expected to improve the quality of risk assessment 
results. 
• Graphical models further the presentation of information in an unambiguous way to 
participants of the risk assessment. This is expected to improve the quality of results, 
and also speed up the risk analysis process since the danger of wasting time and 
resources on misconceptions is reduced. 
• The modelling technology facilitates a more precise documentation of risk assessment 
results and the assumptions on which their validity depend. This is expected to assist 
to the reduction of maintenance costs. 
• The modelling technology provides a solid basis for the integration of assessment 
methods that should improve the effectiveness of the assessment process. 
• The modelling technology is supported by a rich set of tools from which the risk 
analysis may benefit. This may improve quality, reduce costs and further productivity 
of risk assessment. 
• The modelling technology provides a basis for tighter integration of risk management 
in the system development process. This may considerably reduce development costs 
and ensure that the specified security level is achieved. 
 
 
1.3 Report structure 
 
This report is divided into eight chapters and four appendices as specified below: 
 
• Chapter 1: Introduction 
Provides the motivation for the development of MODA, presents the main rational 
behind MODA and gives the overview of the report structure. 
• Chapter 2: Background 
Gives an overview of the CORAS methodology, provides definitions relevant for 
availability, explains risk assessment with a little example, and clarifies the use of 
UML for the availability assessment. 
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• Chapter 3: Problem analysis 
Motivates and presents the MODA success criteria, and discusses research strategies 
that can be used for the validation of MODA success criteria.   
• Chapter 4: Availability decomposed 
Decomposes availability into 4 availability aspects: network availability, software 
availability, hardware availability, and human availability; defines the relationships 
between availability aspects and between availability aspects and assets. 
• Chapter 5: Model Driven Availability Risk Analysis (MODA) 
Provides the description of MODA and exemplifies its usage in a small case study of 
availability risk assessment. 
• Chapter 6: Using MODA to assess a Chat Service 
Demonstrates MODA in a major case study. 
• Chapter 7: Discussion 
Discusses MODA and shows what could be done different. 
• Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Provides the main conclusions of the report, shows how MODA meets the success 
criteria, and discusses relevant and future work. 
• References 
Provides references. 
• Appendix A 
The first part provides consequence and frequency tables for the availability risk 
analysis; the second part provides questionnaires for assets identification. 
• Appendix B 
Provides templates for the MODA risk treatment sub-process. 
• Appendix C 
Provides risk treatment tables and risk treatment priority tables for the case study of 
Chapter 6. 
• Appendix D 
Provides documentation for the case study of Chapter 6. 
 
Figure 1.1 gives a description of the report structure. The arrows show alternative sequences 
in which the chapters and appendices may be read. 
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1. Introduction
2. Background
4. Availability
decomposed
5. MODA
6. Case study
7. Discussion
8. Conclusion
3. Problem
analysis
References
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
 
Figure 1.1: Reading guide to the report 
 
 
If the reader is familiar with the background information in chapter 2, it is possible to go 
directly from chapter 1 Introduction to chapter 4 Availability decomposed. If the reader is not 
interested in the MODA success criteria, he may skip chapter 3 Problem analysis. The arrows 
with two pointers indicate that the reader should use the information from appendices A, B 
and C when he reads chapter 5 and the information from appendix D when he reads chapter 6. 
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2 Background 
 
In this chapter we provide necessary background information. The chapter is structured into 
four sections. Section 2.1 presents and explains risk assessment with the help of a little 
example. Section 2.2 gives an overview of the CORAS methodology for model-based risk 
assessment that has been an important source of inspiration. Section 2.3 gives the definition of 
availability, security and other important notions. An important part of MODA is the practical 
use of UML to support availability risk assessment. Section 2.4 motivates and explains the 
use of UML for the risk assessment.     
 
 
2.1 Risk assessment 
 
Risk is a part of everyone’s life, and people would like to have control over the risks they face 
on a daily basis. The Australian Standard for Risk Management [6] defines risk as “ The 
chance of something happening that will have an impact upon objectives.” The same standard 
defines the risk management process as “The systematic application of management policies, 
procedures and practices to the tasks of establishing the context, identifying, analysing, 
evaluating, treating, monitoring and communicating risk”. By doing risk assessment, you can 
identify threats in advance and treat them before they will harm you, your plans, business or 
project. It can be much cheaper to address the identified risk by avoiding it or minimizing its 
effects than be unprepared and spend time and money on recovery. 
 
The Risk assessment community uses different approaches and methods for the risk 
assessment. For example, while Sommerville [7] decomposes the risk management process 
into four stages for risk identification, risk analysis, risk planning, and risk monitoring, 
AS/NZS 4360 [6] provides a sequencing of the risk management process into sub-processes 
for context identification, risk identification, risk assessment, risk evaluation, and risk 
treatment. In addition, the latter operates with two supporting sub-processes that help project 
leaders to have an overview of the fist five processes.  
 
We base our risk management process on AS/NZS 4360. In the following we illustrate the 
risk assessment with a little example. 
 
Context identification 
 
The goal of this sub-activity is to establish the objectives, strategies, scope and parameters of 
the system, including the specification of the risk assessment resources required and the risk 
assessment records to be kept. By defining the target of evaluation, we specify what we are 
going to analyze – the whole system or some parts of this system. By specifying objectives 
and parameters of the target system we get a clear understanding of the system usage and its 
role in the surrounding environment.  
Imaging you are going to travel with your car in the winter across Scandinavia. You can 
define that the target of evaluation is a car that should drive in the winter across Scandinavia. 
By specifying parameters of the target system – the car, you will define components such as 
motor, chassis, clutch, wheels that contribute to the system functionality and which will be the 
valuable information for the risk identification sub-process.
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Risk identification 
 
If you are going to travel with your car in the winter across Scandinavia, you can face several 
threats that can make your journey less pleasant than anticipated. For example, the tires of 
your car can be punctured, your car can stop because of lack of fuel or you will not be able to 
drive your car because of ice-crusted road.  
 
The objective of risk identification is to define threats that are relevant for your target of 
evaluation. In our case we can define that the most serious threats for our car trip will be tire 
puncturing and ice-crusted road.  
 
Risk analysis 
 
Now when we know the possible risks to our car trip, we have to analyse them and ask 
ourselves what are the consequences of these risks (unwanted incidents) and how big is the 
probability that these risks will actually happen. The consequence and probability of risk can 
be assigned quantitative values or qualitative values like: Nil, Very Low, Low, Medium, High 
and Very High [8]. If you don’t have an additional tire, the consequence of tire puncturing 
will be inability to drive the car and maybe you will have to wait quite long for technical help. 
If you don’t have winter tires, the consequence of ice-crusted road can again be your inability 
to drive the car. By defining the probability of identified unwanted incidents, you have to take 
into account circumstances that are relevant for your case. For example, the probability that 
you will puncture the tire will be higher on the dirt road then on the main road. In our car trip 
case, we decided that the tire puncturing will have the same consequence as ice-crusted road, 
but ice-crusted road will have higher probability than tire puncturing.  
 
Risk evaluation 
 
The objective of risk evaluation is to define priorities of the identified risks for further 
treatment. By comparing the consequence and probability of risks, you get an estimate for risk 
level or its severity. Simplistically, you compare consequences and probabilities of different 
risks to decide which of them should be treated first. If a risk has a very small consequence or 
its probability is near 0, then its treatment can be postponed or it may be removed from the 
list of your risks. In our car trip example, the risk level of ice-crusted road will be higher than 
the risk level of tire puncturing and we decided to treat first the risk of ice-crusted road. 
 
Risk treatment 
 
The objective of the risk treatment is to define treatment approaches for each identified risk. 
For each risk, we can consider one or several of the following treatment approaches [6]: 
 
• Risk avoidance 
• Reduction of likelihood 
• Reduction of consequence 
• Risk transfer 
• Risk retention 
 
For example, we can reduce the likelihood of tire puncturing if we choose only main roads for 
our car trip. We can reduce the consequence of tire puncturing if we bring along additional 
tires. To reduce the likelihood of ice-crusted road, we can choose to use winter tires and drive 
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only in the daytime. To reduce its consequence, we may have some additional equipment in 
the car (e.g. special chains for tires) that we can use in case of difficult road conditions. 
 
 
2.2 CORAS 
 
CORAS [9] is a EU-funded research and technological development project under the 
Information Society Technologies (IST) Programme that was completed in October 2003. Its 
main objectives were:  
 
• To develop a practical framework exploiting methods for risk analysis developed 
within the safety domain, semiformal description methods (in particular, methods for 
object- oriented modelling), and computerised tools (for the above mentioned 
methods), for a precise, unambiguous, and efficient risk analysis of security critical 
systems. 
• To apply the framework in security critical application domains. 
• To assess the applicability, usability, and efficiency of the framework. 
• To promote the exploitation potential of the CORAS framework. 
 
CORAS adapted, refined, and combined methods for risk analysis, semi-formal description 
methods – in particular, methods for object-oriented modelling, and computerised tools, to 
build a specialised RM-ODP [10] inspired framework targeting risk analysis of security 
critical systems. 
 
The main deliverable of the CORAS project is the CORAS framework that is characterised 
by: 
• A careful integration of techniques and features from partly complementary risk 
analysis methods like HazOP [11], FTA [12], FMECA [13], CRAMM [14] and 
Markov analysis [15]. 
• Patterns and methodology for UML oriented modelling targeting the different risk 
assessment methods. 
• A risk documentation framework based on RM-ODP [10]. 
• An integrated risk management and system development process based on UP [16]. 
• A platform for tool-inclusion based on XML [17]. 
 
The CORAS risk management process is based on the standards 
• AS/NZS 4360:1999 Risk Management [6]. 
• ISO/IEC 17799-1:1999 Code of Practice for Information Security Management [18]. 
and complemented by  
• ISO/IEC 13335: Information Technology – Security Techniques – Guidelines for the 
Management of IT-Security [19]. 
• IEC 61508: Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic 
Safety-Related (E/E/PE) Systems [20]. 
 
The CORAS risk management process is decomposed into five sub-processes for context 
identification, risk identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation and risk treatment that are in 
turn decomposed into activities as described in Figure 2.1. The main concepts in the CORAS 
risk management process are presented in Figure 2.2 [5]. 
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                                                                      CORAS sub-processes 
Sub-process 1 
Identify Context 
Sub-process 2 
Identify Risks 
Sub-process 3 
Analyse Risks 
Sub-process 4 
Risk Evaluation 
Sub-process 5 
Risk Treatment 
▪ Identify areas of 
   relevance 
▪ Identify and value 
   assets 
▪ Identify policies and  
   evaluation criteria 
▪ Approval 
▪ Identify threats to  
   assets 
▪ Identify vulnerabilities  
   of assets 
▪ Document unwanted  
   incidents 
▪ Consequence 
   evaluation 
▪ Frequency evaluation 
▪ Determine level of risk 
 
▪ Prioritise risks 
 
▪ Categorise risks 
 
▪ Determine 
   interrelationships among 
   risk themes 
▪ Prioritise the resulting 
   risk themes and risks 
▪ Identify treatment  
   options 
▪ Assess alternative 
   treatment approaches 
Figure 2.1: The sub-processes and activities of the CORAS risk management process 
 
 
 
• Risk management: The culture, processes and structures that are directed towards 
effective management of potential opportunities and adverse effects. 
• Risk management process: The systematic application of management policies, 
procedures and practices to the tasks of establishing the context, identifying, 
analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and communicating risk. 
• Risk identification: The process of determining what can happen, why and how. 
• Risk assessment: The overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation. 
• Risk analysis: A systematic use of available information to determine how often 
specified events may occur and the magnitude of their consequences. 
• Risk evaluation: The process used to determine risk management priorities by 
comparing the level of risk against predetermined standards, target risk levels or other 
criteria. 
• Risk treatment: Selection and implementation of appropriate options for dealing with 
risk. 
 
Figure 2.2: Main concepts in the CORAS risk management process 
 
 
2.3 Security aspects 
 
Keeping the availability of a data system on a high level is not a trivial task. Security 
measures must be incorporated into computer systems whenever they are potential targets for 
malicious or mischievous attacks. Availability cannot be considered separately from security 
and this fact brings on the need to understand availability in the perspective of security 
domain. What we need is a clear definition of availability, security and the concepts that are 
relevant for them. 
 
Computer systems do not always fail in the same way. Some security threats may affect 
system availability while others may not. Threat is defined by [21] as “a potential cause of an 
unwanted event, which may results in harm to a system or organisation and its assets”Security 
threats may also affect other system attributes such as system service, system function (system 
functionality), and system dependability. In the article “Fundamental Concepts of 
Dependability” [22] Avizienis, Laprie and Randell define these system attributes in the 
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following way: “Dependability of a computing system is the ability to deliver service that 
can justifiable be trusted. The service delivered by a system is its behaviour as it is perceived 
by its user(s); a user is another system (physical, human) that interacts with the former at the 
service interface. The function of a system is what the system is intended for, and is 
described by the system specification”.  
 
What is IT security? ISO/IEC TR 13335-1:20001: Information technology – Guidelines for 
the management of IT Security – Part 1: gives the following definition of IT security: 
IT security includes all aspects related to defining, achieving, and maintaining 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, accountability, authenticity, and 
reliability of IT systems [23].  
 
This is in agreement with other definitions of security, which also view it as a composite 
notion. For example, [22] defines security as follows: 
Security is the concurrent existence of a) availability for authorized users only, b) 
confidentiality, and c) integrity. 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the definition of IT security terminology [19] on which this thesis will be 
based: 
 
 
 
• Accountability: The property that ensures that the actions of an entity may be traced uniquely to 
the entity. 
• Authenticity: The property that ensures that the identity of a subject or resource is the one 
claimed. Authenticity applies to entities such as users, processes, systems and information. 
• Availability: The property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorised entity. 
• Confidentiality: The property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised 
individuals, entities, or processes. 
• Data Integrity: The property that data has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorised 
manner. 
• Integrity: See data integrity and system integrity. 
• Non-repudiation: The ability to prove an action or event has taken place, so that this event or 
action cannot be repudiated later. 
• Reliability: The property of consistent intended behaviour and results. 
• System Integrity: The property that a system performs its intended functions in an unimpaired 
manner, free from deliberate or accidental unauthorised manipulation of the system. 
 
Figure 2.3: The definition of IT security terminology 
 
 
2.4 UML 
 
To make a proper risk assessment, it is not sufficient to consider only technical system 
documentation; a clear understanding of system usage and its role in the surrounding 
organisation is just as important. Stakeholders participating in an availability analysis need a 
correct description of the target of evaluation at the right level of abstraction, and are defined 
by [6] as “people and organisations that may affect, be affected by, or perceive themselves to 
be affected by, a decision or activity”. 
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Another challenge is that the availability risk analysis is costly and time consuming and 
should not be initiated from scratch each time we analyse a new or modified system. Hence, 
we need means to support the documentation as well as reuse of risk assessment results. 
 
The risk assessment team consists of “those who perform all sub-processes and deliver the 
risk assessment report to the client” [5]. The members of a risk assessment team are required 
to communicate in order to capture and analyse the functionality and characteristics of the 
system in question. They need effective means that can help them to establish a common 
understanding of aspects relevant for the risk assessment.  
 
The UML [24] – Unified Modeling Language is today the leading specification language in 
software engineering. UML is graphical and helps to address above challenges in the 
following sense: 
• UML models allow documenting the various aspects of the target of evaluation in a 
uniform manner. For instance, UML graphical models can be used to explain 
important details of the target of evaluation to domain experts. 
• Documenting availability assessment with help of UML graphical models supports 
reuse of analysis documentation, both for systems that undergo maintenance and for 
new systems, if similar systems have been analyzed earlier. For example, the 
availability assessment team can reuse UML graphical models from previous 
availability assessment to describe aspects that are relevant for the current availability 
assessment. 
• UML diagrams abstract the essential details of the underlying problem and in this way 
support the communication and interaction among stakeholders with different 
background involved in a risk assessment. For instance, technical personnel can use 
UML graphical models to express their ideas in a way that can be understood by 
people without technical background.  
 
The Object Management Group (OMG) owns the UML trademark and manages its evolution. 
UML defines twelve types of diagrams: four are used to describe the static structure of a 
system, five describe dynamic aspects, and three are used to represent ways to organize and 
manage application modules. Today, UML tools are available from a number of vendors and 
software developers can combine different UML tools to tailor their development 
environments. For example, to facilitate modelling of a net bank system, a software 
development team can combine one vendor’s UML framework for modelling security aspects 
of a data system with another vendor’s UML framework for modelling of financial systems. 
For more information about UML, we refer to [25]. 
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3 Problem analysis 
 
This chapter is structured into two sections. Section 3.1 motivates and presents the success 
criteria for MODA. Section 3.2 presents research strategies and defines the ones we will use 
for the evaluation of the MODA success criteria.  
 
 
3.1 MODA success criteria 
 
In the following section we present a set of statements about what MODA should be and 
motivate why these aspects are important for the final product. When evaluating the final 
methodology, we will evaluate it against these criteria.  
 
As we mentioned in chapter 1, information security is one of the greatest challenges 
companies face today. Security measures must be incorporated to protect data systems and 
company infrastructures against a massive range of threats and vulnerabilities that affect 
availability of data systems. These security threats cannot be ignored during the availability 
risk assessment. Hence we need availability risk assessment methodology that addresses 
availability in a security context. 
 
Success criterion 1 
 
MODA should target availability in a security context 
 
Figure 3.1: Success criterion 1 for MODA 
 
Businesses today must be responsive and change very rapidly. Their supporting software 
systems must change equally rapidly. Time is money - everyone knows this by-word. Time 
too is very important for companies and their employees. The company project managers as 
well as other members of the risk assessment team are not interested in spending a lot of time 
on availability risk assessment. Hence we need availability risk assessment methodology that 
is time efficient. 
 
Success criterion 2 
 
MODA should be time efficient 
Figure 3.2: Success criterion 2 for MODA 
 
Many factors contribute to changes in data systems and systems availability. For example, it 
can be need for integration with another system, changes in user requirements or the 
availability of new technology on the market. This and the fact that threats and vulnerabilities 
are often situation dependent, force organisations and companies to regular assessment of 
risks that can affect the availability of a data system. But regular availability risk assessment 
may very soon “blow up” the financial budget of a software company. Hence we need 
availability risk assessment methodology that is cost effective. One way to achieve this is to 
extract experiences from using the methodology for reuse in later availability assessments.
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Success criterion 3 
 
MODA should be cost effective from a reusability 
perspective 
Figure 3.3: Success criterion 3 for MODA 
 
Project managers and risk analysts have many responsibilities and the effectiveness of their 
work depends very much on the tools that they have available. The availability risk 
assessment methodology that we are developing must support their work, be fit for its 
intended use, and be perceived as an added value. User friendliness is an often-used term that 
is important to any user of risk assessment methodology. Project managers and risk analysts 
should be able to use MODA without difficulties and be assisted by the set of guidelines, 
templates and checklists. 
 
Success criterion 4 
 
MODA should be user friendly assisting its users by 
providing guidelines, templates and checklists 
Figure 3.4: Success criterion 4 for MODA 
 
 
3.2 Validation of success criteria 
 
Validation of our success criteria will be concerned with showing that the requirements listed 
in the previous section are fulfilled. That MODA satisfies these success criteria may be 
viewed as our overall research hypothesis. There are many strategies for the validation of 
research hypothesis, each one suitable for different research settings. The most common of 
them are shown in Figure 3.5 and their definitions accordingly to Joseph E. McGrath [26] are 
given below. 
 
Research strategy
Computer
simulation
Field
studies
Field
experiments
Laboratory
experiments
Experimental
simulation
Sample
surveys
Judgment
studies
Formal
theory  
Figure 3.5: Research strategies 
 
 
Field studies - direct observations of “natural”, ongoing systems, while disturbing and 
intruding on those systems as little as possible. By field study we mean the practical use of 
availability risk assessment methodology. In our thesis we refer to this interpretation of field 
study as Case study. 
 
Field experiments are field studies with one major intervention and manipulation of some 
system’s features. An interesting experiment could be to see if a change in a format of tables 
CHAPTER 3. PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 15
used in MODA would make a difference for the risk analysts who use the availability risk 
assessment methodology. We will not conduct a field experiment due to time and resource 
limitations. 
 
Laboratory experiments are attempts to create the “essence” of some general class of systems 
in a context in which the researcher can control features of the situation. A possible laboratory 
experiment could be to test how changes in templates and the order of guidelines used in 
MODA will affect their understanding by the users of MODA. If there are possibilities for 
misunderstandings, using the guideline or template could lead to faulty results, and this may 
be determined. Because of the time and resource limitations we will not conduct a laboratory 
experiment in our thesis. 
 
Experimental simulations are laboratory studies in which an effort is made to create a system 
that is like some class of naturally occurring systems, but is artificial in that it is created by the 
researchers for study, and people perform in it for research purposes rather than for purposes 
stemming from their own live. An experimental simulation could be used to monitor how 
participants of the risk assessment employ MODA and understand the risk assessment 
methods like HazOp or FTA. Again, it will be difficult to make experimental simulations due 
to time and resource limitations. 
 
Sample surveys are efforts to get information from a broad sample of actors (system 
developers), usually in the form of verbal responses to a relatively small set of questions. In 
sample surveys we could ask a broad sample of risk assessment practitioners (20 – 100 
people) to assess the methodology accordingly to its requirements. Since this strategy requires 
a broad sample of actors, we need to postpone a sample survey about MODA until it 
hopefully gets a larger user-base. 
 
Judgment studies are efforts to get responses from very small and somewhat casually selected 
sample of “judges”. In judgment studies we could ask the rather small group of persons with 
knowledge about risk assessment to assess our methodology. This is not a trivial task because 
the available risk assessment practitioners can be busy and the reading of methodology can 
take time – this can collide with the time constrain of our thesis. 
 
Formal theory denotes set of general theories that are used to support researchers. 
Computer simulation refers to attempts to model a specific real life system or class of 
systems. These two topics will not be investigated further in our thesis.  
 
As explained above we will use Field study (Case study) to argue the fulfilment of the success 
criteria. We do not consider field experiments, laboratory experiments, experimental 
simulations, sample surveys, judgment studies, formal theory and computer simulations as 
appropriate given the scope and resources available for our work. 
 
Figure 3.6 summarises the MODA success criteria and the strategies used for their validation.  
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Success criterion 1: MODA should target availability in a security context 
Validation: This will be verified by use of Field Studies (Case Studies). The case studies will 
show to what extent MODA templates can be used for the identification and treatment of 
security risks. 
Success criterion 2: MODA should be time efficient 
Validation: This will be verified by use of Field Studies (Case Studies). The case studies will 
show whether MODA has templates, tables or guidelines required to facilitate quick 
availability assessment. 
 
Success criterion 3: MODA should be cost effective from a reusability perspective 
Validation: This will be verified by use of Field Studies (Case Studies). The case studies will 
show whether MODA has elements that can be reused. 
 
Success criterion 4: MODA should be user friendly assisting its users by providing 
guidelines, templates and checklists 
Validation: This will be verified by use of Field Studies (Case Studies). The case studies will 
show whether MODA has guidelines, templates and checklists that assist users in the 
availability risk assessment. 
 
Figure 3.6: MODA success criteria and the strategies for their validation 
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4 Availability decomposed 
 
The availability of information system depends on the correct functioning of every element in 
the computing infrastructure including the environment in which the system resides. In order 
to analyse successfully the system availability, we need to know all the key areas of risk to 
system availability. In this chapter we identify these key areas and define how they can affect 
system assets. 
 
This chapter is structured into seven sections. Section 4.1 defines four sub classes of 
availability, the so-called availability aspects, and explains concepts that are relevant for 
them. Section 4.2 describes hardware components and gives definitions that characterise the 
difference between internal, external and basic hardware components. Section 4.3 considers 
the first availability aspect, namely network availability. It starts by defining network 
components. Further it provides a decomposition of network availability and network 
components into more basic entities. The relationship of network availability to other 
availability aspects is considered in sub-section 4.3.1. Assets that can be affected by the 
reduction of network availability are considered in sub-section 4.3.2. Section 4.4 considers the 
second availability aspect, namely software availability. The relationship of software 
availability to other availability aspects is considered in sub-section 4.4.1. How reduction of 
software availability affects assets is considered in sub-section 4.4.2. Section 4.5 describes 
human availability – the third availability aspect. Sub-section 4.5.1 describes relationship of 
human availability to other availability aspects. Assets, which can be affected by the reduction 
of human availability, are described in sub-section 4.5.2. Section 4.6 considers the last 
availability aspect known as hardware availability. The relationship of hardware availability 
to other availability aspects is considered in sub-section 4.6.1. Sub-section 4.6.2 describes 
assets that can be affected by the reduction of hardware availability. Based on the information 
provided in sections 4.1 – 4.6, section 4.7 presents templates for availability analysis. 
 
 
4.1 Availability aspects 
 
An effective function of a data system depends very much on the effective function of data 
system components that in turn depend on the effective functioning of software, hardware and 
the network of links that connects these system components.  
If the network is congested, it cannot deliver packets to the destination host. If you have an 
unstable operating system (software), probably you can have difficulties in use of application 
programs that support your work. If the internal modem (internal hardware) in your computer 
does not function, you cannot receive or send email, or be available for a teleconference with 
your colleagues. If your printer or scanner (external hardware) does not function, you cannot 
print or scan documents. The human factor is also very important to the availability of data 
systems. People configure networks, install new computers, update software and hardware. If 
network or system administrator makes a mistake during router or server configuration, this 
fail can cause a collapse of the whole network.  
In order to have a possibility to do the risk assessment on the very detailed level and at the 
same time make it easy and effective, we consider availability as a super class that is 
decomposed in the following four sub classes (availability aspects): 
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• Network availability 
• Software availability 
• Human availability 
• Hardware availability 
 
We define these four sub classes of system availability as follows: 
 
Network availability is the property of network to be accessible and usable upon demand by 
an authorized entity. 
Software availability is the property of software to be accessible and usable upon demand by 
an authorized entity. 
Human availability is the property of human to be accessible and usable upon demand by an 
authorized entity. 
Hardware availability is the property of hardware to be accessible and usable upon demand 
by an authorized entity. 
 
These categories are different in a sense that they can affect different assets and each of them 
may need the use of different assessment methods. To successfully assess the availability of 
information systems, we have to clarify the following issues: 
 
• Dependencies between availabilities. To what extend do one kind of availability 
depend on other kinds of availability? 
• What assets can be affected by the reduction of each availability? 
 
 
Figure 4.1 specifies the decomposition of availability into availability aspects. 
 
 
Availability
aspect
Required
functionality
Asset
category
System
availability
Authorized
entity
* 11
4
1
1
1
 
Figure 4.1: Decomposition of system availability 
                             
 
The concepts of Figure 4.1 can be given the following definitions: 
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• System availability is the property of system to be accessible and usable upon 
demand by an authorized entity. 
• Availability aspect is a sub-class of system availability (we define four availability 
aspects: network, software, hardware, and human availability). 
• Authorized entity is a system component and/or user that is authorised to access/use 
the service provided by the system. 
• Asset category is a categorisation of similar assets. We categorise assets in the 
following categories: software assets, physical assets, information assets, human 
assets, organisational assets, law and regulation assets [5]. 
• Required functionality is what the system (component) is intended for, and is 
described by the system (component) specification. 
 
We can see from Figure 4.1 that system availability is decomposed into 4 availability aspects. 
Each availability aspect is related to one corresponding asset category (e.g. Human 
availability has one corresponding asset category – Human assets). Each system (component) 
has required functionality and can be accessed/used by more than one authorised entity.  
 
 
4.2 System hardware components 
 
Computer systems can have many different hardware components and very often people use 
different words to describe the same hardware elements. For example, Irv Englander [27] 
in his book “The Architecture of Computer Hardware and Systems Software” describes 
display and printer as “hardware components” while Webopedia [28] - Internet online 
encyclopaedia dedicated to computer technology, describes printer and monitor as “external 
peripheral devices ” that are in contrast to “internal devices” such as a CD-ROM drive or an 
internal Zip drive. However, the same Webopedia uses printers, screens and disc drives as 
examples of hardware and defines hardware as: ”objects that you can actually touch, like 
disks, disk drives, display screens, keyboards, printers, boards, and chips”. All these different 
definitions of the same hardware components can be quite confusing. That’s why it is 
important to know what kind of hardware components we can have in the assessed system.  
 
As we will see in the next section, system components communicate and coordinate their 
actions through the network. Networks of computers are constructed from links and two types 
of nodes: host nodes (connect users/servers to the network) and network nodes (forward 
messages from one link to another). Both host and network nodes may contain hardware 
components that are housed within them or attached to them externally. The following 
definitions characterise this difference more clearly: 
 
• External hardware - any machine or component that is directly connected to the 
host/network node (e.g. keyboard, mouse, printer, scanner, web camera, monitor, 
external modem, external CD burner, external network interface card). 
• Internal hardware - physical object that is housed within the main container of the 
host/network node (e.g. memory, processor, graphic card, sound card, network 
interface card, hard disc, CD-ROM drive, internal Zip- drive). 
• Basic hardware component - physical object that is housed within the main container 
of the external/internal hardware (e.g. external hardware – monitor, contains basic 
hardware components such as chip, circuit, power supply). 
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The components related to the system hardware are shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
Hardware
Component (HC)
Authorized
entity
Software
component
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1
Required
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1
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1
*
Internal
HC
External
HC  
Figure 4.2: System hardware components 
 
 
Figure 4.2 shows that a hardware component can be either internal or external and may 
contain more than one basic hardware component. Both internal and external hardware 
components may require more than one software component that converts general commands 
from an application into specific commands that the hardware component understands.  
 
 
4.3 Network availability 
 
The network availability is the main concern when we analyse telecommunication systems. It 
is concerned with the exchange of information between components and between components 
and the system’s environment. That’s why it is important to figure out what building blocks 
constitute the network. Computer networks must provide robust and effective connectivity 
among a large number of computers, and are constructed from two classes of hardware 
building blocks: nodes and links.  
 
We divide nodes in two categories: the host nodes that connect users or servers to the network 
and the network nodes that are responsible for forwarding of messages from one link to 
another. The host nodes can be dedicated servers (e.g. database server), general-purpose 
computers like desktop workstations or PDA’s that users use to run application programs on. 
The network nodes can be implemented on general-purpose devices (general-purpose 
computers) or by special-purpose devices (e.g. switch, router). 
Network links are the links that connect network nodes to each other. They can be 
implemented on different physical media like coaxial cable, optical fiber or space (the radio 
waves propagate through space). 
 
When we analyse availability of information systems, we have to keep in mind the fact, that 
networks may not remain fixed and may evolve to accommodate changes to both the 
underlying technologies as well as changes in application programs demands. Some nodes of 
the network can be connected by radio links while others can be connected by a cable. 
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To analyse network availability, we analyse the availability of components that contribute to 
the network connectivity: network nodes and links. Nodes and links can in turn be analysed 
by analysing components and factors that contribute to their functionality: software, hardware 
and people. Decomposition of the network availability is shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
Network availability
Network node
availability
General purpose
device
availability
Special purpose
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availability
Link availability
Wired link
availability
Wireless link
availability
 
Figure 4.3: Decomposition of the network availability 
 
 
Figure 4.4 shows that a network can consist of two or more nodes connected by one or more 
links. Each node in the network is either host node or network node and each link is either 
wired link or wireless link. 
 
 
NetworkNode
Network
node
Wired
link
Wireless
link
Link
  2..* 1..*
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Host
node  
Figure 4.4: Network components 
 
 
4.3.1 Relationship to other availability aspects 
 
As we said, network availability depends on the availability of the network building blocks: 
nodes and links that in turn have components and factors that contribute to their fail free 
function: software, hardware and people. First we will describe the components supporting 
functionality of host and network nodes, and then we will define the relationship of network 
availability to other availability aspects. 
 
Figure 4.5 shows decomposition of a host node and its relation to other elements in the 
system. Each host node can be accessed/used by more than one authorized entity, while one 
authorized entity can access/use more than one host node. The required functionality of host 
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node can be supported by more than one internal or external hardware component as well as 
by more than one software component that is either system software component (e.g. 
operating system) or application software (e.g. Microsoft Word). 
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Figure 4.5: Decomposition of host node 
                                
 
Figure 4.6 shows decomposition of a network node and its relation to other elements in the 
system. As we said, each network node can be implemented on a general-purpose device or 
on a special-purpose device. If a network node is implemented on a general-purpose device, 
its required functionality can be supported by the same set of hardware and software 
components that can support the functionality of a host node. If a network node is 
implemented on a special-purpose device, its required functionality can be supported by 
several internal hardware components (e.g. network adaptor) and software components (e.g. 
software that supports update of routing table). 
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Figure 4.6: Decomposition of network node 
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As we can see from Figures 4.5 and 4.6, both host and network nodes depend on effective 
functioning of hardware and software components as well as proper behavior of authorized 
entities that can be either authorized users or other system components. Along with hardware 
and software components, authorized users may directly affect network availability – people 
can update, configure, install or maintain network links as well as network nodes hardware 
and software components. Figure 4.7 shows decomposition of dependability of network 
availability.  
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Figure 4.7: Decomposition of dependability of network availability 
 
 
Network availability depends on: 
 
Software availability:  
      Network node operating system availability 
- if the functionality of a network node is supported by an operating system. 
Network node application software availability 
- if the functionality of a network node is supported by application software. 
Network node internal hardware software availability 
- if the functionality of a network node internal hardware depends on software. 
Network node external hardware availability 
- if the functionality of a network node external hardware depends on software. 
 
Hardware availability: 
Network node internal hardware availability 
- if the functionality of a network node is supported by a internal hardware. 
Network node external hardware availability 
- if the functionality of a network node is supported by a external hardware. 
 
Human availability: 
- if authorized personnel update, configure or install an operating system supporting the 
functionality of a network node. 
- if authorized personnel update, configure or install application software supporting the 
functionality of a network node. 
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- if authorized personnel update, configure or install software supporting the 
functionality of a network node internal hardware. 
- if authorized personnel update, configure or install software supporting the 
functionality of a network node external hardware. 
- if authorized personnel install or maintain network links. 
 
 
4.3.2 How reduction of network availability affects assets 
 
Reduction of network availability may affect assets in the following sense:  
 
• Human assets 
- human asset A: if A delivers a service through the network to the service’s consumers 
(e.g. in the telemedicine service, because of a network problem a specialist  is unable 
to give a consultation to a doctor or patient). 
- human asset A: if A receives a service through the network from the service provider 
(e.g. a stock broker cannot make a deal without network access to online stock 
information). 
• Information assets 
- information asset A: if A is transmitted or accessed through the network (e.g. network 
problems can cause the loss of A or difficulty in delivery or update of A). 
• Software assets 
- software asset A: if A is transmitted or accessed through the network (e.g. network 
problems can cause the loss of A or difficulty in delivery or update of A). 
• Physical assets 
- physical asset A: if A is responsible for execution of service that is accessible by other 
system components through the network (e.g. surveillance video camera or printer that 
are accessible through the network). 
• Organisational assets 
- organisational asset A: if A can be directly affected by the change of network 
availability. 
• Low and regulation assets 
- low and regulation asset A: if A is accessed through the network.  
 
 
4.4 Software availability 
 
The effective functioning of software installed in system components is one of the main 
conditions for effective work of the system. Both internal and external hardware can be 
supplied with its own coordinated software to help make the computer more accessible and 
productive to the user. Application software supports our work in different ways. For 
example, you can use application software to write and translate documents, listen music or 
browse web pages. The operating system has other purposes: it controls and operates 
hardware and provides the user and application programs a variety of facilities and services. 
Software availability can be decomposed into the availability of host node software and 
network node software. Both host node and network node software availability can be further 
decomposed into operating system availability, application software availability, internal 
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hardware software availability, and external hardware software availability. Decomposition of 
the software availability is shown in Figure 4.8. 
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Figure 4.8: Decomposition of the software availability 
 
 
4.4.1 Relationship to other availability aspects 
 
The system administrator has to update software in time and install new software components 
correctly. The operating system installed on a hard disc cannot function if the hard disc does 
not function. The software that supports the functionality of internal and external hardware 
components depends on proper behaviour of the operating system and hard disc. In this 
section we describe the relationship of software availability to other availability aspects. The 
section is divided into two sub-sections. In sub-section 4.4.1.1 we consider software of host 
node and software of network node implemented on a general-purpose device. In sub-section 
4.4.1.2 we consider software of network node implemented on a special purpose device.  
 
4.4.1.1 Relationship of host/network node software availability 
 
The availability of host/network node software can be decomposed into the availability of 
node application software, availability of node operating system and availability of software 
that supports functionality of host/network node internal and external hardware. 
Figure 4.9 shows decomposition of host/network node software availability and dependability 
of software components on other availability aspects. 
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Figure 4.9: Decomposition of dependability of host/network node software availability 
 
 
      Host/Network node operating system depends on: 
• Node internal hardware availability (e.g. hard disc, disc drive, power supply). 
• Availability of authorized users of node OS (e.g. correct installation, update, use). 
• Availability of node OS authorization functionality. 
   
      Host/Network node application software depends on: 
• Node operating system availability. 
• Node internal hardware availability. 
• Availability of authorized users of node application software. 
• Availability of node application software authorization functionality. 
 
      Host/Network node internal/external hardware software depends on: 
• Node operating system availability. 
• Node internal hardware availability. 
• Availability of authorized users of node internal/external hardware. 
• Availability of node internal/external hardware software authorization functionality. 
 
 
4.4.1.2 Relationship of network node software availability 
 
Recall that if a network node is implemented on a special-purpose device, its required 
functionality can be supported by several internal hardware components and software 
components. These software and hardware components in turn can be installed, configured or 
updated by authorized personnel. Figure 4.10 shows dependability of network node software 
on other availability aspects. 
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Figure 4.10: Dependability of network node (special purpose device) software 
 
 
The information depicted in Figure 4.10 can be interpreted in the following sense: 
 
If the functionality of special purpose device depends on software (e.g. device can be 
programmable), availability of device software depends on: 
• Availability of device authorized users (correct use, installation, update or 
configuration of device software). 
• Availability of device software authorization functionality (device software needs a 
protection against unauthorized access). 
• Availability of device internal hardware (device software may access device memory). 
 
 
4.4.2 How reduction of software availability affects assets 
 
This section is divided into two sub-sections. In sub-section 4.4.2.1 we consider software of 
host node and software of network node implemented on a general-purpose device. In sub-
section 4.4.2.2 we consider software of network node implemented on a special purpose 
device. 
 
 
4.4.2.1 Reduction of host/network node software availability 
 
Reduction of host/network node software availability can be analysed by analysing reduction 
of node operating system availability, reduction of node application software availability and 
reduction of node internal/external hardware software availability. 
 
Reduction of host/network node operating system availability 
 
Reduction of host/network node operating system availability may affect assets in the 
following sense: 
 
• Human assets 
- human asset A: if host/network node operating system runs application programs that 
support A in the execution of A’s tasks. 
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- human asset A: if A can be directly affected by the change of functionality of 
application software running under host/network node OS (e.g. application program 
that monitors patient’s health during operation). 
- human asset A: if the reputation of A or relationship of A with other people can be 
affected by the change of functionality of application software running under 
host/network node OS. 
• Information assets 
- information asset A: if host/network node operating system runs application programs 
that store, process or transmit A in the system. 
• Software assets 
- software asset A: if host/network node operating system runs application programs 
that store, process or transmit A in the system. 
• Physical assets 
- physical asset A: if host/network node operating system runs application programs 
that control the function of A.  
• Organisational assets 
- organisational asset A: if A can be directly affected by the change of functionality of 
host/network node operating system. 
• Low and regulation assets 
- low and regulation asset A: if host/network node operating system runs application 
programs that control the access to A. 
 
Reduction of host/network node application software availability 
 
Reduction of host/network node application software availability may affect assets in the 
following sense: 
 
• Human assets 
- human asset A: if host/network node application software supports A in the execution 
of A’s tasks. 
- human asset A: if A can be directly affected by the change of functionality of 
host/network node application software. 
- human asset A: if the reputation of A or relationship of A with other people can be 
affected by the change of functionality of host/network node application software. 
• Information assets 
- information asset A: if host/network node application software is used for storing, 
processing or transmission of A in the system. 
• Software assets 
- software asset A: if host/network node application software is used for storing, 
processing or transmission of A in the system. 
• Physical assets 
- physical asset A: if host/network node application software is used to control the 
function of A.  
• Organisational assets 
- organisational asset A: if A can be directly affected by the change of functionality of 
host/network node application software. 
• Low and regulation assets 
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- low and regulation asset A: if host/network node application software controls the 
access to A. 
 
Reduction of host/network node internal/external hardware software availability 
 
If the functionality of host/network node internal/external hardware depends on software, the 
reduction of host/network node internal/external hardware software availability may affect 
assets in the following sense: 
 
• Human assets 
- human asset A: if host/network node internal/external hardware supports A in the 
execution of A’s tasks. 
- human asset A: if A can be directly affected by the change of functionality of 
host/network node internal/external hardware. 
- human asset A: if the reputation of A or relationship of A with other people can be 
affected by the change of functionality of host/network node internal/external 
hardware. 
• Information assets 
- information asset A: if host/network node internal/external hardware is used for 
storing, processing or transmission of A in the system. 
• Software assets 
- software asset A: if host/network node internal/external hardware is used for storing, 
processing or transmission of A in the system. 
• Physical assets 
- physical asset A: if A is unusable without host/network node internal/external 
hardware software that supports functionality of A (e.g. physical asset - CD-burner is 
unusable without software that supports its functionality). 
• Organisational assets 
- organisational asset A: if A can be directly affected by the change of functionality of 
host/network node internal/external hardware. 
• Low and regulation assets 
- low and regulation asset A: if host/network node internal/external hardware controls 
the access to A. 
 
 
4.4.2.2 Reduction of network node software availability 
 
Reduction of Network node software availability may affect assets in the following sense: 
 
• Human assets 
- human asset A: if Network node software supports A in the execution of A’s tasks. 
- human asset A: if A can be directly affected by the change of functionality of Network 
node software. 
- human asset A: if the reputation of A or relationship of A with other people can be 
affected by the change of functionality of Network node software. 
• Information assets 
- information asset A: if Network node software stores, processes or transmits A in the 
system. 
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• Software assets 
- software asset A: if Network node software stores, processes or transmits A in the 
system. 
• Physical assets 
- physical asset A: if A is unusable without Network node software that supports the  
functionality of A (e.g. there are some routers – physical assets, that are unusable 
without software that supports their functionality). 
• Organisational assets 
- organisational asset A: if A can be directly affected by the change of functionality of 
Network node software. 
• Low and regulation assets 
- low and regulation asset A: if Network node software controls the access to A. 
 
 
4.5 Human availability 
 
Employees and users interact with the system and it is very important to know how this 
interaction is executed and what consequences for people and the system change in this 
interaction may have. Human errors, negligence and greed may be responsible for many 
thefts, frauds or misuse of facilities. For example at nuclear power plant, one mistake in the 
work routines may lead to the health damage of personnel, while a mistake in the work 
routines in a hospital can lead to the damage of patient’s health. 
 
We categorize human services in three categories:  
• people who use a data system to perform services (e.g. booking personnel, medical 
personnel). We refer to this category of human services as human service providers. 
• people who update, configure or install system or system infrastructure (e.g. system 
developers, system/network administrators). We refer to this category of human 
services as system personnel. 
• people who give technical or information support for system or system infrastructure 
(e.g. software troubleshooting service or reparation of scanners, printers). We refer to 
this category of human services as system technicians.  
 
Figure 4.11 shows the decomposition of human availability. 
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Figure 4.11: Decomposition of human availability 
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4.5.1 Relationship to other availability aspects  
 
Human service providers may deliver a service through the network to the service consumers 
(e.g. medical personnel may give online consultation service). System personnel may update 
or configure software components through the network or use software and hardware 
components to accomplish their tasks. System technicians may depend on the proper 
functionality of software and hardware components that support them in service execution. In 
this section we describe the relationship of each category of human services to other 
availability aspects. The section is divided into three sub-sections. In sub-section 4.5.1.1 we 
consider human service providers. Sub-section 4.5.1.2 describes system personnel. In sub-
section 4.5.1.3 we consider system technicians. 
 
 
4.5.1.1 Relationship of human service providers availability 
 
Availability of human service providers depends on: 
 
Network availability:  
- if human service providers deliver service through the network to the service 
consumers. 
- if the human service providers provision of service depends on the network 
availability. 
- if the functionality of software components used by human service providers to 
perform service, depends on the network availability (e.g. You can not use Outlook to 
send email if your computer is connected to the network that can not deliver packets to 
the destination host). 
- if the functionality of hardware components used by human service providers to 
perform service, depends on the network availability. 
 
Software availability:  
      Host/Network node operating system availability 
- if host/network node operating system runs application programs that support human 
service providers in the execution of service. 
Host/Network node application software availability 
- if host/network node application software supports human service providers in the 
execution of service. 
Host/Network node internal hardware software availability 
- if host/network node internal hardware supports human service providers in the 
execution of service. 
Host/Network node external hardware software availability 
- if host/network node external hardware supports human service providers in the 
execution of service. 
 
Hardware availability: 
      Host/Network node internal hardware availability 
- if host/network node internal hardware supports human service providers in the 
execution of service. 
Host/Network node external hardware availability 
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- if host/network node external hardware supports human service providers in the 
execution of service. 
 
 
4.5.1.2 Relationship of system personnel availability 
 
Availability of system personnel depends on: 
 
Network availability:  
- if system personnel deliver service through the network to the service consumers. 
- if the system personnel provision of service depends on the network availability. 
- if the functionality of software components used by system personnel to perform 
service, depends on the network availability. 
- if the functionality of hardware components used by system personnel to perform 
service, depends on the network availability. 
 
Software availability:  
Host/Network node operating system availability 
- if host/network node operating system runs application programs that support system 
personnel in the execution of service. 
Host/Network node application software availability 
- if host/network node application software supports system personnel in the execution 
of service. 
Host/Network node internal hardware software availability 
- if host/network node internal hardware supports system personnel in the execution of 
service. 
Host/Network node external hardware software availability 
- if host/network node external hardware supports system personnel in the execution of 
service. 
 
Hardware availability: 
Host/Network node internal hardware availability 
- if host/network node internal hardware supports system personnel in the execution of 
service. 
Host/Network node external hardware availability 
- if host/network node external hardware supports system personnel in the execution of 
service. 
 
 
4.5.1.3 Relationship of system technicians availability 
 
Availability of system technicians depends on: 
 
Network availability:  
- if system technicians deliver service through the network to the service consumers. 
- if the system technicians provision of service depends on the network availability. 
- if the functionality of software components used by system technicians to perform 
service, depends on the network availability. 
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- if the functionality of hardware components used by system technicians to perform 
service, depends on the network availability. 
 
Software availability:  
Host/Network node operating system availability 
- if host/network node operating system runs application programs that support system 
technicians in the execution of service. 
Host/Network node application software availability 
- if host/network node application software supports system technicians in the execution 
of service. 
Host/Network node internal hardware software availability 
- if host/network node internal hardware supports system technicians in the execution of 
service. 
Host/Network node external hardware software availability 
- if host/network node external hardware supports system technicians in the execution 
of service. 
 
Hardware availability: 
Host/Network node internal hardware availability 
- if host/network node internal hardware supports system technicians in the execution of 
service. 
Host/Network node external hardware availability 
- if host/network node external hardware supports system technicians in the execution 
of service. 
 
Figure 4.12 summarizes the dependability of human availability on other availability aspects. 
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Figure 4.12: Decomposition of dependability of human availability 
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4.5.2 How reduction of human availability affects assets 
 
This section is divided into three sub-sections. In sub-section 4.5.2.1 we consider human 
service providers. Sub-section 4.5.2.2 describes system personnel. In sub-section 4.5.2.3 we 
consider system technicians. 
 
 
4.5.2.1 Reduction of human service providers availability 
 
Reduction of human service providers availability may affect assets in the following sense: 
• Human assets 
- human asset A: if A uses the service provided by human service providers. 
- human asset A: if actions taken by human service providers affect A’s health or ability 
of A to perform its duties.  
• Information assets 
- information asset A: if actions taken by human service providers affect storing, 
processing or transmission of A in the system. 
• Software assets 
- software asset A: if actions taken by human service providers affect storing, 
processing, transmission or function of A in the system. 
• Physical assets 
- physical asset A: if human service providers control the function of A. (e.g. fail in 
work routines in an air traffic control can lead to the loss of plane – physical asset and 
people’s lives – human assets).  
- physical asset A: if actions taken by human service providers affect the functionality 
of A. 
• Organisational assets 
- organisational asset A: if A can be directly affected by the change of availability of 
service provided by human service providers. 
• Low and regulation assets 
- low and regulation asset A: if human service providers provide the access to A.  
 
 
4.5.2.2 Reduction of system personnel availability 
 
Reduction of system personnel availability may affect assets in the following sense: 
 
• Human assets 
- human asset A: if A uses the service provided by system personnel.  
- human asset A: if actions taken by system personnel affect A’s health or ability of A 
to perform its duties.   
• Information assets 
- information asset A: if actions taken by system personnel affect storing, processing or 
transmission of A in the system. 
• Software assets 
- software asset A: if actions taken by system personnel affect storing, processing, 
transmission or function of A in the system. 
• Physical assets 
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- physical asset A: if system personnel control the function of A. 
- physical asset A: if actions taken by system personnel affect A’s functionality.  
• Organisational assets 
- organisational asset A: if A can be directly affected by the change of availability of 
service provided by system personnel. 
• Low and regulation assets 
- low and regulation asset A: if system personnel provide the access to A. 
 
 
4.5.2.3 Reduction of system technicians availability 
 
Reduction of system technicians availability may affect assets in the following sense: 
 
• Human assets 
- human asset A: if A uses the service provided by system technicians. 
- human asset A: if actions taken by system technicians affect A’s health or ability of A 
to perform he/her duties.  
• Information assets 
- information asset A: if actions taken by system technicians affect storing, processing 
or transmission of A in the system. 
• Software assets 
- software asset A: if actions taken by system technicians affect storing, processing, 
transmission or function of A in the system. 
• Physical assets 
- physical asset A: if system technicians control the function of A. 
- physical asset A: if actions taken by system technicians affect A’s functionality.  
• Organisational assets 
- organisational asset A: if A can be directly affected by the change of availability of 
service provided by system technicians. 
• Low and regulation assets 
- low and regulation asset A: if system technicians provide the access to A. 
 
 
4.6 Hardware availability 
 
The effective functioning of hardware components installed in the data system is also one of 
the conditions for effective work of the system. Hardware components constitute the most 
visible part of the computer system and provide “the physical mechanisms to input and output 
data, for manipulating data, and for electronically controlling the various input, output, and 
storage components” [27]. As we defined, both host and network nodes may contain 
components that are housed within them or attached to them externally. Hardware availability 
can be decomposed into the availability of host node hardware and network node hardware. 
Both host node and network node hardware availability can be further decomposed into host 
node internal and external hardware availability and network node internal and external 
hardware availability. Decomposition of hardware availability is shown in Figure 4.13. 
   
 
CHAPTER 4. AVAILABILITY DECOMPOSED 
 
 
 
 
 36 
Hardware availability
Host node
Internal hardware
availability
Host node
External hardware
availability
Host node
Hardware availability
Network node
Internal hardware
availability
Network node
External hardware
availability
Network node
Hardware availability
 
Figure 4.13: Decomposition of hardware availability 
 
4.6.1 Relationship to other availability aspects 
 
The availability of system hardware can be considered from the two perspectives: availability 
of internal hardware and availability of external hardware. Both internal and external 
hardware components have components and factors that contribute to their effective 
functioning. The functionality of hardware components may depend on the software that 
converts commands from applications and makes them understandable for the hardware. Host 
external/internal hardware also depends on the functionality of basic hardware components 
that is housed within the main container of external/internal hardware. Availability of some 
hardware components may also depend on the availability of other hardware components (e.g. 
availability of monitor depends on the availability of graphic card). People can be responsible 
for use, update and maintenance of internal and external hardware components. In this section 
we describe the relationship of hardware availability to other availability aspects. The section 
is divided into two sub-sections. In sub-section 4.6.1.1 we consider host/network node 
internal hardware. In sub-section 4.6.1.2 we consider host/network node external hardware 
and summarize the dependability of host/network node external/internal hardware on other 
availability aspects. 
 
 
4.6.1.1 Relationship of host/network node internal hardware availability  
 
Host/Network node internal hardware depends on: 
- Host/Network node internal hardware software availability, if functionality of 
host/network node internal hardware depends on software (e.g. functionality of power 
supply does not depend on software, but scanner and printer require software that 
supports their functionality). 
- Availability of authorized users of host/network node internal hardware. 
- Availability of basic hardware components of host/network node internal hardware. 
- Availability of other host/network node hardware components, if these components 
support functionality of host/network node internal hardware. 
 
 
4.6.1.2 Relationship of host/network node external hardware availability  
 
Host/Network node external hardware depends on: 
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- Host/Network node external hardware software availability, if functionality of 
host/network node external hardware depends on software.  
- Availability of authorized users of host/network node external hardware. 
- Availability of basic hardware components of host/network node external hardware. 
- Availability of other host/network node hardware components, if these components 
support functionality of host/network node external hardware. 
 
Both external and internal hardware also depend on the availability of hardware authorization 
functionality – how well the hardware is secured against possible threats to be stolen or 
accessed by a not authorized person. Figure 4.14 below summarizes the dependability of 
host/network node external/internal hardware on other availability aspects. 
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Figure 4.14: Decomposition of hardware dependability 
 
 
4.6.2 How reduction of hardware availability affects assets 
 
This section is divided into two sub-sections. In sub-section 4.6.2.1 we consider host/network 
node internal hardware. In sub-section 4.6.2.2 we consider host/network node external 
hardware. 
 
 
4.6.2.1 Reduction of host/network node internal hardware availability 
 
Reduction of host/network node internal hardware availability may affect assets in the 
following sense:  
 
• Human assets 
- human asset A: if internal hardware supports A in the execution of A’s tasks (e.g. 
internal modem connects user to the Internet). 
• Information assets 
- information asset A: if internal hardware is used for storing, processing or 
transmission of A in the system (e.g. important information is often stored in files on a 
hard disc). 
• Software assets 
- software asset A: if internal hardware is used for storing, processing or transmission of 
A in the system. 
• Physical assets 
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- physical asset A: if internal hardware supports the function of A (e.g. the internal 
modem can get functionality problems if the cable connecting it to other internal 
hardware components is broken). 
• Organisational assets 
- organisational asset A: if A can be directly affected by the change of functionality of 
host/network node internal hardware. 
• Low and regulation assets 
- low and regulation asset A: if host/network node internal hardware controls the access 
to A. 
 
 
4.6.2.2 Reduction of host/network node external hardware availability 
 
Reduction of host/network node external hardware availability may affect assets in the 
following sense:  
 
• Human assets 
- human asset A: if external hardware supports A in the execution of A’s tasks (e.g. 
external modem connects user to the Internet). 
• Information assets 
- information asset A: if external hardware is used for storing, processing or 
transmission of A in the system (e.g. important information can be stored on an 
external hard disc). 
• Software assets 
- software asset A: if external hardware is used for storing, processing or transmission 
of A in the system. 
• Physical assets 
- physical asset A: if external hardware supports the function of A (e.g. some scanners 
and printers need power supply cable). 
• Organisational assets 
- organisational asset A: if A can be directly affected by the change of functionality of 
host/network node external hardware. 
• Low and regulation assets 
- low and regulation asset A: if host/network node external hardware controls the 
access to A. 
 
 
4.7 Templates for the availability risk analysis 
 
As we said, the resources and time available for a risk analysis are limited. The identification 
of availability risks is not a trivial process and can take quite long time. Based on the 
information provided in the previous sections, we define templates that can support the 
identification of availability risks. Our templates are so-called fault trees which are based on 
the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) that is “a system engineering method for representing the 
logical combinations of various system states and possible causes which can contribute to 
specified event (called top event)” [6]. The presented templates can be used to support the 
construction of fault trees showing unwanted incidents that can cause the availability risks. 
After the construction of a fault tree, one can calculate the probability of occurrence of the top 
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event from the probability of occurrence of the basic events. We will talk about this topic in 
the next chapter. 
 
FTA uses Boolean logic to describe the combinations of individual faults that can constitute a 
hazardous event. Each level in the tree “lists the more basic events that are necessary and 
sufficient to cause the problem shown in the level above it” [12]. In fault trees presented in 
this section, we use “OR”, “XOR”, and “AND” ports to connect events on the lower level to 
the event on the higher level. We use the “OR” port to denote that any of events on the lower 
level is sufficient to cause the undesired top event (event on the higher level in fault tree). The 
“XOR” port denotes that only one event on the lower level can occur before the undesired 
event on the higher level can happen. The “AND” port denotes that all events on the lower 
level have to occur before the top event can occur. 
This section is structured into five sub-sections. Sub-section 4.7.1 presents the template for 
the assessment of host node availability. The template for the assessment of host application 
software availability is presented in sub-section 4.7.2. Sub-section 4.7.3 describes the 
template for the assessment of host operating system availability. The template for the 
assessment of host hardware availability is presented in sub-section 4.7.4. Sub-section 4.7.5 
describes the template for the assessment of host security service availability. 
 
 
4.7.1 Template for the assessment of host node availability 
 
As we can see from Figure 4.5, the host node has four components that can affect its 
availability: system software (operating system), application software, internal hardware, and 
external hardware. Figure 4.7, presents the decomposition of dependability of host node 
software components. Figure 4.7 shows that the functionality of all host software components 
depends on the availability of host internal hardware – host storage device (hard disc). We 
also see from Figure 4.7 that host application software and host internal/external hardware 
software depend on the availability of host operating system. This means that during the 
availability analysis of host node, we always have to consider the availability of host 
operating system and the availability of host storage device (hard disc). The host storage 
device can be internal or external, and its risks are considered under unwanted incident Denial 
of host hardware availability. The denial of host operating system is considered under 
unwanted incident Denial of host software availability. The assessment of host application 
software and host internal/external hardware is performed for those application and hardware 
components that are relevant for the particular availability assessment. Every computer needs 
the power, and this means that the availability of host node also depends on the availability of 
power supply service. We also have to consider how well the access to the host node is 
secured. Under unwanted incident Denial of host authorization availability we consider the 
probability that the denial of host availability can be caused by the reduction of host 
authorisation availability (e.g. the probability that computer can be stolen or accessed by an 
unauthorized person). Under unwanted incident Denial of host security service availability we 
consider the probability that the denial of host availability can be caused by the reduction of 
host security service availability (e.g. an attack from the Internet (Network) or by computer 
virus; see Figure 4.19). Figure 4.15 shows the template for the assessment of host node 
availability. The additional availability risks that can be important for the host node 
availability can be added to the relevant level of this fault tree.  
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Figure 4.15: Template for the assessment of host node availability 
 
 
4.7.2 Template for the assessment of host application software availability 
 
The template for the assessment of host application software availability is shown in Figure 
4.16 below. Denial of host application software availability may be caused by unwanted 
incidents Denial of software functionality, Incorrect installation and use by user, and Denial 
of software authorization functionality. Under Denial of software functionality we consider 
the probability that software will not function or will malfunction. Under Incorrect 
installation and use by user we consider the probability that the denial of host application 
software may be caused by user actions. Under Denial of software authorization functionality 
we consider the probability that an unauthorized access to the host application software may 
cause its denial of functionality. 
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Figure 4.16: Template for the assessment of host application software availability 
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4.7.3 Template for the assessment of host operating system availability 
 
The template for the assessment of host operating system availability is shown in Figure 4.17 
below. Denial of host operating system availability may be caused by unwanted incidents 
Denial of operating system functionality, Incorrect installation and use by user, and Denial of 
operating system authorization functionality. Under Denial of operating system functionality 
we consider the probability that operating system will not function or will malfunction. Under 
Incorrect installation and use of OS by user we consider the probability that the denial of host 
operating system may be caused by user actions. Under Denial of operating system 
authorization functionality we consider the probability that an unauthorized access to the host 
operating system may cause its denial of functionality. 
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2  
Figure 4.17: Template for the assessment of host operating system availability 
                                           
 
4.7.4 Template for the assessment of host hardware availability 
 
The template for the assessment of host hardware availability is shown in Figure 4.18. This 
template can be used for the assessment of both internal and external host hardware 
components. Denial of host hardware availability may be caused by unwanted incidents 
Denial of functionality of hardware software, Denial of functionality of basic hardware 
components, Denial of functionality of other host hardware components, Incorrect 
installation and use by user, and Denial of authorization functionality of host hardware. 
Under Denial of functionality of hardware software we consider the probability that software 
which supports hardware functionality, will not function or will malfunction. Under Denial of 
functionality of basic hardware components we consider the probability that basic hardware 
components will not function or will malfunction. Under Denial of functionality of other host 
hardware components we consider the probability that other host hardware components that 
support the hardware functionality, will not function or will malfunction. Under Incorrect 
installation and use by user we consider the probability that the denial of host hardware may 
be caused by user actions. Under Denial of authorization functionality of host hardware we 
consider the probability that an unauthorized access to the host hardware may happen and 
cause its denial of functionality (e.g. the probability that the host hardware can be stolen or 
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accessed by an unauthorized person). The events with numbers 1 and 3 in the template are 
optional because there can be hardware components which do not depend on the functionality 
of software or other hardware components. For example, an external hardware – monitor 
depends on the functionality of software that supports its functionality and the functionality of 
graphic card, while an internal hardware – power supply does not depend on the functionality 
of software and other hardware components.   
 
 
Denial of Host
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2 3
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5  
Figure 4.18: Template for the assessment of host hardware availability 
 
 
4.7.5 Template for the assessment of host security service availability 
 
The template for the assessment of host security service availability is shown in Figure 4.19. 
In this template we consider those software and special equipment components that contribute 
to the better protection of host node from security threats. We call this protection as host 
security service availability because antivirus software and special equipment such as firewall 
provide the host node with security service that protects it from the threats (network attacks 
and software viruses) that may affect its availability. The template shows that the protection 
of host node from the security threats can be done with the help of firewall and antivirus 
software.  
 
Under Lack of firewall we consider the probability that due to the lack of firewall, the network 
threats (e.g. network attack) may cause the denial of host availability. Under Denial of 
firewall functionality we consider the probability that the firewall will not protect against 
threats that may cause the denial of host availability. These two threats are mutually excluding 
each other. This means that only one of these threats may occur before the unwanted incident 
Denial of availability due to firewall problems can happen. That is why we use the XOR port 
to connect these two threats to the risk Denial of availability due to firewall problems. In the 
same time, the denial of firewall functionality may have consequences for the host node 
availability if the firewall does not function and simultaneously the host node is attacked from 
the network. These two unwanted incidents have to happen in the same time, and that is why 
we use the AND port to connect them to the risk Denial of firewall functionality.  
 
Under Lack of antivirus software we consider the probability that due to the lack of antivirus 
software, the malicious program or virus may cause the denial of host availability. Under 
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Denial of antivirus software functionality we consider the probability that antivirus software 
will not protect against threats (malicious program or virus) that may cause the denial of host 
availability. We use the XOR port to connect these two threats to the risk Denial of 
availability due to antivirus software problems because only one of these threats may occur 
before the unwanted incident on the higher level can happen. We use the AND port to connect 
the unwanted incidents Virus attack, and Antivirus software does not function to the risk 
Denial of antivirus software functionality because these two unwanted incidents have to occur 
simultaneously before the risk Denial of antivirus software functionality can happen. 
 
 
Denial of Host
Security service
availability
OR
1
Denial of
Firewall
functionality
Denial of
availability
due to firewall
problems
Lack of
antivirus
software - virus
attack
4
Denial of
antivirus
software
funcionality
Lack of
Firewall - attack
from network
Denial of
availability
due to antivirus
software problems
XOR XOR
AND
5
Antivirus
software doesn't
function
Virus
attack
62
Firewall
doesn’t
function
Attack
from
network
3
AND
 
Figure 4.19: Template for the assessment of host security service availability 
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5 Model Driven Availability Risk Analysis 
(MODA) 
 
As we mentioned earlier, the risk assessment community makes use of a structured approach 
to address risks – the so-called Risk management process. Recall that we defined this process 
in chapter 2 as the systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to 
the tasks of establishing the context, identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring 
and communicating risk. MODA is a means within the risk management process to address 
availability risks. In this chapter we present MODA in an example-driven manner.  
 
The chapter is structured into six sections. Section 5.1 gives the overview of the Risk 
management process on which MODA is based. MODA may be understood as a 
specialisation of the five risk management sub-processes specialised towards availability risk 
analysis. In the following we refer to this specialisation as the MODA risk management 
process. The first sub-process of the MODA Risk management process – Context 
Identification is presented in section 5.2. Section 5.3 describes the second sub-process, 
namely Risk Identification. The Risk Analysis is the third sub-process. It is presented in 
section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents Risk Evaluation – the fourth sub-process. Section 5.6 
considers the last sub-process, namely Risk Treatment. All sections are further decomposed 
into sub-sections that present activities of sub-processes and demonstrate their practical use 
with the help of case study. 
 
 
5.1 MODA Risk management process 
 
The MODA risk management process is based on AS/NZS 4360:1999 Risk Management [6] 
and CORAS [5]. AS/NZS 4360 decomposes the risk management process into sub-processes 
for context identification, risk identification, risk assessment, risk evaluation and risk 
treatment. It also defines two sub-processes that run in parallel with the first five: 
communication and consultation, monitor and review. (Figure 5.1) 
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Figure 5.1: AS/NZS 4360 Risk management process
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While the main source of inspiration for the definition of the MODA risk management 
process was AS/NZS 4360, the activities of the sub-processes of the CORAS risk 
management process provided valuable input for the definition of activities of sub-processes 
of the MODA risk management process. 
 
MODA decomposes the risk management process into five sub-processes for context 
identification, risk identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation and risk treatment. These sub-
processes are further decomposed into activities as described in Figure 5.2. The flow of 
information in the MODA risk management process is described in Table 5.1. The columns 
and rows represent the sub-processes of the MODA risk management process. The text in the 
shaded areas denotes the key activities within each sub-process. In the upper, right hand side 
of the shaded diagonal we describe how a sub-process provides information or results to be 
used in a later sub-process. For example, the “Risk identification” sub-process provides risks 
to availability aspects for the “Risk analysis” sub-process. In the lower, left hand side of the 
diagonal we describe how a sub-process depends on results or information from an earlier 
sub-process. 
 
 
           A1.1: Risk management context specification
           A1.2: Specification of the target of evaluation
           A1.3: Identification of stakeholders
           A1.4: Identification of assets
           A1.5: Identification of the risk acceptance criteria
Context identification
Risk identification
           A3.1: Consequence evaluation
           A3.2: Frequency evaluation
Risk analysis
           A4.1: Identification of risks values
           A4.2: Update of risks values
           A4.3: Categorisation of risks into risk treatment
                      categories
           A4.4: Specification of priorities of risk treatment
                      categories
           A5.1: Identification of treatment options
           A5.2: Specification of risks treatment priorities
Risk treatment
Risk evaluation
        A2.1: Identification of risks to availability aspects
  A2.2: Fault tree analysis
 
Figure 5.2: MODA risk management sub-processes along with activities (A) 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. MODA 
 
 
 47
Table 5.1: The flow of information in the MODA risk management process 
Context
identification
Risk
identification
Risk
analysis
Risk
evaluation
Risk
treatment
- Depends on risks to
availability aspects
- Depends on unwanted
incidents
A 3.1 Consequence
evaluation
A 3.2 Frequency
evaluation
- Provides consequence
evaluation
- Provides frequency
evaluation
Risk
analysis
- Depends on risks levels
- Depends on risk
treatment categories
- Depends on risk
treatment category
priority
A 5.1 Identification of
treatment options
A 5.2 Specification of
risks treatment prioritiesRisk
treatment
- Depends on TOE
- Depends on assets
- Depends on assets
values
A2.1 Identification of
risks to availability
aspects
A2.2 Fault tree
analysis
- Provides risks to
availability aspects
- Provides unwanted
incidents
Risk
identification
A1.1 Risk management
context specification
A1.2 Specification of the
target of evaluation
A 1.3 Identification of
stakeholders
A1.4 Identification of
assets
A 1.5 Identification of the
risk acceptance criteria
- Provides target of
evaluation (TOE)
- Provides assets owners
- Provides assets
- Provides assets values
- Provides areas of
relevance (context)
- Provides asset value
domains
- Provides risk evaluation
criteria
- Provides areas of
relevance (context)
Context
identification
- Depends on
consequence evaluation
- Depends on frequency
evaluation
A 4.1 Identification of
risks values
A 4.2 Update of risks
values
A 4.3 Categorization of
risks into risk treatment
categories
A 4.4 Specification of
priorities of risk treatment
categories
- Provides risks levels
- Provides risk treatment
categories
- Provides risk treatment
category priority
Risk
evaluation
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5.2 Context identification 
 
The objective of context identification sub-process is to define the scope of availability 
assessment, stakeholders along with assets, and risk evaluation criteria for each stakeholder. 
The context identification consists of five activities where the first activity may run in parallel 
with the other four and the latter four will typically be carried out in a sequential order: 
 
• Risk management context specification 
• Specification of the target of evaluation 
• Identification of stakeholders  
• Identification of assets 
• Identification of the risk acceptance criteria 
 
5.2.1 Activity 1.1: Risk management context specification 
 
The objective of this activity is to establish the risk assessment objectives and identify needed 
risk assessment processes, activities and resources as well as risk assessment records to be 
kept. These tasks are decomposed into four sub-activities to get an overview of needed actions 
and make accomplishment of this activity more flexible and traceable.  
The risk management context specification activity consists of four sub-activities that will 
typically be carried out in iterative manner:  
 
▪ Specification of risk assessment objectives and needed studies 
▪ Identification of relevant roles for a risk assessment 
▪ Specification of risk assessment plan  
▪ Identification of applied value categories 
 
 
5.2.1.1 Specification of risk assessment objectives and needed studies 
                                           
The objective of this sub-activity is to describe why the risk assessment is undertaken and 
define the risk management processes and activities that should be applied during the risk 
assessment, their scope and the resources required.   
 
As a first step in this sub-activity, goals and objectives of the risk assessment should be 
defined and documented in the Assessment objectives table shown in Table 5.2. One should 
also document management/client decisions that depend on the assessment results. This can 
help the risk analysis leader to plan the work and ensure that the risk analysis is focused on 
management/client interests. 
 
As a second step in this sub-activity, the risk assessment team and stakeholders should agree 
upon to which detail the risk management process will be applied. The needed studies along 
with required resources should be documented in the Assessment methods table [5] shown in 
Table 5.3. The descriptions of needed studies should be sufficiently detailed so that 
stakeholders who have not been the part of the risk management process can understand the 
conclusions and evaluate the process. The needed resources for selected studies should be 
specified as computational or human where the human resources may also include the need 
for specific expertise. 
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Table 5.2: Assessment objectives table 
Risk assessment goals and 
objectives 
<Description> 
 
 
Table 5.3: Assessment methods table 
Reference Method Name Description Applied for 
Task 
Resources Needed 
<Pointer to where 
the method is  
further described> 
<Method name> <Description> <List of tasks 
taken from 
assessment plan>
<Description of resources
needed> 
 
 
Assumptions that restrict the risk management process should be described and documented 
in the Assessment restrictions table [5] shown in Table 5.4. 
 
 
Table 5.4: Assessment restrictions table 
Reference Restriction Description Applied for Activity 
< Pointer to where 
the restriction is  
further described > 
<Restriction> <Description> <List of activities> 
 
 
5.2.1.2 Identification of relevant roles for a risk assessment 
 
The objective of this sub-activity is to define the relevant roles of participants of the risk 
assessment. The Assessment roles table [5] shown in Table 5.5 should be filled in to 
document the roles of members of risk assessment team as well as names and background of 
team members. It should be specified who represents the client or a stakeholder and who 
belongs to the RA-team – those who will perform all the sub-processes and deliver the risk 
assessment report to the client. All roles are optional, except the project leader, the RA leader 
and the target owner (the client) roles that should be filled. 
 
 
Table 5.5: Assessment roles table 
Role Name Organisation Background/Expertise 
Project leader <Name> <Organisation> <Text> 
RA leader <Name> <Organisation> <Text> 
RA secretary <Name> <Organisation> <Text> 
Target owner <Name> <Organisation> <Text> 
Target developer <Name> <Organisation> <Text> 
…    
Field expert <Name> <Organisation> <Text> 
…    
RA expert <Name> <Organisation> <Text> 
…    
Other <Name> <Organisation> <Text> 
…    
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5.2.1.3 Specification of risk assessment plan  
 
The objective of this sub-activity is to define a risk assessment plan.  
 
One should be aware that there are always some factors that can affect the duration of risk 
assessment. Sommerville [7] advises to use the following rule of thumb – first make an 
estimate as if nothing will go wrong, then increase your estimate to cover anticipated 
problems (Sommerville adds 30 per cent) and then add some per cent to your estimate to 
cover other things you hadn’t thought of (Sommerville adds 20 per cent). Anticipated 
problems may include: 
 
• People working on a project may fall ill or may leave. 
• Essential support software and hardware may break down or be delivered late. 
• The new and technically advanced project can have some parts that may turn out to be 
more difficult and take longer than originally anticipated. 
 
Hoffer [29] gives examples of other factors that can affect the project execution (we adjusted 
some descriptions to suite to the risk assessment): 
 
• Perceptions and willingness of stakeholders to participate in the project. 
• Management commitment to the project.  
• Familiarity of the risk assessment team with the proposed assessment area. 
• Familiarity of the risk assessment team with assessment of similar systems of similar 
size. 
 
In addition we can list the following factors that should be taken into account: 
 
• Different stakeholders participating in a risk assessment can have different knowledge 
of risk assessment and risk management. 
• It can take time to “clean up” results between the sub-processes and activities. 
• The potential need for additional or updated system descriptions may be more than 
anticipated. 
 
As a result of this sub-activity, the Assessment plan table [5] shown in Table 5.6 below 
should be filled in to document task types, dates of their execution, and the list of persons 
participating in each task 
 
 
Table 5.6: Assessment plan table 
Date Task Type Task Participating Roles 
<Date> <Type> <Task> <List taken from Assessment roles table> 
 
 
5.2.1.4 Identification of applied value categories 
 
The objective of this sub-activity is to define what kind of value categories should be used in 
the risk assessment. The stakeholders should agree on whether values for consequences, 
frequencies and risks should be qualitative, quantitative, or combination of both. 
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Specification of frequency values 
 
Stakeholders should agree on what kind of frequency values (qualitative or quantitative) can 
be used. The proposal for the frequency values range (scale) is shown in Table 5.7 [5]. The 
range chosen for the frequencies should be in the same order throughout the assessment. The 
quantitative frequency values should be numbers that show probability of a risk. The 
probability should be between 1 and 0, where 1 indicates that the risk will happen for sure, 
and 0 that it cannot happen. The corresponding recommended set of qualitative values is: 
{rare, unlikely, possible, likely, almost certain}.  
The frequency values of risks (e.g. denial of component functionality) can be measured in: 
• the number of unwanted incidents per year (e.g. number of denials of component 
functionality). 
• the number of unwanted incidents per demands (number of denials of component 
functionality/number of demands). 
• the percent of times the service/system or component is used. 
 
Table 5.7: Qualitative and quantitative frequency values 
                                      Frequency Values 
Category        Rare    Unlikely          Possible         Likely Almost certain 
Measured in terms 
of occurrences per 
year/month 
       1/100 
      
  1/10 - 1/50 
      
         1/10 - 1           1 –12       > 12 
Measured in terms 
of occurrences per 
demands 
     1/10000 
 
 
             1/50         1/1 
Measured in the   
percent of times 
the service/system 
or component is 
used 
   0.00 – 0.01 
less often then 
1%  
 
      
    0.01 – 0.05 
between 1%  
and 5% 
     0.05 – 0.20 
between 5%  
and 20% 
      0.20 – 0.50 
between 20% 
and 50% 
    0.50 – 1.00 
between 50% 
and 100% 
 
 
The agreed set of frequency values should be documented in the Frequency values table 
shown in Table 5.8. The construction of table will assist to the achievement of two purposes: 
the documentation of assessment results and reusability of assessment results (e.g. 
documented frequency values can be used in another assessment). 
 
 
Table 5.8: Frequency values table 
                                      Frequency Values 
Category        Rare    Unlikely          Possible         Likely Almost certain 
<Category 
description> 
<frequency 
  value> 
<frequency
  value> 
<frequency 
  value> 
<frequency 
  value> 
<frequency 
  value> 
 
 
Specification of consequence values 
 
Stakeholders should agree on whether consequence values should be quantitative or 
qualitative. The quantitative consequence values should be in the same order as the scale that 
will be used to value assets (see Activity 1.4). In the case of qualitative consequence values, 
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the stakeholders should agree on how consequence values will be computed. One can use four 
alternative approaches to assign consequence values for the availability aspects risks: 
 
• In the first approach, consequence values should reflect how the system unavailability 
(measured in lost hours) might affect aspects that depend on the system availability. 
Figure 5.3 shows the categorization of consequences of the reduction of system 
availability. Consequence values within the chosen consequence domain should be 
assigned according to the following set: {insignificant, minor, moderate, major, 
catastrophic}. For example, one can decide that the unavailability of the environment 
control system for a period of 2 hours may have minor consequence, while 
unavailability of this system for a period of 10 hours may have catastrophic 
consequence. 
 
• In the second approach, the consequence is measured in the loss of assets value. The 
consequence values can be defined with the help of the Asset consequence values 
table shown in Table 5.9. This table shows how consequence values depend on the 
percentages of the loss of asset value because of an unwanted incident. 
• In the third approach, the consequence is measured in the loss of target system 
availability. The consequence values can be defined with the help of the Target system 
consequence values table shown in Table 5.10. This table shows how consequence 
values depend on the reduction of the availability of target system due to an unwanted 
incident. 
 
• In the fourth approach, we assign consequence values according to the level of loss of 
income of the organisation where the system is deployed. In this approach we have to 
consider financial consequences that an unwanted incident can cause to the 
organisation. When we compute the financial consequences of an unwanted incident, 
we can compare the lost income caused by this unwanted incident to the total income 
of organisation. Another way to define consequence values is to determine the total 
cost of recovery from the unwanted incident and then compare this total cost to the 
income of the target organisation. Table 5.11 shows a proposal for the Total income 
consequence values table. The consequence value of an unwanted incident is 
computed in the following way: 
 
1. First we compute the lost income (LI) of organization with the help of the 
following formula: LI = D/(U+D)*I where 
LI is a lost income. 
D is the system downtime during Service Time (time when the system should 
be available). 
U is the system uptime during the Service Time. 
I is the income of organization during the Service Time if the system is up all 
the time. 
2. Then we compute the total cost of recovery (TCR) from an unwanted incident 
(the lost income (LI) has to be added to the cost of recovery (CR): TCR = LI + 
CR). 
3. Now we determine the consequence percent (CP) comparing the total cost of 
recovery to the monthly income (MI) of the target organization: CP = 
(TCR/MI)*100. If we are only interested in the comparison of the lost income 
with the total income of organisation, the CP is defined as follows: CP = 
(LI/MI)*100. 
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4. Finally, when we know the CP, we use the Total income consequence values 
table to determine the consequence values of unwanted incidents. 
 
                   
Impact on public
confidence
Impact on company
reputation Impact on society Impact on people Impact on environment
Consequence
(lost hours)
Impact on business
opportunities
Impact on competitive
ability
Impact on information
processing efficiency
Impact on end-user
productivity
 
Figure 5.3: Categorization of consequences of system unavailability 
 
 
Table 5.9: Asset consequence values table 
 Consequence Values 
Category Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic
Measured in the loss of 
asset value 
 
0-01% 
 
0.1-1%
 
1-5% 
 
5-10% 
 
10-100% 
 
 
Table 5.10: Target system consequence values table 
 Consequence Values 
Category Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic
Measured in the loss of 
target system availability 
 
0-01% 
 
0.1-1%
 
1-5% 
 
5-10% 
 
10-100% 
 
 
Table 5.11: Total income consequence values table 
 Consequence Values 
Category Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic
Total cost of recovery 
from an unwanted 
incident compared to 
the total income of 
organisation 
 
0-01% 
 
0.1-1% 
 
1-5% 
 
5-10% 
 
10-100% 
Lost income caused by 
an unwanted incident 
compared to the total 
income of organisation  
 
0-01% 
 
0.1-1% 
 
1-5% 
 
5-10% 
 
10-100% 
Measured in the impact 
on business 
No impact on 
business. 
Minor delays 
Lost profits 
(Lost project
phases) 
Reduce the resources 
of one or more 
departments. Loss of a 
couple of customers 
Close down 
department(s) 
or business 
sectors 
Out of 
business 
 
 
The agreed set of consequence values should be documented in the Consequence values table 
shown in Table 5.12. The construction of table will assist to the achievement of two purposes: 
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the documentation of assessment results and reusability of assessment results (e.g. 
documented consequence values can be used in another assessment). 
 
 
Table 5.12: Consequence values table 
 Consequence Values 
Category Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic
<Category 
description> 
<consequence 
  value> 
<consequence 
  value> 
<consequence 
  value> 
<consequence 
  value> 
<consequence 
  value> 
 
 
Specification of risk values 
 
Stakeholders should agree on whether risk values should be quantitative or qualitative. One 
also has to agree on how to calculate risk values. In case when the frequency and consequence 
values are quantitative, they should be multiplied [6]. If one of the quantitative values equals 
0, the risk value may be assigned by the relevant stakeholder. If one of the values is 
qualitative, the quantitative value should be mapped to its qualitative equivalent and then risk 
values should be defined with the help of Risk Matrix [5] shown in Table 5.13. In the case the 
frequency and consequence values are qualitative one should apply Risk Matrix. The 
recommended set of risk values is: {no risk (N), low risk (L), moderate risk (M), high risk 
(H), and extreme risk (E)}. 
 
 
Table 5.13: Risk Matrix 
 Frequency values 
Consequence 
     Values 
Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Certain 
Insignificant N N L L M 
Minor N L L M M 
Moderate L L M M H 
Major L M M H H 
Catastrophic M M H H E 
 
 
The agreed set of risk values and their mode of computation should be documented in the 
Risk values table shown in Table 5.14. 
 
 
Table 5.14: Risk values table 
  Chosen risk 
value category 
   Computation 
         mode 
Level    Risk 
   value   
Risk value 
description 
A <value> <description> 
B   
C   
D   
<description> <mode description>
E   
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Specification of treatment action priorities 
 
Stakeholders should agree on how to assign priorities for treatment actions. The priority 
should be based on the level of treatment action value that can be assigned with the help of 
the Risk treatment action priority matrix shown in Table 5.15. The identification of treatment 
action values implies the assignment of values to treatment action benefits and costs. The 
stakeholders should agree on the scale that should be used for the assignment of values. We 
recommend to use the following scale for the benefit, cost and action values: “very low” 
(VL), “low” (L), “moderate” (M), “high” (H), “very high” (VH). The relationship among 
benefit, cost and action values should be agreed upon and demonstrated as in Table 5.15. 
 
 
Table 5.15: Risk treatment action priority matrix 
 Cost of risk treatment action 
Risk treatment 
action benefit 
Very low Low Moderate High Very high 
Very low L VL VL VL VL 
Low L L L VL VL 
Moderate H M M L L 
High VH H H M M 
Very high VH VH H H M 
 
 
The agreed scale for benefit, cost and action values should be documented in the Treatment 
action values table shown in Table 5.16 
 
 
Table 5.16: Treatment action values table 
Level Benefit 
Value 
Cost 
Value 
Treatment 
Action Value
A <value> <value> <value> 
B    
C    
D    
E    
 
 
5.2.2 Activity 1.2: Specification of the target of evaluation 
 
The objective of this activity is to define boundaries of the system that has to be assessed and 
describe its objectives, functions and security aspects. The organisation is always functioning 
in society and can be seen as a part of the society. The system in turn can be seen as a part of 
an organisation. The target of evaluation can be the part of the system that we are going to 
analyse, or the whole system. The description of the target of evaluation can help a risk 
assessment team to get a clear understanding of system usage and system’s role in the 
surrounding environment (organisation/enterprise, society). Specification of the target of 
evaluation also can help to delimit the part of the system to be analysed and in this way spare 
financial and human resources needed for risk assessment. These ideas are shown in Figure 
5.4. 
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Target
System
Organisation
Society
 
Figure 5.4: Organisation with its components as a part of society 
 
 
As a first step of this activity, the system boundaries should be determined by means of 
defining system actors and use cases. Eeles [30] defines an actor as “someone or something 
outside the system that interacts with the system”. An actor can be a person, software, 
hardware devices, an external system, data stores or networks. Finding actors helps establish 
the boundaries of the system since they are external to the system. A use case is a “description 
of a complete flow of events that results in something of value to an actor” [30]. 
 
The procedure for the first step will be following: 
- Make an informal drawing – domain picture that represents an overall understanding 
of a situation. 
- Find all actors. 
- Find all use cases. 
- Document actors and use cases in UML use case diagram. 
 
Some of questions defined by COMET – Component and Model based development 
Methodology [31] can be helpful in defining the target system actors: 
 
• Who uses the system? 
• Who maintains the system? 
• What other systems use this system? 
• Who gets information from the system? 
• Who provides information to the system? 
• Who starts up and shuts down the system? 
• Does anything happen automatically at present time? 
 
To find use cases, one has to consider what each actor requires of the system. The following 
set of questions defined by Eeles [30] may be useful when identifying use cases: 
 
• For each actor, what are the tasks in which the system would be involved? 
• Does the actor need to be informed about certain occurrences in the system? 
• Will the actor need to inform the system about external changes? 
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• What information must be modified or created in the system, and what actors must 
participate in those changes? 
• What use cases will support administration and maintenance of the system (e.g. adding 
new users)? 
 
As a second step of this activity, the risk assessment team should decide whether they need 
detailed description of system architecture (main components). If this description is required, 
one can specify the main system components using UML component/deployment diagrams 
and/or sequence diagrams. 
 
As a last step of this activity, the Target-of-evaluation table [5] shown in Table 5.17 should be 
filled in with relevant information. The system owner, who represent organisation where the 
system has/is deployed, and risk analysts should fill this table with information that describes 
objectives, functions and security aspects of the system.  
 
 
Table 5.17: Target-of-evaluation table 
Target:  <Target of evaluation> 
Objective: 1. <Objective of Target> 
2. … 
Service/Functions: 1. <Service/Function of Target>
2. … 
Security Aspects: <Security> 
 
 
Example. Specification of the target of evaluation: Private Lessons 
 
An English teacher offers online help to people (students) who want to improve their English 
skills. To get a private English lesson, people have to register their personal information and 
make a prepayment with a visa card. The teacher uses the Windows 2000 operating system 
and he has neither a firewall nor antivirus software installed on his computer. An internal 
IDSL modem and a network card installed on his computer allow him to be connected to the 
Internet and these internal hardware components need special software that supports their 
functionality. The Internet provider guarantees that the teacher will have a stable Internet 
connection in 90% of all days of the year. With the help of standard application program for 
communication through the Internet (e.g. Net Meeting), the teacher communicates with 
students and sees them on the monitor. He uses web camera with microphone, speakers and 
special application software Net Customer to view users statistics and to be notified about the 
order of new lesson. Figure 5.5 below shows the domain picture. 
 
 
Internet
Student Teacher
 
Figure 5.5: Domain picture 
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The identified actors and use cases are shown in Figure 5.6. 
Student Teacher
Communicate
Get order
notification
Order
lesson
 
Figure 5.6: Use case diagram 
 
 
The target of evaluation table is shown in Table 5.18. 
 
 
Table 5.18: Private Lessons Target-of-evaluation table 
Target:  Private Lessons system (Teacher) 
Objective: 1. Online interactive English tutorial service 
Service/Function: 1. Provide communication with students 
2. Provide service order notification 
3. Provide order lesson functionality 
Security Aspects: Availability should be the main concern 
 
 
5.2.3 Activity 1.3: Identification of stakeholders  
 
The objective of this activity is to identify all stakeholders of the target system. Recall that 
stakeholders are “those people and organizations that may affect, be affected by, or perceive 
themselves to be affected by, a decision or activity” [5]. Finding stakeholders helps to define 
those people and/or organizations that have interests and/or assets in the target system. 
 
In this activity all stakeholders should be identified and documented in the Stakeholders table 
[5] shown in Table 5.19. The list of identified actors may be helpful in the identification of 
stakeholders. However, one should be aware of the fact that not all actors can be stakeholders, 
since stakeholders, by definition, are only people and/or organizations.  
 
 
Table 5.19: Stakeholders table 
Stakeholder ID Stakeholder (Role) Stakeholder (Name) Description 
<ID> <Role> <Name> <Description> 
    
 
 
Example. Identification of stakeholders: Private Lessons 
 
The identified stakeholders are documented in the Stakeholder table shown in Table 5.20.  
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Table 5.20: Private Lessons Stakeholder table 
Stakeholder ID Stakeholder (Role) Stakeholder (Name)                 Description   
01 Teacher Nick Norman Gives private English lessons 
to students. 
02 Student  Gets private English lessons and  
makes prepayment with a visa card  
 
 
5.2.4 Activity 1.4: Identification of assets  
 
The objective of this activity is to identify and value the assets that are relevant to the target of 
evaluation. 
 
As a first step in this activity, one should identify the asset value domain(s) to be applied. It is 
desirable to apply generic asset value categories that allow comparison of asset values across 
different asset categories. The proposal for asset value domains [5] is shown in Table 5.21. 
 
 
Table 5.21: Generic asset value domains 
Value domain name Asset value descriptions 
Qualitative consequence values Insignificant, Minor, Moderate, Major, Catastrophic
Binary 0/1 where 0 means asset has insignificant value, and 1 
means loss of business 
Ranked numbers On the scale 1 - 10 
Numeric values e.g. as measured in economical value 
 
 
We recommend to identify assets based on the following categories [5], which cover relevant 
aspects of and about a system: 
 
• Human assets: Assets related to human resources, special knowledge. 
• Physical assets: Includes all physical components in the system and system dependent 
components. 
• Information assets: All information in the system and system dependent information. 
• Organisational assets: Organisational concerns, organisational (system) internal 
regulations, routines etc. 
• Law and regulation assets: External laws and regulations that influence the system.  
• Software assets: All software used in the system or system dependent.  
• Other assets: Assets that do not fit into one of the other themes, or assets that are 
composed of a grouping of the above asset classes. 
 
The procedure for the rest of activity will be the following: 
- For each identified stakeholder, identify assets in the target of evaluation: 
Go through all asset categories and identify assets with the help of questionnaires for 
each asset category [5] (Figure 5.7). 
- Assign value to each identified asset. 
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- Illustrate assets in an asset diagram [5] (Figure 5.8). 
- Document identified assets along with their values and stakeholders in the Asset table 
(Table 5.22). 
 
There may be situations when different stakeholders are related to the same asset. In this case, 
the analyst should establish a “one asset – one stakeholder” relationship and only “asset 
owner” (usually stakeholder who is responsible for the asset) can assign value to the asset. 
 
 
Human 
assets
Physical 
assets
Information 
assets
Software 
assets
Organizational 
assets
Questionnair
e
Questionnaire 1
Apendix A
Law and 
regulationasse
ts
Questionnaire 2 Questionnaire 3 Questionnaire 4 Questionnaire 5 Questionnaire 6
Apendix A Apendix A Apendix A Apendix A Apendix A  
Figure 5.7: Questionnaire guide  
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   name>
<Asset value>
<Asset
   name>
<Asset value>
<Asset
   name>
<Asset value>
<<Asset category>>
<Category>
 
<Asset
   name>
<Asset value>
 
<Asset
   name>
<Asset value>
<<Asset category>>
<Category>
Stakeholder 1
<<ownership>>
Stakeholder 2
<<ownership>>
 
Figure 5.8: Asset diagram 
 
 
Table 5.22: Asset table 
ID Stakeholder Asset Category Asset Description Value 
<ID> <Stakeholder> <Category> <Asset> <Description> <Value> 
 
 
Example. Identification of assets: Private Lessons 
 
The asset diagram is shown in Figure 5.9. The asset table is shown in Table 5.23 and 
documents stakeholders, asset themes and assets together with the description of assets and 
their values. Both student and the teacher have availability of service as an asset that is very 
important to them. The student pays 300 NOK for one lesson and the teacher is planning to 
give 6 lessons per day. 
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Availability
of service
1800 NOK
per day
 
Availability
of service
300 NOK
for 1 lesson
<<Asset category>>
Organizational assets
Student
<<ownership>>
Teacher
<<ownership>>
<<Asset category>>
Organizational assets
 
Figure 5.9: Private Lessons Asset diagram 
 
 
Table 5.23: Private Lessons Asset table 
ID Stakeholder Asset 
Category 
Asset Description Value 
01 Teacher Organizational Availability 
of service 
The teacher offers tutorial service to the 
students. 
1800 
NOK 
 per day   
02 Student Organizational Availability
of service 
The student gets tutorial service  
from the teacher 
300 NOK 
for 1  
lesson 
 
 
5.2.5 Activity 1.5: Identification of the risk acceptance criteria  
 
The objective of this activity is to identify the risk acceptance criteria that will be used to 
determine whether a given risk is acceptable or not. 
 
In this activity, each stakeholder has to assign risk acceptance criteria for each asset that the 
stakeholder has in the target system. The risk acceptance criteria should reflect the acceptable 
potential level of risk that an asset can be exposed to. The risk acceptance criteria may be 
defined with respect to single risks, group of risks or total risks. The acceptance values can be 
qualitative or quantitative and may be defined on the basis of consequence, frequency or risk 
values. The acceptance values should be of the same domain. This can help to avoid 
misunderstandings among stakeholders and contribute to the better reusability of availability 
assessment results. We recommend the risk acceptance criteria to be formulated on the form 
shown in Figure 5.10. 
 
No risks with
”acceptance category”  >=  ”acceptance value”
<<Acceptance category>>
No risks with
Frequency  >=  ”Frequency value”
Frequency
No risks with
Risk value  >=  ”Risk value”
Risk value
No risks with
Consequence  >=  ”Consequence value”
Consequence
 
Figure 5.10: Risk acceptance criteria alternatives 
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The chosen risk acceptance criteria for each asset should be documented in the Risk 
acceptance table shown in Table 5.24 
 
 
Table 5.24: Risk acceptance table 
Stakeholder Asset category Asset Risk acceptance criteria 
<stakeholder> <category> <asset> <description> 
     
 
Example. Identification of the risk acceptance criteria: Private Lessons 
 
The risk acceptance table is shown in Table 5.25 and documents stakeholders, asset categories 
and assets along with the description of risk acceptance criteria. 
 
 
Table 5.25: Private Lessons Risk acceptance table 
Stakeholder Asset category Asset Risk acceptance criteria 
Teacher    Organizational Availability of service No risks that have a risk value > Low 
Student    Organizational Availability of service No risks that have a risk value > Low 
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5.3 Risk identification 
 
The objective of the risk identification sub-process is to define the availability aspects risks 
that are relevant for the target of evaluation. The risk identification sub-process consists of 
two activities that will typically be carried out in a sequential order:  
 
▪ Identification of risks to availability aspects 
▪ Fault tree analysis 
 
5.3.1 Activity 2.1: Identification of risks to availability aspects 
 
The objective of this activity is to identify availability aspects risks that are relevant for the 
target of evaluation. During this activity, all assets of each stakeholder are considered and 
possible risks are identified and documented along with relevant entities in the availability 
risks tables. The construction of availability risks tables will insure that all relevant 
availability aspects have been considered and relevant entities of availability aspects are 
discovered. Guidelines in chapter 4 describe assets that can be affected by the reduction of 
availability aspects.  
 
During the risk identification each availability aspect is considered with respect to how the 
reduction of availability aspect can affect assets of each stakeholder. When the software 
availability is considered, the identification of risks can be narrowed to the identification of 
application software risks. It is not necessary to consider operating system availability risks in 
this sub-process because other availability aspects depend on the operating system availability 
and thus an operating system always has to be considered (it is done in the template for the 
analysis of operating system availability). It is also not necessary to consider availability risks 
to internal and external hardware software components in this sub-process because these risks 
are analysed in the templates for the analysis of hardware availability. 
 
Guidelines for the identification of availability aspects risks of the target of evaluation 
 
For each stakeholder 
     For each asset that this stakeholder has 
          For each availability aspect at level 1, 2, and 3 as defined in figures 4.3, 4.8, 4.11, 4.13 
 
- Define whether the asset can be affected by the denial of availability aspect.  
- If the asset can be affected, document the stakeholder, availability aspect, 
availability aspect risk and relevant entity of availability aspect in the Availability 
risks table shown in Table 5.26. It may be convenient to make one table for each 
availability aspect. 
 
 
Table 5.26: Availability risks table 
Stakeholder 
 
Asset 
 
Availability aspect Risk Relevant 
entity 
<Stakeholder> <Asset> <Availability  aspect> <Risk> <Entity> 
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Example. Identification of risks to availability aspects: Private Lessons 
 
In this activity we concentrate on the one stakeholder – the teacher, because the availability of 
the service that he offers to the students, depends on the availability of host node (service 
node – computer that the teacher uses to communicate with the students) and the availability 
of the teacher to give private lessons. Table 5.27 below shows the network availability risks 
table for the teacher. 
 
 
Table 5.27: Private Lessons Network availability risks table 
Stakeholder 
 
Asset 
 
Availability aspect Risk Relevant 
entity 
Teacher Availability of 
service 
Network availability Denial of Network 
availability 
Internet connection 
     
 
 
Without software application Net Meeting the teacher is not able to communicate through the 
Internet with his students. If Net Customer software is not available, the teacher will not be 
notified about the order of new lesson. Table 5.28 below shows the software availability risks 
table for the teacher. 
 
 
Table 5.28: Private Lessons Software availability risks table 
Stakeholder 
 
Asset 
 
Availability aspect Risk Relevant 
entity 
Teacher Availability of 
service 
Host application 
software availability 
Denial of host application 
software availability 
Net Meeting 
 
 
Net Customer 
     
 
 
IDSL modem and network card are necessary to have the Internet connection and without 
web camera, monitor and speakers, the teacher will not be seen by the students and he will not 
be able to see and hear the students. Table 5.29 shows the hardware availability risks table for 
the teacher. 
 
 
Table 5.29: Private Lessons Hardware availability risks table 
Stakeholder 
 
Asset 
 
Availability aspect Risk Relevant 
entity 
Teacher Availability of 
service 
Host internal hardware 
availability 
 
 
Host external hardware 
availability 
Denial of host internal 
hardware availability 
 
 
Denial of host external 
hardware availability 
IDSL modem 
 
Network card 
 
Web camera 
 
Monitor 
 
Speakers 
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Without the teacher, the service has no value and the students cannot get private lessons. 
Table 5.30 below shows the human availability risks table for the teacher. 
 
 
Table 5.30: Private Lessons Human availability risks table 
Stakeholder 
 
Asset 
 
Availability aspect Risk Relevant 
entity 
Teacher Availability of 
service 
Human availability Denial of Human 
availability 
Teacher 
     
 
 
5.3.2 Activity 2.2: Fault tree analysis 
 
The objective of the fault tree analysis activity is to identify causes that may lead to the risks 
identified during the previous activity. During this activity the fault trees, which show 
unwanted events, are built and the relationships among these events are established. 
 
For building of fault trees one can use Templates for the availability risk analysis that are 
described in chapter 4.7. The fault tree analysis activity consists of several steps that will 
typically be carried out in a sequential order:  
 
- Insert availability aspects risks, documented in the availability risks tables, as top 
events in fault trees.  
 
- Build fault trees with the help of templates described in chapter 4.7: (see Figure 5.11) 
To build the fault tree that has the top event:  
- Denial of host application software availability, use the template from Figure 
4.16. 
- Denial of host operating system availability, use the template from Figure 4.17. 
- Denial of host hardware availability, use the template from Figure 4.18. 
- Denial of host node availability, use the template from Figure 4.15. 
- Denial of host security service availability, use the template from Figure 4.19. 
 
- For each event identify possible causes that may lead to it 1 and place them at the next 
level in the fault tree. The identified events have to be connected to the top event 
through a logical port that can be of three kinds: an and-port, an or-port or a xor-port.  
 
- The and-port: All events under this port have to be occurred before the event 
over the and-port can happen. 
- The or-port: At least one event under this port has to be occurred before the 
event over the or-port can happen. 
- The xor-port: Only one event under this port has to be occurred before the event 
over the xor-port can happen. 
 
                                                 
1  Description in the chapter 4 Availability decomposed of relationship of availability aspects to other availability aspects  
    can help in the identification of unwanted incidents 
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- If identified events are described on an appropriate level of abstraction – the building 
of the fault tree can be finished, otherwise the rest of the fault tree is constructed in the 
same way as described in the previous step on the basis of each new identified event 
until the desired level of abstraction is reached.  
 
- If there is still need for more detailed description of incidents, one can use the CORAS 
[5] guidelines for the use of HasOp [11] for risk identification. 
 
 
Denial of Host
application software
availability
Template from figure
4.16
Chapter 4
Denial of Host
operating system
availability
Denial of Host
hardware
availability
Denial of Host
node
 availability
Denial of Host
security service
availability
Template from figure Template from figure Template from figure Template from figure
Template
Chapter 4 Chapter 4 Chapter 4 Chapter 4
4.17 4.18 4.15 4.19
 
Figure 5.11: Fault tree template guide 
 
Example. Fault tree analysis: Private Lessons 
 
As we can see from the availability risks tables (Tables 5.27…5.30), the availability of service 
that the teacher offers to the students can be affected by the reduction of the network 
availability, host node application software availability, host node internal and external 
hardware availability, and human availability (teacher). The availability of host node also can 
be affected by the denial of host operating system availability, power supply service 
availability, and host authorization availability. Figures 5.12 and 5.13 show these ideas. To 
build the fault tree that has the top event Denial of host node availability, we have used the 
template from Figure 4.15. 
 
 
                       
Denial of
service
availability
OR
1
Denial of Host
node
(Service node)
availability
Denial of
Network
availability
Denial of
Human
availability
(Teacher)
2 3  
Figure 5.12: Fault tree with the top event Denial of service availability 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. MODA 
 
 
 67
4
Denial of Host
hardware
availability
OR
Denial of Host
internal
hardware
availability
Denial of Host
external
hardware
availability
6 8
Denial of Host
storage device
availability
(hard disc)
7
Denial of Host
authorization
availability
5
1
Denial of Host
software
availability
2
OR
Denial of Host
application
software
availability
Denial of Host
operating
system
availability
3
Denial of
Power supply
service
availability
Denial of Host
node
availability
OR
Denial of Host
Security
service
availability
 
Figure 5.13: Fault tree with the top event Denial of host node availability 
 
 
Figure 5.14 shows the fault tree for the availability risk Denial of host application software 
availability and is constructed with the help of the template from Figure 4.16. 
 
 
              
Denial of Host
application
software
availability
OR
OR
1
Denial of
Net Meeting
availability
Incorrect
installation
and use by
user
Denial of Net
Meeting
software
functionality
2
Denial of
software
authorisation
functionality
3
OR
1
Denial of
Net Customer
availability
Incorrect
installation
and use by
user
Denial of Net
Customer
software
functionality
2
Denial of
software
authorisation
functionality
3  
Figure 5.14: Fault tree with the top event Denial of host application software availability 
 
 
Figure 5.15 shows the fault tree for the availability risk Denial of host operating system 
availability and is constructed with the help of the template from Figure 4.17. 
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Denial of Host
operating
system
availability
OR
1
Denial of
operating
system
functionality
2
Incorrect
installation and
use by user
Denial of
operating
system
authorization
functionality
3  
Figure 5.15: Fault tree with the top event Denial of host operating system availability 
 
 
For the construction of hardware availability fault trees we can use the template from Figure 
4.18. Figures 5.16 and 5.17 show the fault trees for the availability risks Denial of host 
internal hardware availability and Denial of host external hardware availability. 
 
Denial of Host
internal
hardware
availability
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OR
1
Denial of IDSL
modem
availability
2 3
Denial of
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Incorrect
installation and
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Denial of
functionality of
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hardware
Denial of
functionality of
modem
software
4
OR
5
Denial of
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availability
6 7
Denial of
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Incorrect
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Denial of
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Denial of
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modem
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8
 
Figure 5.16: Fault tree with the top event Denial of host internal hardware availability 
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functionality
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101 2 3 4
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Figure 5.17: Fault tree with the top event Denial of host external hardware availability 
 
 
The template from Figure 4.19 can help us to build the fault tree for the risk Denial of host 
security service availability. Figure 5.18 shows the relevant fault tree. 
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1
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Figure 5.18: Fault tree with the top event Denial of host security service availability 
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5.4 Risk analysis 
 
The objective of the risk analysis sub-process is to describe consequences and frequencies of 
identified risks. The inputs to this sub-process are risks that were identified during the risk 
identification sub-process. The risk analysis sub-process consists of two activities that can be 
carried out in any order:  
 
▪ Consequence evaluation 
▪ Frequency evaluation 
 
5.4.1 Activity 3.1: Consequence evaluation 
 
The objective of this activity is to analyse the consequence of the identified risks and evaluate 
their impact on the enterprise or system level. The consequence can be measured in the loss of 
assets values, the loss of availability of the target system or financial losses of the target 
organisation. The consequence value also can be assessed based on the information from 
previous similar assessments, historical data, available statistic information, and subjective 
assessment of RA-team or experts judgment. 
 
The procedure for this activity is the following: 
 
- Input for this activity are risks identified during the risk identification sub-process. 
 
- The consequence table for each availability aspect should be filled in and document 
stakeholders, assets, risks and their consequence values. The consequence values 
should be defined according to the scale that has been identified during Activity 1.1. 
Table 5.31 shows the general form of consequence table and figures A.2, A.3, A.4, 
A.5 in Appendix A show consequence tables for different availability aspects. 
 
- If consequence values are missing for some unwanted incidents, one can use the 
CORAS [5] guidelines for use of FMECA [13], Markov analysis [15] or Event tree 
analysis [32] for consequence evaluation. 
 
 
Table 5.31: Consequence table 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence
value 
Consequence
description 
<Stakeholder> <Asset> <Risk> <Risk scenario> <Consequence 
   value> 
<Consequence
   description>
 
 
Example. Consequence evaluation: Private Lessons 
 
Recall that a student pays 300 NOK for one lesson and the teacher is planning to give 6 
lessons per day. We assume that the teacher is planning to give private lessons 22 days per 
month. The total monthly income of the teacher will be:  
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300 * 6 * 22 = 39600 NOK. We determine consequence values with the help of Total income 
consequence values table (Table 5.11). The consequence tables for the teacher are depicted in 
tables below and show identified consequence values together with their description. 
 
 
Table 5.32: Private Lessons Consequence table for software availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence 
value 
Consequence 
description 
Denial of host operating 
system availability 
The host 
operating 
system doesn’t 
function or  
malfunction 
Major It takes the teacher one day to 
reinstall the operating system 
and application programs that he 
uses. Additionally he pays 300 
Kr for technical support service. 
TCR = 1800 + 300 = 2100 NOK 
CP = (2100/39600)*100 = 
5,30% 
Denial of  
Net Meeting 
availability 
Application 
software 
Net Meeting 
doesn’t 
function or  
malfunction 
Major 
 
The teacher hasn’t an alternative 
program to use. It takes him 
one day to get an updated 
version 
of Net Meeting and install it. 
The newer version of NM costs 
400 NOK.  
TCR = 1800 + 400 = 2200 NOK 
CP = (2200/39600)*100 = 
5,55% 
Teacher Availability 
of service 
Denial of  
host  
Software 
availability 
Denial of 
host 
application 
software 
availability 
Denial of 
Net Customer 
availability 
Application 
software 
Net Customer 
doesn’t 
function or  
malfunction 
Minor The teacher has an alternative 
program to use in case of denial 
of Net Meeting availability. It 
can 
take him 1 hour to install the  
alternative program. This 
alternative program is freeware 
and costs nothing for the teacher 
TCR = 300 + 0 = 300 NOK 
CP = (300/39600)*100 = 0,75% 
 
 
Table 5.33: Private Lessons Consequence table for hardware availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence 
value 
Consequence 
description 
Denial of host storage device 
availability 
The host hard 
disc  
doesn’t function 
or  
malfunction 
Catastrophic The teacher hasn’t an alternative 
hard disc to use. It takes him 
two days to get a new hard disc 
and install it along with 
operating system and application 
programs. 
A new hard disc costs 800 NOK. 
TCR = 3600 + 800 = 4400 NOK 
CP = (4400/39600)*100 = 
11,11% 
Teacher Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host 
Hardware 
availability 
Denial of 
host 
internal 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of 
modem 
availability 
The modem 
doesn’t 
function or  
malfunction. As  
result of it, the  
teacher’s 
computer 
can’t be 
connected 
to the Internet 
Moderate The teacher has an alternative 
extern modem that he can use in 
case of denial of the intern 
modem. The teacher has paid 
400 NOK for the extern modem 
and it 
takes him 1 hour to install it. 
TCR = 300 + 400 = 700 NOK 
CP = (700/39600)*100 = 1,76% 
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Denial of 
network card 
availability 
The network 
card 
doesn’t function 
or  
malfunction. As  
result of it, the 
teacher 
can’t be 
connected 
to the Internet 
Minor 
 
The teacher has an additional 
network card that he can use 
in case of denial of the internal 
network card. He has got this 
network card free of charge 
from his friend and it takes him 
1 hour to install it. 
TCR = 300 + 0 = 300 NOK 
CP = (300/39600)*100 = 0,75% 
Denial of  
monitor 
availability 
The monitor 
doesn’t 
function or  
malfunction 
Major The teacher hasn’t an additional 
monitor. The reparation of 
monitor takes 5 days. It is more 
profitable for teacher to buy 
a new monitor than wait for 
reparation. The new monitor 
costs 
2000 NOK and it takes the 
teacher 4 hours to buy a new 
monitor and install it. 
TCR = 1200 + 2000 = 3200 
NOK 
CP = (3200/39600)*100 = 
8,08% 
Denial of  
web camera 
availability 
The web camera 
doesn’t function 
or 
malfunction 
Moderate The teacher hasn’t an additional 
web camera. The reparation of 
web camera is too costly. It is 
more profitable for the teacher 
to buy a new web camera. The 
new web camera costs 400 NOK 
and it takes the teacher 3 hours 
to buy and install the new web 
camera. 
TCR = 900 + 400 = 1300 NOK 
CP = (1300/39600)*100 = 
3,28% 
Denial of 
host 
external 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of  
speakers 
availability 
Speakers don’t  
function or 
malfunction 
Minor The teacher has additional 
speakers that he can use 
in case of denial of the old 
speakers. He has got these 
speakers free of charge from his 
friend and it takes him 1 hour to 
install them. 
TCR = 300 + 0 = 300 NOK 
CP = (300/39600)*100 = 0,75% 
 
 
Table 5.34: Private Lessons Consequence table for host security service availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence 
value 
Consequence 
description 
Teacher Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host 
security 
service 
availability 
Lack of firewall – host 
is attacked from the 
Internet 
The host node is 
attacked from the 
Internet  
Major As a result of attack from the Internet 
the operating system and application 
programs don’t function or 
malfunction. The teacher has to 
reinstall the operating system and 
application programs. It takes him the 
whole day to reinstall the operating 
system and all application programs. 
Additionally he pays 300 Kr for 
technical support service. 
TCR = 1800 + 300 = 2100 
CP = (2100/39600)*100 = 5,30% 
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Lack of antivirus 
software – host is 
attacked by computer 
virus 
The host node is 
attacked by  
computer virus 
Major As a result of computer virus the 
operating system and application 
programs don’t function or 
malfunction. The teacher has to 
reinstall the operating system and 
application programs. It takes 
him the whole day to reinstall 
the operating system and all 
application programs. Additionally he 
pays 300 Kr for technical support 
service. 
TCR = 1800 + 300 = 2100 
CP = (2100/39600)*100 = 5,30% 
 
 
Table 5.35: Private Lessons Consequence table for host availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence 
value 
Consequence 
description 
Denial of host Software 
availability 
The host software
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
 The consequence of denial of 
availabilities of host operating system 
and application programs 
Net Meeting and Net Customer 
Denial of host Hardware 
availability 
The host 
hardware 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
 The consequence of denial of  
availabilities of host hard disc, 
modem, network card, monitor, web 
camera and speakers.  
Denial of power supply 
service availability 
The local  
provider of  
electricity has  
technical 
problems 
and can’t provide 
electricity to the 
teacher’s house 
Moderate 
 
 
The statistic shows that it usually 
takes no longer then 2 hours for 
electricity provider to fix technical 
problems. 
TCR = 600 + 0 = 600 NOK 
CP = (600/39600)*100 = 1,51% 
Denial of host security 
service  
availability 
The host is 
attacked from 
the internet 
and/or by 
computer virus 
 The consequence of lack of firewall 
and antivirus software 
Teacher Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host  
availability 
Denial of host 
authorization 
availability 
The host 
computer  
hadn’t protection 
against possible 
theft or 
unauthorized 
access. It is stolen 
or damaged by 
criminals  
Catastrophic As a result of theft of computer the 
teacher has to buy a new computer 
and install operating system along 
with application programs. It will 
take him 2 days to fix the house door, 
buy a new computer and install an 
operating system with application 
programs. The new computer costs 
7000 NOK 
TCR = 3600 + 7000 = 10600 NOK 
CP = (10600/39600) = 26,76% 
 
 
Table 5.36: Private Lessons Consequence table for service availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence 
value 
Consequence 
description 
Teacher Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
Service 
availability 
Denial of host 
availability 
The host is not 
available 
 The consequence of denial of  
availabilities of host software, 
hardware, power supply service, host 
authorization and security service  
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Denial of Network 
availability 
The local Internet 
provider has 
technical 
problems and 
can’t provide 
access to the 
Internet 
Moderate The statistic shows that it usually 
takes no longer then 4 hours for 
Internet provider to fix technical 
problems. 
TCR = 1200 + 0 = 1200 NOK 
CP = (1200/39600)*100 = 3,03% 
Denial of Human 
availability 
The teacher is not 
available because 
he is ill or absent 
Moderate The statistic provided by the 
teacher’s doctor shows that  
in average the teacher was ill no 
longer than 1 day. 
TCR = 1800 + 0 = 1800 NOK 
CP = (1800/39600)*100 = 4,54% 
 
 
5.4.2 Activity 3.2: Frequency evaluation 
 
The objective of this activity is to evaluate the frequency of risks identified during the risk 
identification sub-process. The inputs for this activity are risks identified in the fault tree 
analysis activity. During the frequency evaluation activity, the frequency of the top event in a 
fault tree is identified by applying the frequencies for the events on the level below the top 
event. In general, the frequency of an event is identified by applying the frequencies for the 
events that are on one level below the event of interest.  
One can assign frequencies to risks using either qualitative or quantitative frequency values. 
Quantitative analysis of fault trees uses the minimal cut sets to compute the probability of the 
top event of a fault tree. A minimal cut set is a minimal set of basis (basic) events that can 
cause the top event. If all basis events are independent, the probability of a cut set is 
determined by multiplying together the probability of basis events. The probability of top 
event in a fault tree with n minimal cut sets can be computed with the help of the following 
formula: 1-((1-p1)*(1-p2)*….*(1-pn))  where p1 is the probability of cut set 1 and n is the 
number of cut sets.  
 
Often the basis events are of a qualitative nature. In this case one can use subjective 
probabilities based on expert judgement. Applying qualitative values, one should consider all 
the combinations of qualitative values in each cut-set and choose the ones that give the 
highest contribution to the occurrence probability of the top event. For more information 
about qualitative analysis we refer to [12]. 
 
The frequency values of risks also can be determined with the help of information from 
previous similar assessments, historical data, available statistic information, subjective 
assessment of RA-team or experts judgment. The frequency values also can be collected from 
producers of software and hardware or user support companies that have statistic about the 
use of particular software or hardware. If RA-team finds it difficult to assign frequency values 
for some risks, one can use CORAS [5] guidelines for the application of Markov analysis [15] 
for frequency evaluation. 
 
If risks are organised in fault trees using quantitative values, it is possible to compute 
automatically the frequency of the top event. As a result of this activity, the frequency values 
along with their description, stakeholders, assets, risks and risks scenarios should be 
documented in the frequency table. It is convenient to have one frequency table for each 
availability aspect. Table 5.37 shows the general form of frequency table and figures A.6, 
A.7, A.8, A.9 in Appendix A show frequency tables for different availability aspects. 
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Table 5.37: Frequency table 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency
value 
Frequency 
description 
<Stakeholder> <Asset> <Risk> <Risk scenario> <Frequency
   value> 
<Frequency 
   description> 
 
 
Example. Frequency evaluation: Private Lessons 
 
In the fault trees that we constructed in the fault trees analysis activity, every basis event can 
be sufficient to cause the root event. That is why we use “OR” ports and the probability of the 
root event can be computed with the help of the following formula:  
1-((1-p1)*(1-p2)*….*(1-pn)) where p1 is probability of event 1 and n is the number of basis 
events.  
 
The fault trees with identified frequencies of top events are shown in figures below. 
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Figure 5.19: Determination of frequency for the denial of host application software availability 
 
 
Figure 5.19 shows the fault tree with the probability of top event Denial of host application 
software availability that was determined by computing the probabilities of risks Denial of 
Net Meeting availability and Denial of Net Customer availability. The probabilities of these 
risks were determined by computing the probabilities of basis events on the lowest level of the 
relevant fault tree. The probabilities of these basis events were collected from the producers of 
application software and user support companies that have statistic about the use of particular 
software.  
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Figure 5.20 shows the fault tree with the probability of top event Denial of host operating 
system availability. The probabilities of basis events: Denial of operating system functionality, 
Denial of operating system authorization functionality and Incorrect installation and use of 
operating system by user, were collected from the user support company used by the teacher. 
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Figure 5.20: Determination of frequency for the denial of host operating system availability 
 
 
Figure 5.21 shows the fault tree with the probability of top event Denial of host internal 
hardware availability that was determined by computing the probabilities of risks Denial of 
IDSL modem availability and Denial of network card availability. The probabilities of these 
two risks are determined by computing the probabilities of basis events depicted on the lowest 
level in the fault tree. The probabilities of basis events were collected from the user support 
company used by the teacher. 
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Figure 5.21: Determination of frequency for the denial of host internal hardware availability 
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Figure 5.22 shows the fault tree with the probability of top event Denial of host external 
hardware availability that was determined by computing the probabilities of risks Denial of 
web camera availability, Denial of monitor availability and Denial of speakers availability. 
The probabilities of these risks are determined by computing the probabilities of basis events 
depicted on the lowest level in fault tree. The probabilities of basis events were collected from 
the user support company used by the teacher. 
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Figure 5.22: Determination of frequency for the denial of host external hardware availability 
 
 
Figure 5.23 shows the fault tree with the probability of top event Denial of host security 
service availability that was determined by computing the probabilities of risks Denial of 
security service due to firewall problems and Denial of security service due to antivirus 
software problems. The teacher has neither firewall nor antivirus software. That is why the 
probabilities of risks on the second level of fault tree were determined by computing the 
probabilities of risks Lack of firewall and Lack of antivirus software. The probabilities of 
these basis events were determined by analysing statistical information that shows percentage 
of personal computers attacked from the Internet or affected by virus. 
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Figure 5.23: Determination of frequency for the denial of host security service availability 
 
 
We have now enough information to determine the frequency of risk Denial of host node 
availability shown in Figure 5.24. The frequency of risk Denial of power supply service 
availability was collected from the local power supply company. The frequency of risk Denial 
of host authorization availability was determined by analysing the information provided by 
the local police office. This information shows statistic about the number of burglaries in the 
teacher’s house area and we decided to assign the frequency value to be equal the probability 
of housebreaking in the teacher’s house.  
 
 
4
Denial of Host
hardware
availability
OR
Denial of Host
internal
hardware
availability
Denial of Host
external
hardware
availability
6 8
Denial of Host
storage device
availability
(hard disc)
7
0.0131287 0.01962630.002
0.0001
Denial of Host
authorization
availability
5
1
Denial of Host
software
availability
2
OR
Denial of Host
application
software
availability
Denial of Host
operative
system
availability
0.0141286 0.0130688
0.01
3
Denial of
Power supply
service
availability
Denial of Host
node
availability
OR
Denial of Host
Security
service
availability
0.0270128 0.0344324
0.0885101
0.0199
 
Figure 5.24: Determination of frequency for the denial of host node availability 
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Now we can determine the frequency of risk Denial of Service availability. 
Figure 5.25 shows the relevant fault tree where the probability of top event was determined by 
computing the probabilities of risks Denial of host node availability, Denial of Network 
availability and Denial of human availability. The probability of denial of the Internet 
connection was collected from the Internet provider. The teacher himself provided the 
probability that the service will not be available because of his absence or illness. 
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Figure 5.25: Determination of frequency for the denial of service availability 
 
 
The identified frequencies of top events in fault trees are documented in the frequency tables 
shown in figures below. 
 
 
Table 5.38: Private Lessons Frequency table for software availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency 
value 
Frequency 
description 
Denial of host operating 
system availability 
The host 
operating system 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
   0,0130688 The frequencies of risks that cause 
the denial of host operating system, 
were collected from the user 
support company used by the 
teacher 
Denial of  
Net 
Meeting 
availability 
Net Meeting 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
   0,0070894 The frequencies of risks that cause 
the denial of Net Meeting, were 
collected from the user support 
company used by the teacher 
Teacher Availability 
of service 
Denial of  
host  
Software 
availability 
Denial of 
host 
application 
software 
availability Denial of 
Net 
Customer 
availability 
Net Customer 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
   0,0070894 The frequencies of risks that cause 
the denial of Net Customer were 
collected from the user support 
company used by the teacher 
 
 
Table 5.39: Private Lessons Frequency table for hardware availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency 
value 
Frequency 
description 
Teacher Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host 
Hardware 
availability 
Denial of host storage 
device 
availability 
The host hard 
disc doesn’t 
function or  
malfunction 
      0,002 The frequency is defined by 
analysing statistical information 
from a technical support company 
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Denial of 
modem 
availability 
The modem 
doesn’t 
function or 
malfunction. As  
result of it, the  
teacher’s 
computer 
can’t be 
connected 
to the Internet 
    0,006586 The frequencies of risks that cause 
the denial of modem were 
collected from the user support 
company used by the teacher 
Denial of 
host 
internal 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of 
network 
card 
availability 
The network card 
doesn’t function 
or  
malfunction. As  
result of it, 
computer 
can’t be 
connected 
to the Internet 
    0,006586 The frequencies of risks that cause 
the denial of network card were 
collected from the user support 
company used by the teacher 
Denial of  
monitor 
availability 
The monitor 
doesn’t 
function or  
malfunction 
   0,0080762 The frequency is defined by 
analysing statistical information 
from a technical support company 
Denial of  
web camera 
availability 
The web camera 
doesn’t function 
or 
malfunction 
   0,006586 The frequency is defined by 
analysing statistical information 
from a technical support company 
Denial of 
host 
external 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of  
speakers 
availability 
Speakers don’t  
function or 
malfunction 
   0,0050915 The frequency is defined by 
analysing statistical information 
from a technical support company 
 
 
Table 5.40: Private Lessons Frequency table for host security service availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency 
value 
Frequency 
description 
Lack of firewall – host is 
attacked from the Internet 
The host node is 
attacked from the 
Internet  
        0,01 The probability is determined by 
analysing statistical information 
that shows percentage of personal 
computers attacked from the 
Internet 
Teacher Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host 
security 
service 
availability 
Lack of antivirus software 
– host is attacked by 
computer virus 
The host node is 
attacked by  
computer virus 
        0,01 The probability is determined by 
analysing statistical information 
that shows percentage of personal 
computers attacked by computer 
virus 
 
 
Table 5.41: Private Lessons Frequency table for host availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency 
value 
Frequency 
description 
Denial of host Software 
availability 
The host software
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
   0,0270128 The frequency is defined by 
determine the frequency of denial of 
availabilities of operating system and 
application programs Net Meeting 
and Net Customer 
Teacher Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host  
availability 
Denial of host Hardware 
availability 
The host 
hardware 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
   0,0344324 The frequency is defined by 
determine the frequency of denial of 
availabilities of host hard disc, host 
internal and external hardware 
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Denial of power supply 
service availability 
The local  
provider of  
electricity has  
technical 
problems 
and can’t provide 
electricity to the 
teacher’s house 
        0,01 The probability is determined by 
analysing statistical information 
provided by the local electricity 
provider 
Denial of host security 
service  
availability 
The host is 
attacked from 
the internet 
and/or by 
computer virus 
      0,0199 The probability is determined by 
analysing statistical information that 
shows percentage of personal 
computers attacked from the Internet 
or by computer virus 
Denial of host 
authorization 
availability 
The host 
computer  
hadn’t protection 
against possible 
theft or 
unauthorized 
access. It is stolen 
or 
damaged by 
criminals 
(plotters 
     0,0001 The probability is determined by 
analysing statistical information 
provided by the local police office 
 
 
Table 5.42: Private Lessons Frequency table for service availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency 
value 
Frequency 
description 
Denial of host availability The host is not 
available 
   0,0885101 The frequency is determined by 
computing the frequencies of the 
following risks: 
- Denial of host software 
  availability 
- Denial of host hardware 
  availability 
- Denial of host power supply 
  service availability 
- Denial of host security service 
  availability 
- Denial of host authorization 
  availability 
Denial of Network 
availability 
The local Internet 
provider has 
technical 
problems and 
can’t provide 
access to the 
Internet 
         0,1 The probability is determined by 
analysing statistical information 
provided by the local Internet 
provider 
Teacher Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
Service 
availability 
Denial of Human 
availability 
The teacher is not 
available because 
he is ill or absent 
        0,01 The frequency is provided by the 
teacher himself. 
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5.5 Risk evaluation 
 
The objective of the risk evaluation sub-process is to determine the levels of availability risks, 
categorise risks into risk treatment categories and assign priority for each risk and risk 
treatment category. The risk evaluation sub-process consists of four activities that will 
typically be carried out in a sequential order: 
 
▪ Identification of risks values 
▪ Update of risks values 
▪ Categorisation of risks into risk treatment categories 
▪ Specification of priorities of risk treatment categories 
 
5.5.1 Activity 4.1: Identification of risks values 
 
The objective of this activity is to determine the risk value for each risk. The risk value is an 
estimate of risk severity deduced from the consequence value and the frequency value. 
 
To assign the risk values, one should use the rules for determining the risk values from the 
consequence and frequency values that have been identified during Activity 1.1. The rules for 
assigning the risk values may be displayed in one or more Risk Matrix (Table 5.13 Activity 
1.1). 
  
The following approaches may be used for the determination of risk values of risks that have 
consequence and frequency values of the same or different domains: 
 
- If both values are quantitative, they should be multiplied [6]. 
- If one of quantitative values equals 0, the risk may be assigned a risk value by the 
relevant stakeholder. 
- If both values are qualitative, the Risk Matrix may be applied directly. 
- If one of the values is quantitative, this value has to be mapped to its qualitative 
equivalent before the Risk Matrix may be applied: 
- A quantitative consequence value should be mapped in the Consequence values 
table (Table 5.12) to its qualitative equivalent. 
- A quantitative frequency value should be mapped in the Frequency values table 
(Table 5.8) to its qualitative equivalent. 
 
As a result of this activity, the Risks levels table shown in Table 5.43 should be constructed 
and document all risks along with their consequence, likelihood (frequency) and risk values. 
 
 
Table 5.43: Risks levels table 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Consequence
Value 
Frequency
Value 
Risk 
Value 
<..> <..> <..> <..> <..> <..> 
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Example. Identification of risks values: Private Lessons 
 
Table 5.44 documents all risks along with their identified risk values. For the identification of 
risk values we applied the Risk Matrix (Table 5.13) 
 
 
Table 5.44: Private Lessons Risks levels table 
Stakeholder Asset Risk 
 
Consequence 
Value 
Frequency 
Value 
Risk 
Value 
Denial of host operating system 
availability 
Major Unlikely Moderate
Denial of  
Net Meeting 
availability 
Major Rare Low 
Denial of host 
software 
availability Denial of host 
application 
software 
availability Denial of 
Net Customer 
availability 
Minor Rare No risk 
Denial of host storage device 
availability 
Catastrophic Rare Moderate
Denial of 
modem 
availability 
Moderate Rare Low Denial of host 
internal 
hardware 
availability Denial of 
network card 
availability 
Minor Rare No risk 
Denial of  
monitor 
availability 
Major Rare Low 
Denial of  
web camera 
availability 
Moderate Rare Low 
Denial of host 
Hardware 
availability 
Denial of host 
external 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of  
speakers 
availability 
Minor Rare No risk 
Lack of firewall – host is 
attacked from the Internet 
Major Unlikely ModerateDenial of host 
security service 
availability 
 
Lack of antivirus software – 
host is attacked by computer 
virus 
Major Unlikely Moderate
Denial of host power supply service availability 
 
Moderate Unlikely Low 
Denial of host authorization availability 
 
Catastrophic Rare Moderate
Denial of network availability 
 
Moderate Possible Moderate
Teacher Availability 
of service 
Denial of human availability Moderate Unlikely Low 
 
 
5.5.2 Activity 4.2: Update of risks values 
 
The objective of this activity is to update risks values in order to eliminate risks that have 
acceptable risk values.  
 
The procedure for this activity is the following: 
• For each risk compare the risk value (and possible the consequence and frequency 
values) with the risk evaluation criteria and conclude weather a risk is accepted or not. 
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• If a risk is accepted, the risk value should be changed to “accepted”, and the risk will 
not be evaluated further. If a risk is not accepted, the risk value remains the same. 
• Updated risk values should be documented in the Updated risk levels table shown in 
Table 5.45. 
 
 
Table 5.45: Updated risk levels table 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Consequence
Value 
Frequency
Value 
Updated 
Risk 
Value 
<..> <..> <..> <..> <..> <..> 
 
 
Example. Update of risks values: Private Lessons 
 
We compared the risk values documented in the Risk levels table (Table 5.44) with the risk 
evaluation criteria and documented updated risk values in Table 5.46. As you can see from the 
table, we accepted all risks that have risk value less than “Moderate.”  
 
 
Table 5.46: Private Lessons Updated risk levels table 
Stakeholder Asset Risk 
 
Consequence 
Value 
Frequency 
Value 
Updated
Risk 
Value 
 
Denial of host operating 
system availability 
Major Unlikely Moderate
Denial of  
Net Meeting 
availability 
Major Rare Accepted
Denial of host 
software 
availability Denial of host
application 
software 
availability Denial of 
Net Customer 
availability 
Minor Rare Accepted
Denial of host storage device 
availability 
Catastrophic Rare Moderate
Denial of 
modem 
availability 
Moderate Rare AcceptedDenial of host
internal 
hardware 
availability Denial of 
network card 
availability 
Minor Rare Accepted
Denial of  
monitor 
availability 
Major Rare Accepted
Denial of  
web camera 
availability 
Moderate Rare Accepted
Denial of host 
Hardware 
availability 
Denial of host
external 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of  
speakers 
availability 
Minor Rare Accepted
Lack of firewall – host is 
attacked from the Internet 
Major Unlikely ModerateDenial of host 
security service 
availability 
 
Lack of antivirus software – 
host is attacked by computer 
virus 
Major Unlikely Moderate
Teacher Availability 
of service 
Denial of host power supply service availability 
 
Moderate Unlikely Accepted
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Denial of host authorization availability 
 
Catastrophic Rare Moderate
Denial of network availability 
 
Moderate Possible Moderate
Denial of human availability 
 
Moderate Unlikely Accepted
 
 
5.5.3 Activity 4.3: Categorisation of risks into risk treatment categories 
 
The objective of this activity is to organise risks into risk treatment categories to make the risk 
treatment more effective.  
 
The procedure for this activity is the following: 
 
• Identify the risk treatment categories and document them in the first column of the 
Risk treatment categories table (Table 5.47). 
• For each non-accepted risk identify the risk treatment category the risk belongs to, and 
document it in the second column of the Risk treatment categories table.  
  
Risks that can affect each availability aspect category may require different treatment options 
and approaches. That is why the risk treatment categories may be selected on the basis of 
availability aspect categories. Propose for the risk treatment categories is given in the Possible 
risk treatment categories table shown in Table 5.48. 
 
 
Table 5.47: Risk treatment categories table 
Risk Treatment Category Risks 
<Category> <List of risks> 
 
 
Table 5.48: Possible risk treatment categories 
Risk Treatment 
Category 
1. Host (Node) operating system availability risks 
2. Host (Node) application software availability risks 
3. Host (Node) storage device availability risks 
4. Host (Node) hardware availability risks 
5. Host (Node) security service availability risks (firewall) 
6. Host (Node) security service availability risks (antivirus software) 
7. Host (Node) power supply service availability risks 
8. Host (Node) authorization availability risks 
9. Network availability risks (for network consumer) 
10. Network availability risks (for network provider) 
11. Human availability risks 
 
 
Example. Categorisation of risks into risk treatment categories: Private Lessons 
 
The categorization of risks into risk treatment categories is shown in Table 5.49. 
CHAPTER 5. MODA 
 
 
 86 
Table 5.49: Private Lessons Risk treatment categories table 
Risk Treatment 
Category 
Risks 
Host operating system 
availability risks 
1. Denial of host operating  
    system availability 
Host storage device 
availability risks 
1. Denial of host hard disk  
    availability  
Host security service 
availability risks (firewall)
1. Lack of firewall – host is  
    attacked from the Internet 
Host security service 
availability risks (antivirus 
software) 
1. Lack of antivirus software –   
    host is attacked by a computer 
    virus 
Host authorization 
availability risks 
1. Denial of host authorization 
    availability 
Network availability risks 
(for network consumer) 
1. Denial of Network availability  
 
 
5.5.4 Activity 4.4: Specification of priorities of risk treatment categories 
 
The objective of this activity is to specify priorities of risk treatment categories. The priority 
should be based on the level of risk treatment category value. The risk treatment category 
value should be assigned for each risk treatment category and documented along with the risk 
treatment category priority in the Risk treatment category priority table shown in Table 5.50. 
It is convenient to have the Risk treatment category priority table sorted by priority. 
 
The risk treatment category value can be calculated in different ways: 
 
• The maximum risk value. The risk treatment category value is assigned the maximum 
risk value of its risks. 
• The total risk value. The risk treatment category value is the sum of the risk values of 
all the risks included in this risk treatment category: 
• If the risk values are quantitative, a calculation can be done directly. 
• If the risk values are qualitative, before a calculation they have to be assigned numeric 
values according to the agreed scale (e.g. no risk (N) = 0; extreme risk (E) = 4;).  
• The average risk value. The risk treatment category value is the average of the risk 
values of all the risks included in this risk treatment category. The qualitative values 
should be assigned numeric values before a calculation. 
• The highest risk value. The risk treatment category value consists of two elements: 
- The highest risk value represented in this risk treatment category. 
- The number of risks with the highest risk level.  
 
 
Table 5.50: Risk treatment category priority table 
Risk Treatment 
Category 
Risks Risk Treatment 
Category Value 
Risk Treatment 
Category Priority
<Category> <List of risks> <Value> <Priority> 
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Example. Specification of priorities of risk treatment categories: Private Lessons 
 
We decided to use the highest risk value approach to define values of risk treatment 
categories. The identified values and priorities of risk treatment categories are shown in Table 
5.51. The risk treatment category value consists of two elements: a letter that denotes the 
highest risk value represented in this category and the number of risks with the highest risk 
level. In our case all risk treatment categories have the same priority. 
 
 
Table 5.51: Private Lessons Risk treatment category priority table 
        Risk Treatment 
            Category 
                     Risks Risk Treatment 
Category Value 
 Risk Treatment  
Category Priority 
Host operating system 
availability risks 
1. Denial of host operating  
    system availability 
M1 1 
Host storage device availability 
risks 
1. Denial of host storage device  
    availability 
M1 1 
Host security service availability 
risks (firewall) 
1. Lack of firewall – host is  
    attacked from the Internet 
M1 1 
Host security service availability 
risks (antivirus software) 
1. Lack of antivirus software – host  
    is attacked by a computer virus 
M1 1 
Host authorization availability 
risks 
1. Denial of host authorization 
    availability 
M1 1 
Network availability risks 1. Denial of Network availability M1 1 
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5.6 Risk treatment 
 
The objective of the risk treatment sub-process is to define treatment approaches and 
treatment options along with treatment actions within each treatment option for each risk 
within each risk treatment category. In the final phase of this sub-process, the treatment 
actions should be prioritised based on their costs and benefits. The Risk treatment sub-process 
consists of two activities that will typically be carried out in a sequential order: 
 
▪ Identification of treatment options 
▪ Specification of risks treatment priorities 
 
5.6.1 Activity 5.1: Identification of treatment options 
 
The objective of this activity is to define treatment approaches and treatment options along 
with treatment actions (see Figure 5.26) within each treatment option for each risk within each 
treatment category identified during the Risk evaluation sub-process. 
For each risk treatment category, one or several of the following treatment approaches can be 
considered [6]: 
 
a) Risk avoidance 
b) Reduction of likelihood 
c) Reduction of consequences 
d) Risk transfer 
e) Risk retention 
 
Organizational assets should be protected and companies should use security policies to 
provide the baseline from which the fundamental principles of system and assets protection 
are defined. For example, you can reduce the risk of unauthorized access to a building by 
defining in the security policy that the access to building should be controlled not only by 
clerk but also by electronic door lock. 
But knowledge of security policy is not enough to provide the effective treatment of possible 
risks. You should know the system architecture, in other words how system components 
interact with each other. By making changes in system architecture, you can either increase or 
decrease the system availability. For example, you can reduce the possibility of denial of 
system availability by installing a firewall to protect your system against network attacks. 
When you install a firewall, you change your system architecture or in other words, you 
redesign the system (You implement the new design of the system).  
 
Along with system architecture, you should also consider how well the functionality of 
system components conforms to components specification and whether the probability of 
risks to these components has changed. While testing of components can help you to define 
that system components are functioning correctly, a monitoring can help you to decide 
whether or not some particular risks are becoming more or less probable. For example, a 
network administrator can test network equipment to be sure that it works correctly, and he 
can install a program for monitoring network traffic that will notify him about increased 
network traffic (it can affect the functionality of network equipment) or link state changes. 
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Within each of the chosen treatment approaches, treatment may involve different treatment 
options. Consideration of different treatment options may help us to look at the risk treatment 
from different perspectives and in this way increase the number of possible solutions. Thus, if 
we consider Revising the security policy as a treatment option, a security policy can be 
changed to not allow the use of a critical system component (risk avoidance) or security 
policy can specify that financial consequences of denial of component availability should be 
covered by insurance (risk transfer). You can write requirement in security policy that only 
competent users (certified users) can use this component (reduction of likelihood) or you can 
specify that recovery from denial of component availability should be done only by 
specialized company (reduction of consequence). 
 
Considering Redesigning system as a treatment option, we can decide to avoid all potential 
single points of failure through redundancy of critical components (reduction of likelihood) or 
we can specify that critical components should not be connected to the Internet (risk 
avoidance). We can reduce the consequence of localized physical disasters by physical 
separation of critical system components (reduction of consequence) or we can decide to lease 
parts of the network with critical components to another network provider (risk transfer). 
 
Considering Strategies for testing as a treatment option, we can decide to test regularly this 
critical system component and in this way reduce the likelihood of denial of component 
availability (reduction of likelihood) or regularly test the functionality of additional 
component and in this way insure possibility for replacement of critical component (reduction 
of consequence). 
 
If we consider Strategies for monitoring as a treatment option, we can decide to install 
software for monitoring of functionality of critical system component (reduction of 
likelihood) or monitoring of functionality of additional system component (reduction of 
consequence) 
Thus, within each treatment approach, one or several of the following treatment options can 
be considered: 
 
1) Revising the security policy 
2) Redesigning the system 
3) Strategies for testing 
4) Strategies for monitoring 
 
 
Cost
Risk treatment
category
Benefit
Treatment
option
Treatment
approach
1
5
1 11 1
4
1
Risk 1*
Treatment
action
*
1
 
Figure 5.26: Risk treatment 
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Figure 5.26 shows graphical representation of risk treatment. As you can see from the figure, 
each risk belongs to one risk treatment category, while risk treatment category may include 
many risks. For each risk treatment category we can consider five treatment approaches and 
four treatment options within each treatment approach. Within each treatment option we can 
consider different treatment actions where each of them has cost and benefit. 
 
For the identification of treatment options and treatment actions within each treatment option, 
one can use Templates for risk treatment that are shown in Appendix B. The identified 
treatment options and treatment actions have to be documented in the risk treatment tables 
that should be constructed for each risk treatment category. Templates for risk treatment and 
risk treatment tables play different roles in this activity. Templates for risk treatment should 
facilitate communication among stakeholders and assist them in the identification of treatment 
options and treatment actions within each treatment option. Risk treatment tables should be 
used to document identified risk treatment options and treatment actions along with treatment 
actions costs and benefits. 
 
The identification of treatment options activity consists of two steps that will typically be 
carried out in sequential order: 
 
• For each risk treatment category identify risk treatment options and treatment actions 
with the help of Templates for risk treatment (see Risk treatment templates guide in 
Figure 5.27): 
For identification of treatment options for risk treatment category: 
- Host application software availability risks, use the templates from figures B.1, 
B.2, B.3. 
- Host operating system availability risks, use the templates from figures B.4, B.5, 
B.6. 
- Host hardware availability risks, use the templates from figures B.7, B.8, B.9, 
B.10.  
- Host storage device availability risks, use the templates from figures B.11, B.12, 
B.13. 
- Host security service availability risks (firewall), use the template from 
FigureB.14. 
- Host security service availability risks (antivirus software), use the template from 
FigureB.15. 
- Host authorization availability risks, use the template from Figure B.16. 
- Host power supply service availability risks, use the template from Figure B.17. 
- Human availability risks, use the template from Figure B.18. 
- Network availability risks (for network provider), use the template from Figure 
B.19. 
- Network availability risks (for network consumer), use the template from Figure 
B.20. 
 
• For each risk treatment category document identified treatment options and treatment 
actions in the Risk treatment table shown in Table 5.52. 
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Figure 5.27: Risk treatment templates guide 
 
 
Table 5.52: Risk treatment table 
ID Risk Approach Treatment
Option 
Treatment 
Action 
Benefit Cost 
1) <treatment> <benefit> <cost> 
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
b) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
c) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 <id> <risk> 
e) 
4)    
 
 
Figure 5.28 shows the general structure of risk treatment templates. From the figure we can 
see that to make the treatment of a risk on the highest level, we have to treat risks that can 
lead to this risk. For example, to treat the risk Denial of application software availability, we 
have to make the treatment of risks: Denial of application software functionality, Denial of 
application software authorization functionality, and Incorrect installation and use of 
application software. For each of risks that can lead to the risk on the highest level we 
constructed template that will facilitate the identification of risk treatment options and risk 
treatment actions. In each of constructed templates, the treatment actions were defined by 
considering different treatment approaches (the level 3 in Figure 5.28) and different treatment 
options within each of treatment approaches (the lowest level in Figure 5.28). 
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Figure 5.28: General structure of risk treatment templates 
 
 
Example. Identification of treatment options: Private Lessons 
 
The identified with the help of templates risk treatment options and risk treatment actions are 
documented in the risk treatment tables shown in figures C.1 – C.6 in Appendix C. The risk 
treatment tables were constructed for each identified risk treatment category. 
 
 
5.6.2 Activity 5.2: Specification of risks treatment priorities 
 
The objective of this activity is to define priority among risk treatment actions. The inputs for 
this activity are the risks with identified risk treatment options and risk treatment actions as 
well as risk treatment actions costs and benefits that were documented in the risk treatment 
tables in Activity 5.1. The priority should be defined for each risk treatment action identified 
for a treatment of a particular risk. 
 
The priority should be based on the level of treatment action value that can be assigned with 
the help of the Risk treatment action priority matrix chosen in Activity 1.1 (Table 5.15). The 
identification of treatment action values implies an assignment of values to the benefit and 
cost of each treatment action. Treatment actions benefits and costs should be assigned values 
according to the scale chosen in Activity 1.1.  
 
As a result of this activity, the Risk treatment priority table shown in Table 5.53 should be 
constructed for each risk treatment category and document the costs, benefits and priorities of 
treatment actions within each risk of treatment category. 
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Table 5.53: Risk treatment priority table 
ID Risk Approach Treatment
Option 
Treatment
Action 
Benefit Cost Treatment 
Action 
Priority 
1) <treatment> <benefit> <cost> <priority> 
2)     
3)     
a) 
4)     
1)     
2)     
3)     
b) 
4)     
1)     
2)     
3)     
c) 
4)     
1)     
2)     
3)     
d) 
4)     
1)     
2)     
3)     
 <id> <risk> 
e) 
4)     
 
 
Example. Specification of risks treatment priorities: Private Lessons 
 
First we assigned values for the benefits and costs of all treatment actions. All treatment 
actions benefits and costs were assigned values according to the following scale: “very low” 
(VL), “low” (L), “moderate” (M), “high” (H), “very high” (VH). Then, we identified the risk 
treatment actions priorities with the help of the Risk treatment action priority matrix (Table 
5.15). The identified priorities of risk treatment actions are shown in Appendix C, figures C7 
– C.12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. MODA 
 
 
 94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  95
 
6 Using MODA to assess a Chat Service 
 
To evaluate the suitability of MODA we conducted a case study using MODA to assess the 
availability of a chat service. In this chapter we summarise our experiences from this case 
study. In particular, we discuss to what extent the success criteria formulated in chapter 3 
have been fulfilled. 
 
The chat service AMIGOS [33] is offered by a business company to the public. The intended 
users of AMIGOS chat service are people who use PDA terminals with Internet access. To 
use the chat service, the user has to open a chat terminal program on the PDA and type his 
username and password. When the user successfully logs into the service, he gets access to his 
private account that contains all relevant information that the user will need in order to 
interact with other people. The system owner – the business company estimates that the 
service is used about 30000 hours each month and it charges 1$ for each hour of service 
usage. The chat service is implemented on two nodes: UnixSuper and UnixSuperDuper. 
These two nodes and user’s PDA communicate through the Internet. Successfully logged in 
users get access to his or her private account and can choose among different chat rooms. 
When the user chooses a chat room, the chat window opens on the PDA terminal and he or 
she can start to chat with other service users. 
 
The purpose of this case study is to check how MODA meets its success criteria, namely: 
• Success criterion 1: MODA should target availability in a security context. 
• Success criterion 2: MODA should be time efficient.  
• Success criterion 3: MODA should be cost effective from a reusability perspective. 
• Success criterion 4: MODA should be user friendly assisting its users by providing 
guidelines, templates and checklists. 
 
We describe the availability risk assessment of AMIGOS chat service in Appendix D. 
Appendix D is structured into six sections. The first five describe the practical use of 
corresponding five MODA sub-processes for the availability risk assessment of the chat 
service. Section D.1 documents the results from the Context identification of the chat service. 
The Risk identification is presented in section D.2.  Section D.3 documents the results from 
the Risk Analysis. The Risk Evaluation is presented in section D.4. Section D.5 documents 
the results from the last sub-process, namely Risk Treatment. Section D.6 presents the 
summary of main conclusions. 
 
This chapter is structured into four sections. Section 6.1 discusses how MODA meets its first 
success criterion. The second success criterion is discussed in section 6.2. Section 6.3 
provides argumentation for how MODA meets its third success criterion. Section 6.4 
discusses how MODA meets its fourth success criterion. 
 
 
6.1 How MODA meets its first success criterion 
 
Based on the experience from the risk assessment of the chat service, we discuss in this 
section how MODA meets its first success criterion. This section is structured into three sub-
sections. Sub-section 6.1.1 presents how MODA supports the fulfilment of the first success 
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criterion. Sub-section 6.1.2 shows how it worked out in the risk assessment of the chat 
service. The conclusion is presented in sub-section 6.1.3. 
 
Success criterion 1 
 
MODA should target availability in a security context 
 
 
 
6.1.1 MODA support 
 
To address availability in a security context we define it in MODA as “The property of being 
accessible and usable upon demand by an authorised entity” [19]. Further, we constructed 
templates that support the identification and treatment of security risks. For example, in the 
template for denial of host node availability (Figure 4.15) we define two categories of security 
risks. Under Denial of host authorization availability we consider the probability of events 
that can cause the denial of host availability because of lack/reduction of Host authorisation 
availability (e.g. the probability that computer can be stolen or accessed by an unauthorized 
person). Under Denial of host security service availability we consider the probability that the 
host node will be affected by an attack from the Internet (Network) or by computer virus. We 
consider these risks on a more detailed level in the template for denial of host security service 
availability (Figure 4.19).  
 
In the risk evaluation sub-process we suggest to categorize security risks into three risk 
treatment categories: Host authorization availability risks, Host security service availability 
risks (firewall), and Host security service availability risks (antivirus software). Further, we 
construct templates to support the treatment of risks that belong to these risk treatment 
categories. For instance, the template in Figure B.14 supports the identification of risk 
treatment options and risk treatment actions for the risk treatment category Host security 
service availability risks (firewall). The template in Figure B.15 is meant to support the 
treatment of risks belonging to the risk treatment category Host security service availability 
risks (antivirus software). We suggest risk treatment options and risk treatment actions for the 
risk treatment category Host authorization availability risks in the template shown in Figure 
B.16. 
 
 
6.1.2 How it worked out 
 
In the risk identification sub-process we have used the template for denial of host node 
availability (Figure 4.15) to construct the fault tree (Figure D.2.4) that among other host risks 
also shows security risks Denial of host authorization availability and Denial of host security 
service availability. Further, we have used the template for denial of host security service 
availability (Figure 4.19) to construct the fault tree (Figure D.2.14) that shows security risks 
that may affect the PDA availability. The similar trees were constructed for the risks Denial of 
host (UnixSuper) security service availability, and Denial of host (UnixSuperDuper) security 
service availability. 
 
In the risk analysis sub-process we identified the consequences and frequencies of risks that 
may cause the denial of security service availability and authorization availability of PDA and 
chat service nodes. The consequence and frequency tables for the host security service 
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availability risks (Tables D.3.3 and D.3.8) were constructed to document the consequences 
and frequencies of risks that may cause the denial of security service availability of PDA and 
chat service nodes. Frequencies of these risks were defined in figures D.3.1, D.3.5 and D.3.6.  
In Figure D.3.1 under Lack of firewall we considered the probability that due to the lack of 
firewall, the network risks (e.g. network attack) may cause the denial of PDA availability. In 
the same figure under Lack of antivirus software we considered the probability that due to the 
lack of antivirus software, the malicious program or virus may cause the denial of PDA 
availability. In figures D.3.5 and D.3.6 under Denial of firewall functionality we considered 
the probability that firewall will not protect against risks that may cause the denial of chat 
service nodes availability. Under Denial of antivirus software functionality we considered the 
probability that antivirus software will not protect against risks (malicious program or virus) 
that may cause the denial of chat service nodes availability. 
 
In the risk evaluation sub-process we categorised risks with the help of the Possible risk 
treatment categories table (Table 5.48). Host node security risks were divided into three risk 
treatment categories (Table D.4.3): Host authorization availability risks, Host security service 
availability risks (firewall), and Host security service availability risks (antivirus software).  
 
In the risk treatment sub-process we identified risk treatment options and risk treatment 
actions for security risks with the help of three templates for risk treatment from appendix B. 
Templates from figures B.14 (Lack of firewall/Attack from the network), B.15 (Lack of antivirus 
software/Virus attack) and B.16 (Denial of host authorization availability) were used to define risk 
treatment options and actions for the corresponding risk treatment categories. The identified 
treatment options and treatment actions were documented in the risk treatment tables (Tables 
D.5.3, D.5.4, D.5.5) that were constructed for each risk treatment category. 
 
 
6.1.3 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we evaluated how MODA meets its first success criterion. The case study of 
the chat service shows that MODA targets availability from a security perspective with the 
help of templates and guidelines. Particularly, it focuses on the most important security risks 
in templates targeting the identification and treatment of security risks. The case study shows 
that two templates can be effectively used for the identification of security risks: the template 
for denial of host node availability (Figure 4.15) and the template for denial of host security 
service availability (Figure 4.19). With the help of these templates the following five security 
risks may be identified: 
- Denial of host authorization availability 
- Lack of firewall/Attack from the network 
- Denial of firewall functionality 
- Lack of antivirus software/Virus attack 
- Denial of antivirus software functionality 
 
Further, with the help of the Possible risk treatment categories table (Table 5.48) these risks 
can be organized into three risk treatment categories (Table D.4.3). The identification of risk 
treatment options and risk treatment actions for these risk treatment categories can be done 
effectively with the help of three templates for risk treatment shown in figures B.14 (Lack of 
firewall/Attack from the network), B.15 (Lack of antivirus software/Virus attack) and B.16 (Denial 
of host authorization availability). 
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Along with the benefits mentioned above, the case study has shown that we have some 
challenges that are not so simple to resolve. On the one hand, MODA does not address all 
possible security risks (e.g. Sabotage), and on the other hand security risks that are typical for 
particular environment, may be defined more effectively by domain experts. 
 
 
6.2 How MODA meets its second success criterion 
 
In this section we discuss how MODA meets its second success criterion. This section is 
structured into three sub-sections. Sub-section 6.2.1 presents how MODA supports the 
fulfilment of the second success criterion. Sub-section 6.2.2 shows how it worked out in the 
risk assessment of the chat service. The conclusion is presented in sub-section 6.2.3. 
 
Success criterion 2 
 
MODA should be time efficient 
 
 
6.2.1 MODA support 
 
We address time efficiency in MODA by means of guidelines, templates and the predefined 
set of tables. For example, in the context identification sub-process we define the set of 
frequency and consequence values (Tables 5.7, 5.9…5.11 and Figure 5.3) to support the rapid 
identification of the range of frequency and consequence values. Further, in the risk 
identification sub-process we support the quick construction of fault trees by means of 
templates for availability risk analysis (Figures 4.15…4.19). In the risk analysis sub-process 
we facilitate the rapid construction and documentation of consequence and frequency values 
by means of the predefined set of consequence and frequency tables (Figures A.2…A.9 in 
Appendix A). To support the quick identification of the risk treatment categories we suggest 
eleven risk treatment categories in the Possible risk treatment categories table (Table 5.48). In 
the risk treatment sub-process we support the rapid identification of the risk treatment options 
and risk treatment actins by means of templates for risk treatment (Figures B.1…B.20 in 
Appendix B). 
 
6.2.2 How it worked out 
 
In the context identification sub-process the predefined set of frequency values (Table 5.7) 
helped us in the quick identification of the range of frequency values that were documented in 
the Frequency values table (Table D.1.1). With the help of Figure 5.3 that shows the 
categorisation of consequences, we rapidly defined that the consequence values for PDA user 
should be measured in the impact of service lost time on the user (Table D.1.2). With the help 
of the Total income consequence values table (Table 5.11) we quickly defined the set of 
consequence values for the chat service owner (Table D.1.2). 
 
In the risk identification sub-process we quickly constructed fault trees with the help of 
templates for availability risk analysis. To build the fault trees that have the top events Denial 
of host node (PDA) availability, Denial of host node (UnixSuper) availability, and Denial of 
host node (UnixSuperDuper) availability, we have used the template from Figure 4.15. To 
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build the fault trees that have the top event Denial of host application software availability 
(Figures D.2.5, D.2.6, D.2.7) we have used the template from Figure 4.16. To build the fault 
trees that have the top event Denial of host operating system availability (Figures D.2.8, 
D.2.9, D.2.10) we have used the template from Figure 4.17. To build the fault trees that have 
the top event Denial of host hardware availability (Figures D.2.11, D.2.12, D.2.13) we have 
used the template from Figure 4.18. 
 
In the risk analysis sub-process the predefined set of consequence and frequency tables 
(Figures A.2...A.9 in Appendix A) facilitated quick construction and documentation of 
consequence and frequency values. In the risk evaluation sub-process we identified quickly 
the risk treatment categories (Table D.4.3) with the help of the Possible risk treatment 
categories table (Table 5.48).  
 
In the risk treatment sub-process we identified quickly the risk treatment options and risk 
treatment actions with the help of templates shown in Appendix B. The templates from 
figures B.4, B.5, and B.6 were used to identify the risk treatment options and actions for the 
risk treatment category Host operating system availability risks (Risk treatment table in Table 
D.5.1). The templates shown in figures B.8, B.9, and B.10 were used to identify the risk 
treatment options and actions for the risk treatment category Host hardware availability risks 
(Risk treatment table in Table D.5.2). The template shown in Figure B.16 was used to identify 
the risk treatment options and actions for the risk treatment category Host authorization 
availability risks (Risk treatment table in Table D.5.3). The risk treatment options and actions 
for the risk treatment categories Host security service availability risks (firewall) and Host 
security service availability risks (antivirus software) were identified with the help of 
templates shown in figures B.14 and B.15.  
 
 
6.2.3 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we evaluated how MODA meets its second success criterion. The case study of 
the chat service shows that MODA targets time efficiency with the help of templates, 
guidelines and the predefined set of tables. The specification of the range of consequence and 
frequency values can be done quickly with the help of the predefined set of frequency and 
consequence values (Table 5.7, 5.9-5.11, Figure 5.3). In the risk identification sub-process the 
construction of fault trees can be done rapidly with the help of the templates for availability 
risk analysis (Figures 4.15…4.19). In the risk analysis sub-process the predefined set of 
consequence and frequency tables (Figures A.2…A.9 in Appendix A) supports the quick 
construction and documentation of consequence and frequency values. In the risk evaluation 
sub-process the risk treatment categories can be quickly identified with the help of the 
Possible risk treatment categories table (Table 5.48). In the risk treatment sub-process the risk 
treatment options and risk treatment actions can be identified rapidly with the help of the 
templates for risk treatment (Figures B.1…B.20 in Appendix B).  
 
These conclusions are all rather subjective, based on the authors experiences and opinions. It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct a scientifically satisfactory empirical evaluation. 
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6.3 How MODA meets its third success criterion 
 
In this section we discuss how MODA meets its third success criterion. This section is 
structured into three sub-sections. Sub-section 6.3.1 presents how MODA supports the 
fulfilment of the third success criterion. Sub-section 6.3.2 shows how it worked out in the risk 
assessment of the chat service. The conclusion is presented in sub-section 6.3.3. 
 
Success criterion 3 
 
MODA should be cost effective from a reusability 
perspective 
 
 
6.3.1 MODA support  
 
We address cost efficiency in MODA by means of reuse of tables and graphical models. All 
tables and templates have a clear defined structure and this makes it possible to use modelling 
tools that may automate some parts of availability assessment. For instance, it is enough to 
define once the headings of assessment roles and assessment methods tables (Tables 5.3, 5.5), 
and then produce with the help of modelling tools partially filled assessment methods and 
assessment roles tables that may be reused in the further availability risk assessments. The 
tables containing the proposed range of frequency and consequence values (Tables 5.7, 5.9… 
5.11) may be reused directly. Further, the Risk Matrix (Table 5.13) and the Risk treatment 
action priority matrix (Table 5.15) may be reused directly to compute the risk values and the 
priority of treatment actions. We construct the templates for availability risk analysis (Figures 
4.15…4.19) in a general manner to support their reusability. We also formulate the risk 
treatment actions (Figures B.1…B.20 in Appendix B) in a general manner to assist the reuse 
of the risk treatment tables. 
 
 
6.3.2 How it worked out 
 
In all sub-processes the availability risk assessment results were documented in tables and 
graphical models and many of them may be reused in new or current availability risk 
assessment. In the context identification sub-process the consequence values were 
documented in the Consequence values table (Table D.1.2) and the frequency values were 
documented in the Frequency values table (Table D.1.1). These tables as well as the Risk 
Matrix (Table D.1.4) and the Risk treatment action priority matrix (Table D.1.5) may be 
reused directly in new or current availability risk assessment. 
 
In the risk identification sub-process the most of templates for availability risk analysis were 
used directly without changes to construct fault trees. To reuse them in new availability risk 
analysis we only have to change the name of hardware and software components that were 
analysed. For example, the fault trees with the top events Denial of host node availability 
(Figure D.2.4) and Denial of host security service availability (Figure D.2.14) may be reused 
without changes, while the fault trees with the top events Denial of host (PDA) application 
software availability (Figure D.2.5) and Denial of host (PDA) operating system availability 
(Figure D.2.8) may be reused by changing the name of host and software components. 
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In the risk treatment sub-process the risk treatment tables may be reused effectively with 
possible small changes. To reuse them in new availability risk analysis we only have to decide 
if we need to change the treatment actions documented in the relevant risk treatment table. 
Those treatment actions that we decide to keep may be preserved in the risk treatment table 
along with their benefits and costs. The same approach can be applied to the reuse of 
treatment priority tables.  
 
 
6.3.3 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we evaluated how MODA meets its third success criterion. The case study of 
the chat service shows that MODA targets cost efficiency by supporting reusability of tables 
and graphical models. In the context identification sub-process the frequency and 
consequence tables (Tables D.1.1 and D.1.2) document the agreed range of frequency and 
consequence values that may be reused in new availability risk analysis. The Risk Matrix 
(Table 5.13) and the Risk treatment action priority matrix (Table 5.15) also may be reused 
directly. In the risk identification sub-process the most of templates for availability risk 
analysis (Figures 4.15…4.19) may be reused directly without changes. Those templates that 
need changes, may be reused by changing the name of hardware and software components. In 
the risk treatment sub-process the risk treatment tables and the risk treatment priority tables 
may be reused with possible small changes. 
 
Along with these positive experiences, the case study has shown that we need means to 
extract, save and define reusable elements. A database of reusable elements and a 
computerized tool that manages the construction, extraction and reuse of these elements 
would be very helpful. 
 
 
6.4 How MODA meets its fourth success criterion 
 
In this section we discuss how MODA meets its fourth success criterion. This section is 
structured into three sub-sections. Sub-section 6.4.1 presents how MODA supports the 
fulfilment of the fourth success criterion. Sub-section 6.4.2 shows how it worked out in the 
risk assessment of the chat service. The conclusion is presented in sub-section 6.4.3. 
 
Success criterion 4 
 
MODA should be user friendly assisting its users by 
providing guidelines, templates and checklists 
 
 
6.4.1 MODA support  
 
We address user friendliness in MODA by providing guidelines, templates and checklists. In 
the context identification sub-process the identification of applied value categories is 
supported by guidelines and the predefined set of consequence and frequency values (Tables 
5.7, 5.9…5.11, Figure 5.3). Further, graphical models (e.g. Domain picture, Use case 
diagram) should support the communication between people with different background. We 
support the identification of actors, use cases, assets and the risk acceptance criteria by 
guidelines and checklists (Figure 5.10). In the risk identification sub-process we support the 
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identification of availability aspect risks and the construction of fault trees by guidelines and 
templates (Figures 4.15…4.19). In the risk analysis sub-process we support the identification 
and documentation of consequence and frequency values by guidelines and the predefined set 
of consequence and frequency tables (Figures A.1…A.10 in Appendix A). In the risk 
evaluation sub-process we support the identification and update of risk values by guidelines. 
Further, the Possible risk treatment categories table (Table 5.48) should support the 
categorisation of risks into risk treatment categories, and the specification of their priorities is 
supported by guidelines. In the risk treatment sub-process we support the identification of risk 
treatment actions by graphical templates (Figures B.1…B.20 in Appendix B). The Risk 
treatment action priority matrix (Table 5.15) should support the identification of priorities of 
risk treatment actions. 
 
 
6.4.2 How it worked out 
 
In all sub-processes we were assisted by the set of guidelines, templates and checklists. In the 
context identification sub-process the range chosen for frequency and consequence values was 
easily defined with the help of guidelines and the predefined set of consequence and 
frequency values (Tables 5.7, 5.11, Figure 5.3). Graphical models depicted in Figure D.1.5 
(Domain picture) and Figure D.1.6 (Use cases) supported the communication between people 
with different background participating in the availability risk assessment. In Activity 1.2 we 
used guidelines to define actors and use cases. The identified actors helped us to define 
stakeholders of the target system (Table D.1.8). In Activity 1.4 we identified assets with the 
help of questionnaires (Figure 5.7) and we specified the risk acceptance criteria with the help 
of checklist (Figure 5.10).  
 
In the risk identification sub-process we identified availability aspects risks with the help of 
guidelines and documented them in the availability risks tables (Tables D.2.1, D.2.2, D.2.3, 
D.2.4). The fault tree analysis activity was done easily and quickly with the help of guidelines 
and templates for availability risk analysis (Figures 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19).  
 
In the risk analysis sub-process the frequency and consequence values were defined with the 
help of guidelines. The partially filled consequence and frequency tables (Figures A.1, … 
A.10) facilitated correct and quick construction of these tables for the documentation of 
results from Activity 3.1 and Activity 3.2. 
 
In the risk evaluation sub-process we defined the risk values (Table D.4.1) with the help of 
the Risk Matrix (Table 5.13). Further, we updated the risk values (Table D.4.2) with the help 
of guidelines. The categorisation of risks into risk treatment categories (Table D.4.3) was 
done easily with the help of the Possible risk treatment categories table (Table 5.48). The 
specification of priorities of risk treatment categories was performed effectively with the help 
of guidelines (Table D.4.4). 
 
In the risk treatment sub-process we identified the risk treatment options and risk treatment 
actions with the help of templates for risk treatment (Figures B.1, …B.20 in Appendix B).  
These templates are graphical and present the risk treatment options and risk treatment actions 
in an easy to understand way. This facilitated the rapid and easy identification and 
documentation of risk treatment actions (Tables D.5.1, …D.5.5). Further, we identified the 
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risk treatment actions priorities with the help of the Risk treatment action priority matrix 
(Table 5.15). 
 
 
6.4.3 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we evaluated how MODA meets its fourth success criterion. The case study of 
the chat service shows that MODA targets user friendliness by providing in all sub-processes 
guidelines, templates and checklists. In the context identification sub-process guidelines and 
the predefined set of consequence and frequency values (Tables 5.7, 5.9…5.11, Figure 5.3) 
help in the identification of applied value categories. Graphical models (Figures D.1.5, D.1.6) 
support the communication between stakeholders with different background. Further, the 
identification of actors, use cases, assets and the risk acceptance criteria is supported by 
guidelines and checklists (Figure 5.10). In the risk identification sub-process the identification 
of availability aspects risks and the construction of fault trees are supported by guidelines and 
templates (Figures 4.15…4.19). In the risk analysis sub-process the identification and 
documentation of consequence and frequency values is supported by guidelines and the 
predefined set of consequence and frequency values (Figures A.1…A.10 in Appendix A). In 
the risk evaluation sub-process the identification and update of risk values as well as the 
identification of priorities of risk treatment categories are supported by guidelines. The 
categorization of risks into risk treatment categories is supported by the predefined set of risk 
treatment categories suggested in the Possible risk treatment categories table (Table 5.48). In 
the risk treatment sub-process the identification of risk treatment actions is supported by the 
graphical templates for risk treatment (Figures B.1…B.20 in Appendix B). The Risk 
treatment action priority matrix (Table 5.15) supports the identification of priorities of risk 
treatment actions. 
 
Conducting this case study we also felt that we need more help on the practical side with 
regard to the construction of tables and graphical models and documentation of results. 
The use of a specialized computerized tool that effectively manages the construction of tables 
and diagrams as well as documentation of results would be very helpful. 
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7 Discussion 
 
During the project work, we faced different challenges that could be solved in different ways. 
In this chapter we will discuss them and show what could be done different. 
 
 
Availability aspects 
 
In our project we defined four sub classes of availability:  
 
• Network availability 
• Software availability 
• Human availability 
• Hardware availability 
 
Considering each of the above sub-classes of availability to be one of the links in the 
availability chain, it is obvious that each of these links must contribute to the overall 
availability of the system. To insure that important areas are not missed, in the template for 
Host node availability (Figure 4.15) we also considered aspects that do not belong to any of 
sub-classes of availability, but in the same time are important for the availability of Host 
node:  
 
• Power supply service availability 
• Host security service availability 
• Host authorization availability 
 
We could organise these aspects into fifth sub-class of availability – Environment availability.  
This sub-class of availability could also contain other aspects such as Lighting service 
availability, Air Conditioning service availability, and Heating service availability. In the 
template for Host node availability, all aspects that belong to the Environment service 
availability could be considered in the fault tree for the Environment service availability. The 
practicality of this idea is an issue for further research. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show relevant 
templates for Environment service availability and Host node availability. 
 
 
Denial of Air
Conditioning
service
availability
Denial of Host
authorization
availability
OR
Denial of Host
Environment
service
availability
2 53
Denial of Host
Power supply
service
availability
1
Denial of Host
Security service
availability
Denial of Lighting
service
availability
4
Denial of Heating
service
availability
6  
Figure 7.1: Template for the assessment of Host Environment service availability 
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Denial of Host
hardware
availability
OR
Denial of Host
Environment
service
availability
OR
Denial of Host
node
availability
65
3
Denial of Host
software
availability
2
OR
1 4
Denial of Host
external
hardware
availability
Denial of Host
storage device
availability
Denial of Host
internal
hardware
availability
Denial of Host
operating
system
availability
Denial of Host
application
software
availability
 
Figure 7.2: Template for the assessment of Host node availability 
 
 
Specification of risk assessment objectives 
 
The objective of this sub-activity of Activity 1.1 is to describe why the risk assessment is 
undertaken. To facilitate the description of risk assessment objectives we could consider a risk 
assessment benefits on a system and organization levels and think over how these benefits 
contribute to the achievement of organization high-level goal. Figure 7.3 shows these ideas. 
 
 
Organization level
benefit
System level
benefit
Organization high
level goal
Risk
assessment
may have results into contrubutes to
 
Figure 7.3: Risk assessment contribution to the achievement of high-level goal 
 
 
The checklists provided in figures 7.4 and 7.5 could be helpful in the identification of system 
and organization level benefits as well as organization high-level goal. The most of 
organization level benefits cannot be easily measured in terms of dollars and are called by 
Hoffer [29] as intangible benefits. The Figure 7.5 shows that an organization level benefit is a 
sub-class of organization high-level goal. It means that some of organization level benefits 
can be the organization high-level goal(s). 
 
 
Increased system
maintainability
Increased system
reliability
Increased system
availability
Increased system
usability
Increased system
security
System level
benefit
Increased system
portability
Increased system
functionality
Increased flexibility of
system functionality System error reduction
 
Figure 7.4: System level benefits 
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Opening new markets
and increasing sales
opportunities
Increasing competitive
ability
Positive impacts on
society
Increased
organizational
flexibility
Faster decision making
Organization high
level goal
Organization
level benefit
Improved of
management planning
and control
More timely
information
Promotion of
organizational learning
and understanding
Availability of new,
better, or more
information
Ability to investigate
more alternatives
Information processing
efficiency
Improved asset
utilization
Improved resource
control
Improved
organizational planning
Increased accuracy in
clerical operations
Improved work process
that can improve
employee morale  
Figure 7.5: Organization level benefits 
 
 
The risk assessment objective, organization high level goal, system and organization level 
benefits could be documented in the Risk assessment objective table shown in Table 7.1. This 
approach of specification of the risk assessment objectives was not implemented in MODA 
for two reasons. Firstly, such a detailed guideline is mainly useful for the assessment of data 
systems that have not assessed so far. For the periodical assessment of information systems 
these detailed guidelines will be unnecessary. Secondly, in the context identification sub-
process we tried to be compatible with CORAS that does not specify risk assessment 
objectives on a detailed level. 
 
 
Table 7.1: Risk assessment objective table 
Risk assessment 
objective 
System level
benefit 
Organization level
benefit 
Organization high 
level goal 
<objective> <benefit> <benefit> <goal> 
 
 
Risk evaluation 
 
In the activity 4.1 of Risk evaluation sub-process we document identified risks values in the 
Risk levels table. In the activity 4.2 we document updated risks values in the Updated risk 
levels table. Instead of using two tables for the documentation of identified risk values and 
updated risk values, we could add one column in the Risk levels table (Table 7.2) for the 
documentation of updated risks values. On the one hand the use of one table may contribute 
to improved time efficiency of the risk assessment. On the other hand the use of two tables 
may facilitate improved reusability of the risk assessment results.  
 
 
CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION 
 
 
 108 
Table 7.2: Risks levels table (updated) 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Consequence
Value 
Frequency
Value 
Risk 
Value 
Updated 
Risk 
Value 
<..> <..> <..> <..> <..> <..> <..> 
 
 
In the activity 4.3 we could make the categorisation of risks into risk treatment categories 
more explicit in the Risk treatment categories table shown in Table 7.3. This table could be 
used to document all identified risks along with their risk treatment categories. On the one 
hand this table could be quickly filled and on the other hand stakeholders would not have 
flexibility to define their own risk treatment categories. We decided that flexibility is more 
important and did not implement this table in MODA. 
 
 
Table 7.3: Risk treatment categories table 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk treatment category 
Denial of host operating system 
availability 
Host (Node) operating system 
availability risks 
Denial of availability 
of <application n1> 
… 
Denial of  
Host (Node) 
Software 
availability 
Denial of 
Host (Node) 
application 
software 
availability Denial of availability 
of <application nn > 
Host (Node) application software 
availability risks 
 
Denial of host storage device 
availability 
Host (Node) storage device 
availability risks 
Denial of availability 
of <internal hardware 
n1> 
… 
Denial of 
Host (Node) 
internal 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of availability 
of <internal hardware 
nn> 
Denial of availability 
of <external hardware 
n1> 
… 
Denial of 
Host (Node) 
Hardware 
availability 
Denial of 
Host (Node) 
external 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of availability 
of <external hardware 
nn> 
Host (Node) hardware availability 
risks 
 
Lack/Denial of firewall – host is 
attacked from the Internet 
Host (Node) security service 
availability risks (firewall) 
Denial of 
Host (Node) 
security 
service 
availability 
Lack/Denial of antivirus software – 
host is attacked by computer virus 
Host (Node) security service 
availability risks (antivirus software) 
Denial of Host (Node) power supply service 
availability 
 
Host (Node) power supply service 
availability risks 
Denial of Host (Node) authorization availability 
 
Host (Node) authorization 
availability risks 
Denial of Network availability (optional) 
 
Network availability risks 
<Stakeholder> <Asset> 
Denial of Human availability (optional) Human availability risks 
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Risk treatment  
  
In the Risk treatment sub-process the identification of treatment options could be supported 
by diagrams that show availability threats and treatment strategies. These diagrams could be a 
part of UML profile for availability risk assessment and their main purpose will be to 
facilitate communication and interaction between different groups of stakeholders involved in 
an availability risk analysis. We did not develop this UML profile because this extends the 
scope of our project. Figure 7.6 shows some of network threats and strategies to treat these 
threats.  
 
 
A A
d)c)
4 nodes Network
Denial of availability of
links connected to node A
A A
e) f)Denial of availability of node A
and links connected to node A
g) h)
Network
Attack
Firewall
Network
Attack
Network attack Protection against
Network attack
Redundant links connected
to node A
A A
b)a)
Alternative links connected
to node A
Node A with redundant
components
 
Figure 7.6: Network threats and their treatment 
 
 
As you can see from Figure 7.6, the network threats may be organized into threats that affect 
network components (Figures c and e) and threats that affect the whole network (Figure g). 
Among threats to network components we distinguish the denial of network node availability 
(Figure c) and denial of link connecting two network nodes (Figure e). These threats may be 
depicted graphically using a broken line to denote the denial of link and using a shadowed 
circle to denote the denial of network node. Using unbroken line and unpainted circle (Figure 
a) we depict network lines and nodes that functioning normally. By combing the different 
types of lines and nodes (Figures b, d, f) we can depict different treatment strategies. Further, 
we can define special symbols (Figures g, h) that may be used to depict network threats and 
the protection against these threats.  
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Figure 7.7 shows the categorisation of availability threats symbols. As you can see, threats to 
different availability aspects may be depicted using different symbols. Further, these symbols 
are organized into classes and sub-classes where sub-class inherits the main properties of its 
super class. For example, the symbols denoting the denial of host hardware availability and 
host external hardware availability are almost the same.  The only difference is that the last 
one has letters ’EH’ denoting the denial of host external hardware availability.  
 
 
Denial of Power
supply service
availability
Denial of Host
authorization
availability
Denial of Host
software
availability
Host node
availability
threats
STOP
Denial of Host
security service
availability
Denial of Host
hardware
availability
Denial of Host
application
software
availability
Denial of Host
operating
system
availability
OSSoft
STOP
Virus
Attack
Denial of Host
protection against
virus attacks
Denial of
Host External
hardware
availability
Denial of
Host hard
disk
availability
Denial of
Host Internal
hardware
availability
IH EH HD
Denial of Host
protection against
network attacks
STOP
Net
Attack
 
Figure 7.7: Categorisation of availability threats symbols 
 
 
Figures 7.8 and 7.9 illustrate how symbols depicted in Figure 7.10 may be used in use cases. 
Figure 7.8 shows two actors: a user and a mis-user who may be responsible for two threats 
that can cause the denial of host node availability. The treatment of a threat may be denoted 
by a red cross with lighting. Figure 7.9 shows how two threats from Figure 7.11 can be treated 
by installing a firewall and antivirus software.  
 
 
STOP
Net
Attack
STOP
Virus
Attack
User
Mis- user
Denial of Host
node
availability
 
Figure 7.8: Security service availability threat use case 
CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION 
 
 
 111
STOP
Net
Attack
STOP
Virus
Attack
User
Mis- user
 Host node
 availability
Firewall
Antivirus
software
Soft
Virus
Anti
 
Figure 7.9: Security service availability treatment use case 
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8 Conclusion 
 
We have presented MODA, a methodology for identifying, assessing and treating risks to 
availability. The MODA methodology is model driven and has been tested in two case 
studies: Private Lessons and Chat Service. The benefits of using MODA is a more efficient 
availability risk assessment due to extensive use of templates that contribute to high level of 
reusability and better communication among different stakeholders. MODA is characterised 
by the following:  
 
• A risk management process based on AZ/NZS [6] and CORAS [5]. 
• Specialised templates and guidelines that support each sub-process of the MODA risk 
management process. 
• Integration of techniques and features from risk assessment methods like FTA [12]. 
• Use of models to describe aspects that are relevant for availability risk assessment. 
 
MODA meets the requirements of chapter 3 in the following sense: 
 
1. MODA targets availability from a security perspective with the help of templates and 
guidelines:  
- Identification of security risks to host node availability is addressed in the 
templates for Host node availability (Figure 4.15) and Host security service 
availability (Figure 4.19).  
- Security risks are suggested to be categorised into three risk treatment categories: 
Host authorization availability risks, Host security service availability risks 
(firewall), Host security service availability risks (antivirus software) (Table 5.48). 
- Three templates for risk treatment support the identification of treatment strategies 
for host security risks (Figures B.14, B.15, B.16 in Appendix B). 
 
2. Time effectiveness of MODA is achieved by means of guidelines, templates, check 
lists and a predefined set of tables and was validated in two case studies: 
- Predefined set of consequence and frequency categories helps in the quick 
identification of set of consequence and frequency values (Tables 5.7, 5.9…5.11, 
Figure 5.3). 
- Guidelines and templates assist to quick identification of risks and strategies for 
risk treatment (Figures 4.15… 4.19; B.1…B.20 in Appendix B). 
- Predefined set of consequence and frequency tables facilitates quick construction 
and documentation of consequence and frequency values (Figures A.1…A.10 in 
Appendix A). 
- Categorisation of risks into risk treatment categories can be done quickly 
according to the availability aspects categories (Table 5.48). 
 
3. Cost effectiveness of MODA is achieved in the following way: 
- Availability risk assessment results are documented in tables and graphical models 
that can be reused in new or current availability risk assessment (e.g. fault trees in 
Activity 2.2; risk treatment tables in Activity 5.1). 
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- Clear defined structure of templates and tables makes it possible to automate some 
parts of availability assessment (e.g. templates for the availability risk analysis 
from section 4.7; tables for risk analysis from Appendix A). 
4. User friendliness of MODA is supported in the following way: 
- Graphical models support the communication between people with different 
background participating in availability risk assessment (e.g. Graphical templates 
for risk treatment in Activity 5.1). 
- In all sub-processes users are assisted by set of guidelines, templates and 
checklists.  
 
 
8.1 Related work 
 
MODA uses models to describe aspects that are relevant for availability risk assessment. The 
concept of model based risk assessment has been a research topic since 80-s [34] [35]. 
Recently CORAS [5] – a research and technological development project under the 
Information Society Technologies (IST) Programme (IST-2000-25031) developed a practical 
framework targeting risk analysis of security critical systems, which combines methods for 
risk analysis with methods for object-oriented modelling. Among other approaches to model-
based risk assessment we can mention CRAMM [14], ATAM [36], Surety Analysis [37], and 
RSDS [38].  
 
Some of the activities of the MODA risk management process are similar to the activities 
used in the CORAS risk management process, while others are completely different. This is 
due to the difference in goals of these two risk assessment methodologies. While CORAS 
addresses computer systems and security risks in a general manner, the main purpose of 
MODA is to target availability risks.  
 
In the first sub-process – context identification, MODA’s activities have more similarities 
with activities in CORAS then they do in other sub-processes. This is because in the first sub-
process, both CORAS and MODA aim to clarify and define aspects that do not depend much 
on the kind of the risk assessment: scope of the risk assessment, participants of the risk 
assessment, target of evaluation, stakeholders, assets, risk evaluation criteria. This in turn 
explains why the most tables that MODA have borrowed from CORAS are used in this sub-
process. At the same time MODA aims to be time effective and this explains why it does not 
have all the activities and sub-activities of CORAS. For example, the CORAS Activity 1.1 
Identify areas of relevance has five sub-activities: the risk management context, the target of 
evaluation, the organisational context, the SWOT analysis, and the system description sub-
activity. MODA does not have the three last ones and redefines only the first two sub-
activities: Activity 1.1 Risk management context specification and Activity 1.2 Specification 
of the target of evaluation have the same purpose in MODA as the similar sub-activities of 
Activity 1.1 in CORAS.  
 
Further, Activity 1.4 Identification of assets redefines in MODA the CORAS Activity 1.2 
Identify and value assets, and Activity 1.5 Identification of the risk acceptance criteria 
redefines the risk evaluation criteria sub-activity of the CORAS Activity 1.3. MODA does not 
have an activity corresponding to the CORAS Activity 1.4 Approval.  
 
In the context identification sub-process, MODA uses eleven CORAS tables and defines 
thirteen own tables and figures. Table 8.1 shows MODA and CORAS tables and figures used 
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in this sub-process. Table 8.2 shows the most important MODA features in the context 
identification sub-process that are not part of the CORAS methodology. 
 
 
Table 8.1: MODA and CORAS tables used in the context identification sub-process 
CORAS MODA 
Table 5.3: Assessment methods table 
Table 5.4: Assessment restrictions table  
Table 5.5: Assessment roles table 
Table 5.6: Assessment plan table 
Table 5.7: Qualitative and quantitative frequency 
values 
Table 5.13: Risk Matrix 
Table 5.17: Target-of-evaluation table 
Table 5.19: Stakeholders table 
Table 5.21: Generic asset value domains 
Figure 5.8: Asset diagram 
Table 5.22: Asset table 
 
 
Table 5.2: Assessment objectives table 
Table 5.8: Frequency values table 
Figure 5.3: Categorization of consequences of system 
unavailability 
Table 5.9: Asset consequence values table  
Table 5.10: Target system consequence values table 
Table 5.11: Total income consequence values table 
Table 5.12: Consequence values table 
Table 5.14: Risk values table 
Table 5.15: Risk treatment action priority matrix 
Table 5.16: Treatment action values table 
Figure 5.7: Questionnaire guide  
Figure 5.10: Risk acceptance criteria alternatives 
Table 5.24: Risk acceptance table 
 
 
Table 8.2: The most important MODA features in the context identification sub-process 
MODA features 
• Guidelines for the definition of a risk assessment plan. 
• Predefined set of consequence categories (Figure 5.3, Tables 5.9..5.11). 
• Risk treatment action priority matrix (Table 5.15) for the specification of 
treatment action priorities. 
• Guidelines for the identification of actors and use cases. 
 
 
In the risk identification sub-process CORAS targets the identification of all kinds of risks 
while MODA concentrates on the identification of risks to availability. That is why MODA in 
this sub-process redefines one of three CORAS activities: Activity 2.1 Identification of risks 
to availability aspects redefines in MODA the CORAS Activity 2.1 Identify threats to assets. 
MODA does not have activities that have the same purpose as the CORAS Acivity 2.2 
Identify vulnerabilities of assets and Activity 2.3 Document unwanted incidents. Further, 
MODA supports this sub-process by specialized templates and guidelines. This explains why 
none of the CORAS tables were used in this sub-process. Table 8.3 shows the most important 
MODA features in the risk identification sub-process that are not part of the CORAS 
methodology.  
 
 
Table 8.3: The most important MODA features in the risk identification sub-process 
MODA features 
• Guidelines for the identification of availability aspects risks and the 
construction of fault trees. 
• Availability risks table (Table 5.26) is constructed for each availability 
aspect. 
• Templates support the building of fault trees (Figures 4.15…4.19). 
• Guidelines for the detailed risk identification. 
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In the risk analysis sub-process MODA redefines both CORAS activities. Activity 3.1 
Consequence evaluation and Activity 3.2 Frequency evaluation redefine the CORAS Activity 
3.1 and Activity 3.2. CORAS targets the wide spectrum of risks by applying for the 
consequence evaluation the risk assessment methods like FMECA [13], Event trees [32], and 
Markov analysis [15]. The frequency evaluation is addressed in CORAS by applying FTA 
[12] and Markov analysis. MODA meets its success criteria by narrowing to FTA for 
frequency evaluation. In this sub-process MODA does not use the CORAS tables. Further, it 
uses the predefined set of consequence and frequency tables to support the effective 
construction and documentation of consequence and frequency values. Table 8.4 shows the 
most important MODA features in the risk analysis sub-process that are not part of the 
CORAS methodology. 
 
 
Table 8.4: The most important MODA features in the risk analysis sub-process 
MODA features 
• Guidelines for the identification of consequence and frequency values. 
• Use of the predefined set of consequence and frequency tables (Figures 
A.1…A.10). 
 
 
In the risk evaluation sub-process MODA redefines three of five CORAS activities. Activity 
4.1 Identification of risks values, Activity 4.3 Categorization of risks into risk treatment 
categories, and Activity 4.4 Specification of priorities of risk treatment categories redefine the 
CORAS Activity 4.1, Activity 4.3, and Activity 4.5 respectively. MODA does not have 
activities that have the same purpose as the CORAS Acivity 4.2 Prioritise risks and Activity 
4.4 Determine interrelationships among risk themes. In this sub-process MODA does not use 
the CORAS tables. Further, it defines five tables and suggests eleven risk treatment categories 
in the Possible risk treatment categories table (Table 5.48). Table 8.5 shows the most 
important MODA features in the risk evaluation sub-process that are not part of the CORAS 
methodology. 
 
 
Table 8.5: The most important MODA features in the risk evaluation sub-process 
MODA features 
• Guidelines for the identification and update of risk values. 
• Use of the predefined set of risk treatment categories (Table 5.48). 
• Guidelines for the specification of priorities of risk treatment categories. 
 
 
In the risk treatment sub-process MODA redefines both two CORAS activities. Activity 5.1 
Identification of treatment options and Activity 5.2 Specification of risks treatment priorities 
redefine the CORAS Activity 5.1 and Activity 5.2. In this sub-process MODA does not use 
CORAS tables. While CORAS provides guidelines for the risk treatment in a general manner, 
MODA defines treatment actions for each predefined risk treatment category. Further, 
MODA applies its own Risk treatment action priority matrix for the specification of priorities 
of risk treatment actions. Table 8.6 shows the most important MODA features in the risk 
treatment sub-process that are not part of the CORAS methodology. 
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Table 8.6: The most important MODA features in the risk treatment sub-process 
MODA features 
• Guidelines for the identification of risk treatment options and risk treatment 
actions. 
• Use of graphical templates for the identification of treatment actions 
(Figures B.1…B.20). 
• Specification of priorities of risk treatment actions with the help of Risk 
treatment action priority matrix (Table 5.15). 
 
 
8.2 Future work 
 
One major challenge when performing an availability risk analysis is to establish a common 
understanding of the target of evaluation, availability risks and treatment strategies among the 
stakeholders participating in the availability analysis. An interesting area of research will be 
to develop a UML profile aiming to facilitate communication among stakeholders 
participating in availability assessment, by making the UML diagrams easier to understand 
for non-experts. Some elements of this profile we presented in Chapter 7. Dealing with the 
large volume of information, tables and diagrams is a non-trivial task. It will be interesting to 
develop computerised tool that effectively manages the construction of tables and diagrams as 
well as database of information relevant for availability risk assessment. 
 
An essential part of the results of an availability risk analysis will typically have a certain 
general character. To avoid spending time and resources on starting from scratch for every 
new analysis, it is important to collect these general aspects. Documenting availability risk 
analysis results in UML-diagrams, tables and plain text opens for the collection of these 
general aspects through partially instantiated UML-diagrams, tables and check lists. CORAS 
organizes related general elements in so-called ’experience packages’ and has a computerised 
repository that manages the extraction, reuse and maintenance of experience packages [39]. 
An experience package is either constructive or supportive. Elements in the constructive 
experience package may be extended, instantiated or adjusted into concrete risk analysis 
documentation. Elements in the supportive package act as a helping hand during the 
instantiation of constructive elements or the making of new reusable elements. 
 
It will be interesting to upgrade the CORAS repository to support the effective management 
of availability experience packages. Further, the availability experience packages may have 
sub-packages that contain elements specific for particular domain, e.g., telemedicine or e-
commerce. These packages may be further decomposed into constructive and supportive. An 
important part of the work will be to define what kind of generic elements MODA has, and in 
what package they may be included. 
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Appendix A.  
 
 
This appendix is structured into two sections. Section A.1 presents consequence and frequency 
tables for the risk analysis sub-process. Section A.2 provides questionnaires for assets 
identification. 
 
A.1 Tables for the risk analysis sub-process 
 
 
This section is divided into two sub-sections. Sub-section A.1.1 presents consequence tables. 
Frequency tables are presented in sub-section A.1.2. Section A.2 provides questionnaires for 
assets identification. 
 
A.1.1 Consequence tables 
 
 
Table A.1: Consequence table (General form) 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence
value 
Consequence 
description 
<stakeholder> <asset> <incident> <scenario> <consequence 
   value> 
<consequence 
   description> 
 
 
Table A.2: Consequence table for host software availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence 
value 
Consequence 
description 
Denial of host operating 
system availability 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
Denial of  
<entity n1> 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
… <scenario> <value> <description> 
<Stake 
holder> 
<Asset> Denial of  
host  
software 
availability 
Denial of 
host 
application 
software 
availability <entity nn> <scenario> <value> <description> 
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Table A.3: Consequence table for host hardware availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence 
value 
Consequence 
description 
Denial of host storage device 
availability 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
Denial of 
<entity n1> 
<scenario> <value> <description> Denial of 
host 
internal 
hardware 
availability 
… 
 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
… <scenario> <value> <description> 
… <scenario> <value> <description> 
<Stake 
holder> 
<Asset> Denial of 
host 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of 
host 
external 
hardware 
availability Denial of 
<entity nn> 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
 
 
Table A.4: Consequence table for host security service availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence 
value 
Consequence 
description 
Lack of firewall – host is 
attacked from the Internet 
         <scenario>     <value> <description> <Stake 
holder> 
<Asset> Denial of 
host 
security 
service 
availability 
Lack of antivirus software – 
host is attacked by computer 
virus 
         <scenario>     <value> <description> 
 
 
Table A.5: Consequence table for host availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence 
value 
Consequence 
description 
Denial of host Software 
availability 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
Denial of host Hardware 
availability 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
Denial of power supply 
service availability 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
Denial of host security service 
availability 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
<Stake 
holder> 
<Asset> Denial of 
host  
availability 
Denial of host authorization 
availability 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
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A.1.2 Frequency tables 
 
 
Table A.6: Frequency table (General form) 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency
value 
Frequency 
description 
<stakeholder> <asset> <incident> <scenario> <Frequency 
   value> 
<Frequency 
   description> 
 
 
Table A.7: Frequency table for host software availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency 
value 
Frequency 
description 
Denial of host operating 
system availability 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
Denial of  
<entity n1> 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
… <scenario> <value> <description> 
<Stake 
holder> 
<Asset> Denial of  
host  
software 
availability 
Denial of 
host 
application 
software 
availability <entity nn> <scenario> <value> <description> 
 
 
Table A.8: Frequency table for host hardware availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency 
value 
Frequency 
description 
Denial of host storage device 
availability 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
Denial of  
<entity n1> 
<scenario> <value> <description> Denial of 
host 
internal 
hardware 
availability 
… 
 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
… <scenario> <value> <description> 
… <scenario> <value> <description> 
<Stake 
holder> 
<Asset> Denial of 
host 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of 
host 
external 
hardware 
availability Denial of  
<entity nn> 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
 
 
Table A.9: Frequency table for host security service availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency 
value 
Frequency 
description 
Lack/Denial of firewall – host 
is attacked from the Internet 
<scenario> <value> <description> <Stake 
holder> 
<Asset> Denial of 
host 
security 
service 
availability 
Lack/Denial of antivirus 
software – host is attacked by 
computer virus 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
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Table A.10: Frequency table for host availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency 
value 
Frequency 
description 
Denial of host Software 
availability 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
Denial of host Hardware 
availability 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
Denial of power supply 
service availability 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
Denial of host security service 
availability 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
<Stake 
holder> 
<Asset> Denial of 
host  
availability 
Denial of host authorization 
availability 
<scenario> <value> <description> 
 
 
 
A.2 Questionnaires for assets identification 
 
 
Asset category Description Questionnaire
Human assets Assets related to human resources, special knowledge Questionnaire 1 
Physical assets Includes all physical components in the system and  
system dependent components 
Questionnaire 2 
Information assets All information in the system and system dependent 
information 
Questionnaire 3 
Software assets All software used in the system or system dependent Questionnaire 4 
Organizational  
assets 
Organizational concerns, organizational (system) 
internal regulations, routines etc. 
Questionnaire 5 
Law and regulation 
assets 
External laws and regulations that influence the  
system 
Questionnaire 6 
Figure A.1: Questionnaire overview 
 
 
Questionnaire 1: for identification of assets related to the asset category “Human”  
 
Q1.1 Which personnel safety is important? 
Q1.2 Which parts of the system is depending on special knowledge? 
Q1.3 Which special knowledge is it important to keep the within organization ? 
Q1.4 Which parts of the system is depending on single individuals? 
 
Questionnaire 2: for identification of assets related to the asset category “Physical assets”  
 
Q2.1 Which system components is the system functionality depending on? 
Q2.2 Which system components is system critical? 
Q2.3 Which system components are of highest value? 
Q2.4 Which system components have the highest maintainability costs? 
Q2.5 Which system components have the longest repair time? 
Q2.6 Which system components have the highest repair costs? 
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Questionnaire 3: for identification of assets related to the asset category “Information assets”  
 
Q3.1 Which parts of the system is transporting/containing confidential information? 
Q3.2 Which parts of the system is transporting/containing personnel information? 
Q3.3 Which parts of the system is transporting/containing credit card/account information? 
Q3.4 Which parts of the system is transporting/containing customers information? 
Q3.5 Which parts of the system is transporting/containing financial information? 
Q3.6 Which parts of the system is transporting/containing business information? 
Q3.7 Which parts of the system information is confidential? 
 
Questionnaire 4: for identification of assets related to the asset category “Software assets”  
 
Q4.1 Which system software is processing confidential information? 
Q4.2 Which system software is processing personnel information? 
Q4.3 Which system software is processing credit card/account information? 
Q4.4 Which system software is processing customers information? 
Q4.5 Which system software is processing financial information? 
Q4.6 Which system software is processing business information? 
Q4.7 Which parts of software are properly tested? 
Q4.8 To which part of the system are QA applied? 
 
Questionnaire 5: for identification of assets related to the asset category “Organizational assets”  
 
Q5.1 How important is the system to the organization? 
Q5.2 How much of value is the system to the organization related to other parts of the 
         organization? 
Q5.3 How critical is the system to the organization? 
 
Questionnaire 6: for identification of assets related to the asset category “Law and regulation 
assets”  
 
Q6.1 Which system stakeholders are aware of all the system relevant laws and regulations? 
Q6.2 Which countermeasures are installed to avoid breach in laws and regulations that can 
          lead to significant losses? 
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Appendix B.  
 
 
This appendix provides templates for risk treatment. Table B.1 shows the overview of templates 
presented in this appendix. The middle column shows the risk treatment template. The left 
column shows the corresponding figure. The right column shows the page where the reader can 
find the template. 
 
Table B.1: The overview of Appendix B 
Figure Template for the treatment of risk Page 
B.1 
B.2 
B.3 
 
B.4 
B.5 
B.6 
 
B.7 
B.8 
B.9 
B.10 
 
B.11 
B.12 
B.13 
 
B.14 
B.15 
 
B.16 
 
B.17 
 
B.18 
 
B.19 
B.20 
Denial of application software functionality 
Incorrect installation and use of application software 
Denial of application software authorization functionality 
 
Denial of operating system functionality 
Incorrect installation and use of operating system 
Denial of operating system authorization functionality 
 
Denial of hardware software functionality 
Denial of hardware component functionality 
Incorrect installation and use of hardware component 
Denial of hardware component authorization functionality 
 
Denial of storage device functionality 
Incorrect installation and use of storage device 
Denial of storage device authorization functionality 
 
Lack of firewall/Attack from the network 
Lack of antivirus software/Virus attack 
 
Denial of Host authorization availability 
 
Denial of power supply service availability 
 
Denial of Human availability 
 
Lack of quality of service in the network (Network consumer) 
Lack of quality of service in the network (Network provider) 
130 
131 
132 
 
133 
134 
135 
 
136 
137 
138 
139 
 
140 
141 
142 
 
143 
144 
 
145 
 
146 
 
147 
 
148 
149 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of application
software availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Treatment of risk
Denial of application
software functionality
List of possible
revisions:
- Eliminate the use of
application software
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- Application software
must be kept updated
- Application software
configuration changes
have to be done first
on the test computer
- Installation of new
software has to be
done first on the test
computer
- Use an other more
reliable application
software with the
same functionality
- Upgrade to the more
reliable version of
application software
- Regular tests of
application software
functionality
- Test regularly the
competence of users/
employees that are
responsible for use of
software or technical
support
- Install software for
monitoring of
application software
functionality (error
statistic monitoring)
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Daily full data and
system backup
- Recovery from
application software
problems should be
done only by
competent users/
employees
- Recovery from
application software
problems should be
done only by
specialized company
(technical support)
- Install additional
software with the
same functionality on
computer
- Regular tests of
additional software
functionality
- Install software for
monitoring of
additional software
functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
denial of application
software functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.1: Template for treatment of risk Denial of application software functionality 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of application
software availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Treatment of risk
Incorrect installation and use
of application software
List of possible
revisions:
- Eliminate the use of
application software
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- The competence of
users/employees that
are responsible for
use of software or
technical support
should be updated
regularly
- Application software
can be used only by
competent users/
employees
- All users have to
attend a training
course before they
can use software
- Help in installation
and use of application
software from a
colleague
- Help in installation
and use of application
software from a
software support
service
- Test regularly the
competence of users/
employees that are
responsible for use of
application software
- Self study of user
manual/text book and
self testing of user
knowledge
- Install software for
monitoring of
application software
functionality (error
statistic monitoring)
- Install equipment for
monitoring of user
actions (video
surveillance)
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Daily full data and
system backup
- Recovery from
application software
problems should be
done only by
competent users/
employees
- Recovery from
application software
problems should be
done only by
specialized company
(technical support)
- Have a backup
competent user
available
- Regular tests of
backup user
competence
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
incorrect installation
and use of application
software
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.2: Template for treatment of risk Incorrect installation and use of application software 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of application
software availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Treatment of risk
Denial of software
authorization functionality
List of possible
revisions:
- Eliminate the use of
application software
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- Rules for choosing
or changing of a
password should be
strict, known and
followed by each
employee
- The competence of
users/employees or
departments that are
responsible for
software (host)
security should be
updated regularly
- Use the screensaver
with password
protection
- Users should always
log out whenever they
leave computer for
any period of time
- Use an other
application software
with the same
functionality and a
more strong access
control
- Daily control of user
logs
- Test regularly
(monthly) the
competence of users/
employees or
departments that are
responsible for
software (host)
security
- Regular tests of
employees/users
security awareness
- Self study of user
manual/text book
about host (software)
security and self
testing of knowledge
- Install software for
monitoring  and daily
analysis of user logs
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Daily full data and
system backup
- Recovery from
application software
problems should be
done only by
competent users/
employees
- Install an additional
software with the
same functionality on
computer
- Have an additional
work station (PC) with
installed application
software available
and test software
regularly
- Install software for
monitoring of
additional software
functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
unauthorized access
to application
software
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.3: Template for treatment of risk Denial of application software authorization functionality 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of operating system
availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Treatment of risk
Denial of operating system
functionality
List of possible
revisions:
- Eliminate the use of
operating system
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- operating system
must be kept updated
- operating system
configuration changes
have to be done first
on the test computer
- Installation of new
software has to be
done first on the test
computer
- Install an other more
reliable operating
system
- Upgrade to the more
reliable version of
operating system
- Regular tests of
operating system
functionality
- Test regularly the
competence of users/
employees that are
responsible for use of
operating system or
technical support
- Install software for
monitoring of
operating system
functionality (error
statistic monitoring)
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Daily full data and
system backup
- Recovery from
operating system
problems should be
done only by
competent users/
employees
- Recovery from
operating system
problems should be
done only by
specialized company
(technical support)
- Have compact discs
and diskettes with
operating system,
diagnostic and
recovery tools
available
- Emergency boot
diskette should be
created
- Install operating
system and
application programs
on additional work
station
- Install RAID storage
implementations
- Regular tests of
operating system
installed on additional
work station
- Install software on
additional workstation
for monitoring of
operating system
functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
denial of operating
system functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.4: Template for treatment of risk Denial of operating system functionality 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of operating
system availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Treatment of risk
Incorrect installation and use
of operating system
List of possible
revisions:
- Eliminate the use of
operating system
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- The competence of
users/employees that
are responsible for
use of operating
system or technical
support should be
updated regularly
- operating system
can be used only by
competent users/
employees
- All users have to
attend a training
course before they
can use operating
system
- Help in installation
and use of operating
system from a
colleague
- Help in installation
and use of operating
system from a
software support
service
- Test regularly the
competence of users/
employees that are
responsible for use of
operating system
- Self study of user
manual/text book and
self testing of user
knowledge
- Install software for
monitoring of
operating system
functionality (error
statistic monitoring)
- Install equipment for
monitoring of user
actions (video
surveillance)
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Daily full data and
system backup
- Recovery from
operating system
problems should be
done only by
competent users/
employees
- Recovery from
operating system
problems should be
done only by
specialized company
(technical support)
- Have a backup
competent user
available
- Regular tests of
backup user
competence
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
incorrect installation
and use of operating
system
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.5: Template for treatment of risk Incorrect installation and use of operating system 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of operating
system availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Treatment of risk
Denial of operating system
authorization functionality
List of possible
revisions:
- Eliminate the use of
operating system
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- Rules for choosing
or changing of a
password should be
strict, known and
followed by each
employee
- The competence of
users/employees or
departments that are
responsible for
operating system
(host) security should
be updated regularly
- Use the screensaver
with password
protection
- Users should always
log out whenever they
leave computer for
any period of time
- Use an other
operating system with
more strong access
control
- Daily control of user
logs
- Test regularly
(monthly) the
competence of users/
employees or
departments that are
responsible for
operating system
(host) security
- Regular tests of
employees/users
security awareness
- Install software for
monitoring  and
analysis of user logs
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Daily full data and
system backup
- Recovery from
operating system
problems should be
done only by
competent users/
employees
- Recovery from
operating system
problems should be
done only by
specialized company
(technical support)
- Emergency boot
diskette should be
created and kept in
secure place
- Install operating
system and
application programs
on additional work
station
- Install RAID storage
implementations
- Regular tests of
operating system
installed on additional
work station
- Install software on
additional workstation
for monitoring of
operating system
functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
unauthorized access
to operating system
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.6: Template for treatment of risk Denial of operating system authorization functionality 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of hardware
component availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Treatment of risk
Denial of hardware
software functionality
List of possible
revisions:
- Eliminate the use of
hardware component
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- hardware software
must be kept updated
- hardware software
configuration changes
have to be done first
on the test computer
- only competent
users can update
hardware software or
make configuration
changes to hardware
software
- Install another more
reliable hardware
software
- Upgrade to the more
reliable version of
hardware software
- Regular tests of
hardware software
functionality
- Test regularly the
competence of users/
employees that are
responsible for
update of hardware
software or technical
support
- Install software for
monitoring of
hardware software
functionality (error
statistic monitoring)
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Daily full data and
system backup
- Recovery from
hardware software
problems should be
done only by
competent users/
employees
- Recovery from
hardware software
problems should be
done only by
specialized company
(technical support)
- Install an additional
hardware software
with the same
functionality on
computer
- Regular tests of
additional hardware
software functionality
- Install software for
monitoring of
additional hardware
software functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
denial of hardware
software functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.7: Template for treatment of risk Denial of hardware software functionality 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of hardware
component availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Treatment of risk
Denial of hardware
component functionality
List of possible
revisions:
- Eliminate the use of
hardware component
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- hardware
component
configuration changes
have to be done first
on the test computer
- the competence of
users/employees that
are responsible for
use of hardware
component or
technical support
should be updated
regularly
- hardware
component
configuration changes
can be done only by
competent users
- use only very
reliable hardware
components
- Install another more
reliable hardware
component
- Upgrade to the more
reliable version of
hardware component
- Regular tests of
hardware component
- Install software for
monitoring of
hardware component
functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an additional
hardware component
with the same
functionality available
- Recovery from
hardware component
problems should be
done only by
competent users/
employees
- Recovery from
hardware problems
should be done only
by specialized
company (technical
support)
- Install additional
hardware component
with the same
functionality on
computer
- Regular tests of
additional hardware
component
functionality
- Install software for
monitoring of
additional hardware
component
functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
denial of hardware
component
functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.8: Template for treatment of risk Denial of hardware component functionality 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of hardware
component availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Treatment of risk
Incorrect installation and use
of hardware component
- Eliminate the use of
hardware component
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- The competence of
users/employees that
are responsible for
use of hardware
component or
technical support
should be updated
regularly
- Hardware
component can be
used only by
competent users/
employees
- All users have to
attend a training
course before they
can use hardware
component
- Help in installation
and use of hardware
component from a
colleague
- Help in installation
and use of hardware
component from a
hardware support
service
- Test regularly the
competence of users/
employees that are
responsible for use of
hardware component
- Self study of user
manual/text book and
self testing of
knowledge
- Install software for
monitoring of
hardware component
functionality (error
statistic monitoring)
- Install equipment for
monitoring of user
actions (video
surveillance)
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Daily full data and
system backup
- Have an additional
hardware component
available
- Recovery from
hardware component
problems should be
done only by
competent users/
employees
- Recovery from
hardware component
problems should be
done only by
specialized company
(technical support)
- Have a backup
competent user
available
- Regular tests of
backup user
competence
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
incorrect installation
and use of hardware
component
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.9: Template for treatment of risk Incorrect installation and use of hardware component 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of hardware
component availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Treatment of risk
Denial of hardware component
authorization functionality
List of possible
revisions:
- Eliminate the use of
hardware component
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- introduce the strict
rules for access to the
room/area where
hardware component
is installed
- access to the room
where hardware
component is
installed should be
controlled by an
electronic door lock
- provide regular
security awareness
training of employees
- hardware
component should be
fastened with screws
to the wall, table or
floor, and physical
access to the
hardware component
should be secured
with a lock
- Install hardware
component in an
other room/area with
more strong access
control
- Regular tests of
access control to the
room, area or building
where critical
components are
installed
- Regular tests of
employees/users
security awareness
- Regular tests of
security personal
competence
- Install software for
monitoring and
detection of access to
the room/area where
hardware component
is installed
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an additional
hardware component
with the same
functionality available
- Recovery from
hardware component
problems should be
done only by
competent users/
employees
- Recovery from
hardware problems
should be done only
by specialized
company (technical
support)
- Install an additional
hardware component
with the same
functionality on
computer
- Install additional
hardware component
in an other room/area
with better access
control
- Test regularly the
functionality of
additional hardware
component
- Install software for
monitoring of
additional hardware
component
functionality
- Install software for
monitoring and
detection of access to
the room/area where
additional hardware
component is
installed
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
unauthorized access
to hardware
component
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.10: Template for treatment of risk Denial of hardware component authorization functionality 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of storage device
 availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Treatment of risk
Denial of storage
device functionality
List of possible
revisions:
- Eliminate the use of
storage device
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- storage device
configuration changes
have to be done first
on the test computer
- storage device
configuration changes
can be done only by
competent users
- the program for
cleaning of hard disk
should be run
regularly (weakly)
- Use an other more
reliable storage
device
- Upgrade to the more
reliable version of
storage device
- Divide hard disk into
logical partitions with
help of hard disk
management
software
- Run regularly the
program for testing,
analysis and
defragmentation of
hard disk
- Install software for
monitoring of storage
device functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an additional
storage device
available
- Recovery from
storage device
problems should be
done only by
competent users/
employees
- Recovery from
storage device
problems should be
done only by
specialized company
(technical support)
- Install RAID storage
solution with
transparent failover
- Install mirrored hard
disks
- Test regularly the
functionality of RAID
storage solution
- Regular tests of
additional storage
device functionality
- Install software for
monitoring and failure
detection of additional
storage device
functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
unauthorized access
to storage device(s)
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.11: Template for treatment of risk Denial of storage device functionality 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of storage device
availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Treatment of risk
Incorrect installation and use
of storage device
- Eliminate the use of
storage device
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- The competence of
users/employees that
are responsible for
use of storage device
or technical support
should be updated
regularly
- storage device can
be used only by
competent users/
employees
- All users have to
attend a training
course before they
can use storage
device
- Help in installation
and use of storage
device from a
colleague
- Help in installation
and use of storage
device from a
hardware support
service
- Test regularly the
competence of users/
employees that are
responsible for use of
storage device
- Self study of user
manual/text book and
self testing of
knowledge
- Install software for
monitoring of storage
device functionality
(error statistic
monitoring)
- Install equipment for
monitoring of user
actions (video
surveillance)
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Daily full data and
system backup
- Have an additional
storage device
available
- Recovery from
storage device
problems should be
done only by
competent users/
employees
- Recovery from
storage device
problems should be
done only by
specialized company
(technical support)
- Have a backup
competent user
available
- Regular tests of
backup user
competence
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
incorrect installation
and use of storage
device
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.12: Template for treatment of risk Incorrect installation and use of storage device 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of storage device
availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Treatment of risk
Denial of storage device
authorization functionality
List of possible
revisions:
- Eliminate the use of
storage device
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- introduce the strict
rules for access to the
room/area where
storage device is
installed
- access to the
storage device should
be allowed only to
authorized individuals
- access to the room
where storage device
is installed should be
controlled by an
electronic door lock
- provide regular
security awareness
training of employees
- storage device
should be fastened
with screws to the
wall, table or floor,
and physical access
to the storage device
should be secured
- Install storage
device in an other
room/area with more
strong access control
- Regular tests of
access control to the
room, area or building
where critical
components (storage
device) are installed
- Regular tests of
employees/users
security awareness
- Regular tests of
security personal
competence
- Install software for
monitoring and
detection of access to
the room/area where
storage device is
installed
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an additional
storage device
available
- Recovery from
storage device
problems should be
done only by
competent users/
employees
- Recovery from
storage device
problems should be
done only by
specialized company
(technical support)
- Install RAID storage
solution with
transparent failover
- Install mirrored hard
disks
- Test regularly the
functionality of RAID
storage solution
- Regular tests of
additional storage
device functionality
- Install software for
monitoring and failure
detection of additional
storage device
functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
unauthorized access
to storage device(s)
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.13: Template for treatment of risk Denial of storage device authorization functionality 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of Host security
service availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Treatment of risk
Lack of firewall/attack
from the network
List of possible
revisions:
- Remove connection
from the Internet
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- The firewall should
be kept updated
- The competence of
users/employees or
departments that are
responsible for host
security should be
updated regularly
- Security awareness
of employees should
be updated regularly
- Install firewall
- Install proxy servers
- Test regularly
(monthly) the
competence of users/
employees or
departments that are
responsible for  host
security
- Regular tests of
employees/users
security awareness
- Regular tests of
network security by a
specialized company
(simulation of network
intrusion)
- Install software for
monitoring of network
traffic
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Daily full data and
system backup
- Recovery from a
network attack should
be done only by
competent users/
employees
- Recovery from a
network attack should
be done only by
specialized company
(technical support)
- Install an additional
host node with
installed operating
system, application
programs, antivirus
software and firewall
- Test regularly the
functionality of
software and
hardware
components installed
on the additional host
node
- Install software for
monitoring of
functionality of
software and
hardware
components installed
on the additional host
node
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of a
network attack
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.14: Template for treatment of risk Lack of firewall/Attack from the network 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of Host security
service availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Treatment of risk
Lack of antivirus software/
virus attack
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- Attachments from
unknown sources
should not be opened
- Antivirus software
should be kept
updated
- The competence of
users/employees or
departments that are
responsible for host
security should be
updated regularly
- Compact disks and
diskettes should be
checked on virus
before they can be
used
- Security awareness
of employees should
be updated regularly
- Install antivirus
software
- Configure email
software/server to
filter and eliminate
unsolicited junk email
- Test regularly
(monthly) the
competence of users/
employees or
departments that are
responsible for  host
security
- Regular tests of
employees/users
security awareness
- Install software for
monitoring and
detection of access to
the room/area where
host node is installed
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Daily full data and
system backup
- Recovery from a
virus attack should be
done only by
competent users/
employees
- Recovery from  a
virus attack should be
done only by
specialized company
(technical support)
- Emergency boot
diskette should be
created and kept in
secure place
- Install an additional
host node with
installed operating
system, application
programs and
antivirus software
- Test regularly the
functionality of
software and
hardware
components installed
on the additional host
node
- Install software for
monitoring of
functionality of
software and
hardware
components installed
on the additional host
node
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of a
virus attack
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.15: Template for treatment of risk Lack of antivirus software/Virus attack 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of Host
authorization availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
List of possible
revisions:
- Eliminate the use of
host node (computer)
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- introduce the strict
rules for access to the
room/area where host
node is installed
- access to the room
where host node is
installed should be
controlled by an
electronic door lock
- provide regular
security awareness
training of employees
- host node should be
fastened with screws
to the wall, table or
floor, and physical
access to the host
should be secured
with a lock
- Install host node in
an other room/area
with more strong
access control
- Regular tests of
access control to the
room, area or building
where host node is
installed
- Regular tests of
employees/users
security awareness
- Regular tests of
security personal
competence
- Install software for
monitoring and
detection of access to
the room/area where
host node is installed
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an additional
host node with
installed operating
system and
application programs
available
- Install and fasten
with screws an
additional host node
with installed
operating system and
application programs
in an other room,
floor, building or
department
- Test regularly the
functionality of
software and
hardware
components installed
on the additional host
node
- Install software for
monitoring of
functionality of
software and
hardware
components installed
on the additional host
node
- Install software for
monitoring and
detection of access to
the room/area where
additional host node
is installed
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
unauthorized access
to host node
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.16: Template for treatment of risk Denial of Host authorization availability 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of power supply
service availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- every host node
should have installed
hot-pluggable
redundant power
supplies
- Install UPS and
generators in every
room/department
- Install sun panels as
an additional source
of electricity
- Regular tests of
power supply
equipment
- Install software for
monitoring of
functionality of power
supply equipment
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Additional UPS and
generators should be
available in every
room, department or
building
- Install additional
UPS and generators
in every room,
department or
building
- Regular tests of
additional UPS and
generators
functionality
- Install software for
monitoring of
additional UPS and
generators
functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
denial of power
supply service
availability
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.17: Template for treatment of risk Denial of power supply service availability 
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Treatment of risk
Denial of human
availability
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
List of possible
revisions:
- Automation of
service
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- The competence of
users/employees that
are responsible for
service execution
should be updated
regularly
- Service execution
only by competent
users/employees
- All employees have
to attend a training
course before they
can participate in the
service execution
- Help in the service
execution from a
colleque
- Test regularly the
competence of users/
employees that are
responsible for
service execution
- Self study of user
manual/text book and
self testing of user
knowledge
- Regular health tests
of users/employees
- Install software for
monitoring  and daily
analysis of user logs
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Human resources
support service
should be used in
case of lack of
personnel
- Have a backup
competent user
available
- Regular tests of
backup user
competence
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
denial of human
availability
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.18: Template for treatment of risk Denial of Human availability 
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Network consumer
Treatment of risk
Lack of quality of service
in the network
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- Use only network
provider with
acceptable level of
quality of service in
the network
- The network
equipment hardware
and software must be
kept updated
- All hardware and
software configuration
changes have to be
done first on the test
computer
- Installation of new
software and
hardware
components has to be
done first on the test
computer
- Ask network
provider for
acceptable (better)
level of quality of
service in the network
- Regular tests of
network equipment
hardware, software
and network lines
- Test new software
and hardware
components on the
test computer before
they can be installed
on the main computer
- Install software for
monitoring  and
analysis of network
equipment hardware
and software
functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Daily full host and
network nodes data
and system backup
- Have additional
network equipment
available
- Install redundant
network equipment
(network adapters,
modems)
- Install redundant
(multiple) network
lines
- Install redundant
network software
- Test regularly
redundant network
equipment
- Test regularly
network lines
- Test regularly
redundant network
software
- Install software for
monitoring  and
analysis of redundant
network equipment
functionality
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
denial of network
availability
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.19: Template for treatment of risk Lack of quality of service in the network (Network consumer) 
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Network provider
Treatment of risk
Lack of quality of service
in the network
Risk
avoidance
Reduction of
likelihood
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
List of possible
revisions:
- The network
equipment hardware
and software must be
kept updated
- All hardware and
software configuration
changes have to be
done first on the test
computer
- Installation of new
software and
hardware
components has to be
done first on the test
computer
- Update regularly the
competence of users/
employees that are
responsible for use or
technical support of
network equipment
- Avoid all potential
single points of failure
through redundancy
of host and network
nodes, hardware and
software components,
connections and
paths
- Upgrade network
links
- Upgrade network
equipment hardware
and software
- Regular tests of host
and network nodes
hardware, software
and network links
- Test new software
and hardware
components on the
test computer before
they can be installed
on the main computer
- Test regularly the
competence of users/
employees that are
responsible for use or
technical support of
network equipment
- Use predictive
threshold monitoring
of network
performance
- Monitoring of link
state changes
- Error statistic
monitoring
- Zone changes
monitoring
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Reduction of
consequence
List of possible
revisions:
- Daily full host and
network nodes data
and system backup
- Have additional host
and network nodes
hardware and
software available
- Physical separation
of network equipment
to protect against
localized physical
disasters
- Reduce the impact
of local failures
through the use of
zoning - limit the
types of interactions
between devices in
different zones
- Test regularly
additional network
equipment
- Test regularly
additional network
software
- Install software for
monitoring  and
management of
network zones
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
Risk
transfer
List of possible
revisions:
- Have an insurance
that covers the
financial
consequences of
denial of network
availability
- Lease parts of the
network to an other
network provider
Revising the
security policy
Redesigning
the system
Strategies for
testing
Strategies for
monitoring
 
Figure B.20: Template for treatment of risk Lack of quality of service in the network (Network provider) 
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Appendix C.  
 
This appendix is structured into two sections. Section C.1 provides risk treatment tables for 
Private Lessons. Section C.2 provides risk treatment priorities tables for Private Lessons. 
 
 
C.1 Private Lessons: Risk treatment tables 
 
Table C.1: Private Lessons Treatment table for network availability risks (network consumer) 
 
ID Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit Cost 
1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
Use only network provider 
with acceptable level of 
quality of service in the 
network 
Quality of Internet 
connection can usually be on 
the acceptable level 
Cost of network 
access from the new 
network provider 
1) 
Network equipment hardware 
and software must be kept 
updated 
Insure reliable functionality 
of network equipment 
hardware and software 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher (updates) 
and cost of updates 
2) Ask network provider for 
acceptable (better) level of 
quality of service in the 
network 
Quality of Internet 
connection can usually be on 
the acceptable level 
Cost of network 
access from the 
network provider 
3) Regular tests of network 
equipment hardware and 
software 
Early discovering and  
preventing of network 
equipment hardware and 
software problems 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher (tests) and 
cost of tests 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of network 
equipment hardware and 
software functionality 
Early discovering and  
preventing of network 
equipment hardware and 
software problems 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) and cost 
of software 
1) Have additional network 
equipment available 
Quick change of failed 
network equipment 
Cost of additional 
network equipment 
2) Install redundant network 
equipment  
Reduce the consequence of 
network equipment failure 
Cost of additional 
network equipment 
3) Test regularly redundant 
network equipment  
Insure correct functionality of 
redundant network equipment 
– insure possibility for 
replacement of failed network 
equipment 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher (tests) and 
cost of tests 
c) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and analysis of 
redundant network equipment 
functionality  
Insure correct functionality of 
redundant network equipment 
– insure possibility for 
replacement of failed network 
equipment 
Cost of installation 
(work hours), cost of 
hardware and software 
and cost of monitoring
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
denial of network availability 
Reduce the financial 
consequences of denial of 
network availability 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Denial of 
network 
availability 
(Lack of 
quality 
of service in  
the network: 
bandwidth, 
timeliness, 
reliability/ 
stability) 
e) 
4)    
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Table C.2: Private Lessons Treatment table for host operating system availability risks 
 
 
ID Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit Cost 
1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
1) Operating system must be 
kept updated  
More stable and effective 
operating system 
 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher (update) 
and cost of update 
Install another more reliable 
operating system  
More reliable and stable 
functionality of OS  
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) and cost 
of OS 
2) 
Upgrade to the more reliable 
version of OS 
More reliable and stable 
functionality of OS 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher (update) 
and cost of update 
3) Regular tests of operating 
system 
Early discovering and 
preventing of operating 
system problems 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher (tests) and 
cost of tests 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of operating 
system functionality 
Early discovering and 
preventing of operating 
system problems 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) and cost 
of software 
Daily full data and system 
backup  
Insure possibility for 
recovery from operating 
system problems 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher (backup) 
and cost of backup 
software and hardware
1) 
Emergency boot diskette 
should be created  
Insure possibility for 
recovery from operating 
system problems 
Cost of diskette 
2) Install OS and application 
programs on additional work 
station 
Insure possibility for 
recovery from operating 
system problems – use of 
additional work station in 
case of denial of OS 
functionality on the main 
workstation 
Cost of additional 
work station and cost 
of work time of the 
teacher (installation) 
3) Regular tests of OS installed 
on additional work station  
Insure correct functionality of 
OS on additional work station 
- use of additional work 
station in case of denial of OS 
functionality on the main 
workstation 
Cost of work station, 
installation (the 
teacher work hours) 
and cost of tests 
c) 
4) Install software on additional 
work station for monitoring 
of operating system 
functionality  
Insure correct functionality of 
OS on additional work station 
- use of additional work 
station in case of denial of OS 
functionality on the main 
workstation 
Cost of installation 
(the teacher work 
hours) and cost of 
software 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
denial of operating system 
functionality 
Reduce financial 
consequences of denial of 
operating system 
functionality  
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Denial of 
operating 
system 
functionality 
e) 
4)    
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1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
1)  The competence of 
users/employees responsible 
for use of OS should be 
updated regularly (regular 
training courses) 
More correct use of operating 
system  
Cost of training course
2) Help in installation and use of 
OS from a software support 
service 
More correct and efficient use 
of operating system  
Cost of software 
support service 
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book and self testing of 
knowledge 
More correct and efficient use 
of operating system 
Cost of book/teaching 
program 
b) 
4)    
1) Use software support service 
for recovery from OS 
problems 
Quick recovery from OS 
problems 
Cost of software 
support service 
2) Have a backup competent 
user available  
Possible more efficient use of 
operating system. OS user 
can always get quick help 
from competent user 
Cost of work time of 
backup user 
3)    
c) 
4)    
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
incorrect use of OS 
Reduce financial 
consequences of incorrect use 
of operating system. 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Incorrect 
installation and 
use of 
operating 
system 
e) 
4)    
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1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
Introduce the strict rules for 
choosing or changing of 
password 
Insure strong protection 
against unauthorized access 
to OS 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher/specialist 
to formulate the rules  
Use the screensaver with 
password protection  
Better protection of OS 
against unauthorized access 
Cost of time to change 
screensaver options 
1) 
Users should always logout 
whenever they leave 
computer for any period of 
time 
Better protection of OS 
against unauthorized access 
Cost of time to logout 
2) Use another operating system 
with more strong access 
control 
Insure effective OS access 
control  
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) and cost 
of OS 
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book about host (OS) security 
and self testing of knowledge 
Better protection of OS 
against unauthorized access  
Cost of book/manual 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and analysis of 
user logs 
Insure access of only 
authorized users 
Cost of software 
1) Daily full data and system 
backup 
Quick recovery from OS 
problems 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher and cost of 
backup software and 
hardware 
2) Install OS and application 
programs on additional work 
station  
Quick recovery from 
operating system problems -
insure high service 
availability  
Cost of additional 
work station and cost 
of work time of the 
teacher (installation) 
3) Regular tests of OS installed 
on additional work station  
Insure correct functionality of 
additional work station -
insure high service 
availability 
Cost of work station, 
installation (work 
hours) and cost of 
tests 
c) 
4) Install software on additional 
work station for monitoring 
of OS functionality and 
analysis of user logs  
Insure correct functionality of 
additional work station and 
access of only authorized 
users – better availability of 
service 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) and cost 
of software 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
unauthorized access to 
operating system 
Reduce financial 
consequences of unauthorized 
access to operating system 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Denial of 
operating 
system 
authorization 
functionality 
e) 
4)    
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Table C.3: Private Lessons Treatment table for host storage device availability risks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ID Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit Cost 
1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
1) Use of hard disc only by 
users that have completed 
training course  
More correct use and 
installation of hard disc by 
user  
Cost of arrangement 
or attendance of 
training course 
2) Help in installation and use of 
hard disc from a colleague 
More correct and efficient use 
of hard disc  
Cost of colleague 
work time 
3) User has to study a text book 
about installation and use of 
hard disc or study and test his 
knowledge with help of 
teaching interacting program 
More correct and efficient use 
of hard disc  
Cost of book/teaching 
program 
b) 
4)    
1) Use hardware support service Quick recovery from hard 
disc problems 
Cost of hardware 
support service 
2) Have a backup competent 
user available  
Possible more efficient use of 
hard disc. Hard disk user can 
always get quick help from 
competent user 
Cost of work time of 
backup user 
3)    
c) 
4)    
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
incorrect use of hardware 
component 
Reduce financial 
consequences of incorrect use 
of hardware component 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Incorrect 
installation and 
use of hard 
disk 
e) 
4)    
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1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
1) Run regularly (weakly) the 
program for cleaning of hard 
disk   
More stable and effective 
hard disk 
functionality 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher (cleaning) 
and cost of software 
2) Divide hard disk into logical 
partitions with help of hard 
disk management software 
 
Possible more stable and 
effective functionality of hard  
disk. Reduction of 
consequence of disk crash 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) 
and cost of software 
3) Run regularly (weakly) the 
program for analysis and 
defragmentation of hard disk 
More stable and effective 
hard disk functionality 
 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher and cost of 
analysis software 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of hard disk 
functionality 
Early discovering and 
preventing of hard disk 
problems 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) and cost 
of software 
1) Have an additional hard disk 
available 
The new hard disk can be 
quickly installed in case of 
denial of the old hard disk  
Cost of additional 
hard disk 
2) Install RAID storage solution 
with transparent failover 
Higher availability of host 
hard disk  
Cost of RAID system 
and cost of installation
3) Regular tests of additional 
hard disk functionality 
Insure correct functionality of 
additional hard disk - insure 
possibility for its use in case 
of denial of main hard disk 
Cost of tests 
c) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and failure 
detection of additional hard 
disk functionality 
Insure correct functionality of 
additional hard disk - insure 
possibility for its use in case 
of denial of main hard disk 
Cost of installation 
(work hours) and cost 
of software 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
denial of hard disk 
functionality 
Reduce financial 
consequences of denial of 
hard disk functionality 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Denial of hard 
disk 
functionality 
e) 
4)    
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1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
Access to the room where 
hard disk is installed should 
be protected by a door with a 
lock 
Insure protection against 
unauthorized access to hard 
disk 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher/specialist 
to formulate the rules  
1) 
External hard disk should be 
fastened with screws to a 
wall, floor or table and 
physical access to the hard 
disk should be secured with a 
lock 
Insure protection against 
unauthorized access to hard 
disk 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) 
and cost of equipment 
(screws, lock) 
2) Install hard disk in another 
room/area with more strong 
access control 
Insure protection against 
unauthorized access to hard 
disk 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation)  
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book about host security and 
self testing of knowledge  
Better protection of hard disk 
against unauthorized access  
Cost of book/manual 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and detection of 
access to the room/area where 
hard disk is installed 
Insure access to hard disk of 
only authorized users 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) and cost 
of software 
1) Have an additional hard disk 
available 
The new hard disk can be 
quickly installed in case of a 
damage of the old hard disk  
Cost of additional 
hard disk 
2)    
3)    
c) 
4)    
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
unauthorized access to hard 
disk 
Reduce financial 
consequences of unauthorized 
access to hard disk 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Denial of hard 
disk 
authorization 
functionality 
e) 
4)    
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Table C.4: Private Lessons Treatment table for host authorization availability risks 
 
 
 
 
 
ID Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit Cost 
1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
Host node should be fastened 
with screws to a wall, floor or 
table and physical access to 
the host node should be 
secured with a lock 
Improve protection against 
unauthorized access to host 
node 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) 
and cost of equipment 
(screws, lock) 
1) 
Access to the room where 
host node is installed should 
be protected by door with a 
lock 
Improve protection against 
unauthorized access to host 
node 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher/specialist 
to formulate the rules  
2) Install host node in another 
room/area with more strong 
access control 
Improve protection against 
unauthorized access to host 
node 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation)  
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book about host security and 
self testing of knowledge  
Better protection of host node 
against unauthorized access  
Cost of book/manual 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and detection of 
access to the room/area where 
host node is installed 
Insure access to the host node 
of only authorized users (The 
teacher) 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) and cost 
of software 
1) Have an additional host node 
with installed operating 
system and application 
programs available 
Better availability of service 
in case of damage (denial) of 
original host node 
Cost of additional host 
node 
2) Install and fasten with screws 
an additional host node with 
installed OS and application 
programs in another room 
with more strong access 
control 
Improve protection against 
unauthorized access to 
additional host node – insure 
possibility of its use in case 
of denial of the main host 
node 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) and cost 
of additional host 
node 
3) Test regularly (monthly) the 
functionality of OS and 
application programs 
installed on additional host 
node 
Insure correct and effective 
functionality of additional 
host node – denial of 
functionality of original host 
node will not affect service 
availability 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher (tests)  
c) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and detection of 
access to the room/area where 
additional host node is 
installed 
Insure access to additional 
host node of only authorized 
users – insure possibility of 
its use in case of denial of the 
main host node 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) and cost 
of software 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
unauthorized access to host 
node 
Reduce financial 
consequences of unauthorized 
access to host node 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Denial of Host 
authorization 
availability 
e) 
4)    
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Table C.5: Private Lessons Treatment table for host security service availability risks (antivirus software) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ID Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit Cost 
1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
Attachment from unknown 
sources should not be opened 
Reduce the possibility for 
virus attack 
No cost 
Compact disks and diskettes 
should be virus checked 
before they can be used 
Reduce the possibility for 
virus attack 
No cost 
1) 
Antivirus software should be 
regularly updated 
Reduce the possibility for 
virus attack 
Cost of update 
2) Install antivirus software Reduce the possibility for 
virus attack 
Cost of software 
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book about host security and 
self testing of knowledge  
Better protection of host node 
against virus attack  
Cost of book/manual 
b) 
4) Secure physical access to the 
host and install video 
surveillance equipment for 
monitoring of access to the 
computer 
Insure access to the host of 
only authorized users – 
reduction of possibility of 
virus attack caused by 
unauthorized physical access 
to the host 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) and cost 
of video and access 
control equipment 
1) Daily full data and system 
backup 
Higher availability of 
operating system, application 
programs and data –reduction 
of virus attack consequence 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher (backup) 
and cost of backup 
software and hardware
2) Install OS, application 
programs and antivirus 
software on additional work 
station  
Use of additional work 
station in case of denial of 
functionality of the main 
work station  
Cost of additional 
work station and cost 
of work time of the 
teacher (installation) 
3) Regular tests of OS and 
application programs 
installed on additional work 
station  
Insure possibility for use of 
additional work station in 
case of denial of functionality 
of the main work station 
Cost of work station, 
installation of OS and 
application programs 
(work hours) and cost 
of tests 
c) 
4) Install software on additional 
work station for monitoring 
of OS functionality  
Insure possibility for use of 
additional work station in 
case of denial of functionality 
of the main work station 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) and cost 
of software 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
virus attack 
Reduce financial 
consequences of virus attack 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Lack of 
antivirus 
software/virus 
attack  
e) 
4)    
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Table C.6: Private Lessons Treatment table for host security service availability risks (firewall) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ID Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit Cost 
1) Remove connection from the 
Internet  
Eliminate the possibility of 
attack from the Internet 
Possible reduction of 
service availability 
and revenue  
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
1) Firewall should be regularly 
updated 
Reduce the possibility for 
virus attack 
Cost of update 
2) Install firewall  Better protection of host node 
against network attacks 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) and cost 
of software 
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book about host security and 
self testing of knowledge  
Better protection of host node 
against network attacks  
Cost of book/manual 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of network traffic 
Early discovering and 
preventing of network 
problems – better protection 
against possible network 
attack 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) and cost 
of software 
1) Daily full data and system 
backup 
Higher availability of 
operating system, application 
programs and data –reduction 
of network attack 
consequence 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher (backup) 
and cost of backup 
software and hardware
2) Install OS, application 
programs and antivirus 
software on additional work 
station  
Use of additional work 
station in case of denial of 
functionality of the main 
work station  
Cost of additional 
work station and cost 
of work time of the 
teacher (installation) 
3) Regular tests of OS and 
application programs 
installed on additional work 
station  
Insure possibility for use of 
additional work station in 
case of denial of functionality 
of the main work station 
Cost of work station, 
installation of OS and 
application programs 
(work hours) and cost 
of tests 
c) 
4) Install software on additional 
work station for monitoring 
of OS functionality  
Insure possibility for use of 
additional work station in 
case of denial of functionality 
of the main work station 
Cost of work time of 
the teacher 
(installation) and cost 
of software 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
network attack 
Reduction of financial 
consequences of network 
attack 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Lack of 
firewall/attack 
from the 
network  
e) 
4)    
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C.2 Private Lessons: Risk treatment priorities tables 
 
 
Table C.7: Private Lessons Treatment priority table for network availability risks (network consumer) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ID Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit Cost Treatment 
action 
priority 
1)     
2)     
3)     
a) 
4)     
Use only network provider 
with acceptable level of 
quality of service in the 
network 
High Moderate High 1) 
Network equipment hardware 
and software must be kept 
updated 
Moderate Low Moderate 
2) Ask network provider for 
acceptable (better) level of 
quality of service in the 
network 
High Moderate High 
3) Regular tests of network 
equipment hardware and 
software 
Moderate Low Moderate 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of network 
equipment hardware and 
software functionality 
Low Moderate Low 
1) Have additional network 
equipment available 
High Moderate High 
2) Install redundant network 
equipment  
High Moderate High 
3) Test regularly redundant 
network equipment  
Low Low Low 
c) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and analysis of 
redundant network equipment 
functionality  
Low Moderate Low 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
denial of network availability 
Moderate Very High Low 
2)     
3)     
d) 
4)     
1)     
2)     
3)     
 Denial of 
network 
availability  
(Lack of 
quality 
of service in  
the network 
bandwidth, 
timeliness, 
reliability/ 
stability) 
e) 
4)     
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Table C.8: Private Lessons Treatment priority table for host operating system availability risks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ID Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit Cost Treatment 
action 
priority 
1)     
2)     
3)     
a) 
4)     
1) Operating system must be 
kept updated  
High Very Low Very High 
Install another more reliable 
operating system  
High High Moderate 2) 
Upgrade to the more reliable 
version of OS 
High Moderate High 
3) Regular tests of operating 
system 
Moderate Low Moderate 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of operating 
system functionality 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Daily full data and system 
backup  
High Low High 1) 
Emergency boot diskette 
should be created  
High Very Low Very High 
2) Install OS and application 
programs on additional work 
station 
High High Moderate 
3) Regular tests of OS installed 
on additional work station  
Moderate High Low 
c) 
4) Install software on additional 
work station for monitoring 
of operating system 
functionality  
Moderate High Low 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
denial of operating system 
functionality 
Moderate Very High Low 
2)     
3)     
d) 
4)     
1)     
2)     
3)     
 Denial of 
operating 
system 
functionality 
e) 
4)     
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1)     
2)     
3)     
a) 
4)     
1) The competence of 
users/employees responsible 
for use of OS should be 
updated regularly (regular 
training courses) 
High Moderate High 
2) Help in installation and use of 
OS from a software support 
service 
High High Moderate 
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book and self testing of 
knowledge 
High Very Low Very High 
b) 
4)     
1) Use software support service 
for recovery from OS 
problems 
High High Moderate 
2) Have a backup competent 
user available  
Moderate High Low 
3)     
c) 
4)     
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
incorrect use of OS 
Moderate Very High Low 
2)     
3)     
d) 
4)     
1)     
2)     
3)     
 Incorrect 
installation and 
use of 
operating 
system 
e) 
4)     
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1)     
2)     
3)     
a) 
4)     
Introduce the strict rules for 
choosing or changing of 
password 
High Very Low Very High 
Use the screensaver with 
password protection  
High Very Low Very High 
1) 
Users should always logout 
whenever they leave 
computer for any period of 
time 
High Very Low Very High 
2) Use another operating system 
with more strong access 
control 
Moderate High Low 
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book about host (OS) security 
and self testing of knowledge 
High Very Low Very High 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and analysis of 
user logs 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
1) Daily full data and system 
backup 
High Low High 
2) Install OS and application 
programs on additional work 
station  
High High Moderate 
3) Regular tests of OS installed 
on additional work station  
Moderate High Low 
c) 
4) Install software on additional 
work station for monitoring 
of OS functionality and 
analysis of user logs  
Moderate High Low 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
unauthorized access to 
operating system 
Moderate Very High Low 
2)     
3)     
d) 
4)     
1)     
2)     
3)     
 Denial of 
operating 
system 
authorization 
functionality 
e) 
4)     
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Table C.9: Private Lessons Treatment priority table for host storage device availability risks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ID 
 
Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit Cost Treatment 
action 
priority 
1)     
2)     
3)     
a) 
4)     
1) Use of hard disc only by 
users that have completed 
training course  
High Moderate High 
2) Help in installation and use of 
hard disc from a colleague 
High High Moderate 
3) User has to study a text book 
about installation and use of 
hard disc or study and test his 
knowledge with help of 
teaching interacting program 
High Very Low Very High 
b) 
4)     
1) Use hardware support service High High Moderate 
2) Have a backup competent 
user available  
Moderate High Low 
3)     
c) 
4)     
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
incorrect use of hardware 
component 
Moderate Very High Low 
2)     
3)     
d) 
4)     
1)     
2)     
3)     
 Incorrect 
installation and 
use of hard 
disk 
e) 
4)     
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1)     
2)     
3)     
a) 
4)     
1) Run regularly (weakly) the 
program for cleaning of hard 
disk   
High Very Low Very High 
2) Divide hard disk into logical 
partitions with help of hard 
disk management software 
 
High Very Low Very High 
3) Run regularly (weakly) the 
program for analysis and 
defragmentation of hard disk 
High Very Low Very High 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of hard disk 
functionality 
High Moderate High 
1) Have an additional hard disk 
available 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
2) Install RAID storage solution 
with transparent failover 
High Moderate High 
3) Regular tests of additional 
hard disk functionality 
Moderate Low Moderate 
c) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and failure 
detection of additional hard 
disk functionality 
Moderate High Low 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
denial of hard disk 
functionality 
Moderate Very High Low 
2)     
3)     
d) 
4)     
1)     
2)     
3)     
 Denial of hard 
disk 
functionality 
e) 
4)     
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1)     
2)     
3)     
a) 
4)     
Access to the room where 
hard disk is installed should 
be protected by a door with a 
lock 
High Very Low Very High 1) 
External hard disk should be 
fastened with screws to a 
wall, floor or table and 
physical access to the hard 
disk should be secured with a 
lock 
High Very Low Very High 
2) Install hard disk in another 
room/area with more strong 
access control 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book about host security and 
self testing of knowledge  
High Very Low Very High 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and detection of 
access to the room/area where 
hard disk is installed 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
1) Have an additional hard disk 
available 
High Moderate High 
2)     
3)     
c) 
4)     
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
unauthorized access to hard 
disk 
Moderate Very High Low 
2)     
3)     
d) 
4)     
1)     
2)     
3)     
 Denial of hard 
disk 
authorization 
functionality 
e) 
4)     
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Table C.10: Private Lessons Treatment priority table for host authorization availability risks 
 
 
 
 
 
ID 
 
Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit Cost Treatment 
action 
priority 
1)     
2)     
3)     
a) 
4)     
Host node should be fastened 
with screws to a wall, floor or 
table and physical access to 
the host node should be 
secured with a lock 
High Very Low Very High 1) 
Access to the room where 
host node is installed should 
be protected by door with a 
lock 
High Very Low Very High 
2) Install host node in another 
room/area with more strong 
access control 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book about host security and 
self testing of knowledge  
High Very Low Very High 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and detection of 
access to the room/area 
where host node is installed 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
1) Have an additional host node 
with installed operating 
system and application 
programs available 
High High Moderate 
2) Install and fasten with screws 
an additional host node with 
installed OS and application 
programs in another room 
with more strong access 
control 
High High Moderate 
3) Test regularly (monthly) the 
functionality of OS and 
application programs 
installed on additional host 
node 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
c) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and detection of 
access to the room/area 
where additional host node is 
installed 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
unauthorized access to host 
node 
High Very High Moderate 
2)     
3)     
d) 
4)     
1)     
2)     
3)     
 Denial of Host 
authorization 
availability 
e) 
4)     
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Table C.11: Private Lessons Treatment priority table for host security service availability risks (antivirus 
software) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ID 
 
Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit Cost Treatment 
action 
priority 
1)     
2)     
3)     
a) 
4)     
Attachment from unknown 
sources should not be opened 
High Very Low Very High 
Compact disks and diskettes 
should be virus checked 
before they can be used 
High Very Low Very High 
1) 
Antivirus software should be 
regularly updated 
High Very Low Very High 
2) Install antivirus software Very High Low Very High 
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book about host security and 
self testing of knowledge  
High Low High 
b) 
4) Secure physical access to the 
host and install video 
surveillance equipment for 
monitoring of access to the 
computer 
Moderate High Low 
1) Daily full data and system 
backup 
High Low High 
2) Install OS, application 
programs and antivirus 
software on additional work 
station  
High High Moderate 
3) Regular tests of OS and 
application programs 
installed on additional work 
station  
Moderate High Low 
c) 
4) Install software on additional 
work station for monitoring 
of OS functionality  
Moderate High Low 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
virus attack 
Moderate Very High Low 
2)     
3)     
d) 
4)     
1)     
2)     
3)     
 Lack of 
antivirus 
software/virus 
attack 
e) 
4)     
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Table C.12: Private Lessons Treatment priority table for host security service availability risks (firewall) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ID 
 
Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit Cost Treatment 
action 
priority 
1) Remove connection from the 
Internet  
No benefit   
2)     
3)     
a) 
4)     
1) Firewall should be regularly 
updated 
High Low High 
2) Install firewall  Very High Moderate High 
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book about host security and 
self testing of knowledge  
Moderate Low Moderate 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of network traffic 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
1) Daily full data and system 
backup 
High Low High 
2) Install OS, application 
programs and antivirus 
software on additional work 
station  
High High Moderate 
3) Regular tests of OS and 
application programs 
installed on additional work 
station  
Moderate High Low 
c) 
4) Install software on additional 
work station for monitoring 
of OS functionality  
Moderate High Low 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
network attack 
Moderate Very High Low 
2)     
3)     
d) 
4)     
1)     
2)     
3)     
 Lack of 
firewall/attack 
from the 
network 
e) 
4)     
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Appendix D. Chat service case study 
 
In this appendix we describe the practical use of MODA for the availability risk assessment of 
the chat service AMIGOS. The appendix is structured into six sections. The first five sections are 
decomposed into sub-sections that describe the results of activities of each sub-process of the 
MODA Risk management process. The last section presents the summary of main conclusions. 
Table D1 shows the overview of Appendix D. The left column shows sub-processes of the 
MODA Risk management process. The middle column shows sections in Appendix D that 
describe activities of MODA sub-processes. The right column shows the page where the reader 
can find corresponding section or sub-section.  
 
 
The MODA sub-process Section Page 
Sub-process 1:  
Context identification 
D.1 Contest identification – overview of the 
section 
D.1.1 Activity 1.1 Risk management context 
specification 
D.1.2 Activity 1.2 Specification of the target of 
evaluation 
D.1.3 Activity 1.3 Identification of 
stakeholders of the target system 
D.1.4 Activity 1.4 Identification of assets 
D.1.5 Activity 1.5 Identification of the risk 
acceptance criteria 
 
172 
 
172 
 
174 
 
178 
178 
 
179 
Sub-process 2:  
Risk identification 
D.2 Risk identification – overview of the 
section 
D.2.1 Activity 2.1 Identification of risks to 
availability aspects 
D.2.2 Activity 2.2 Fault tree analysis 
 
180 
 
180 
181 
Sub-process 3:  
Risk analysis 
D.3 Risk analysis – overview of the section 
D.3.1 Activity 3.1 Consequence evaluation 
D.3.2 Activity 3.2 Frequency evaluation 
190 
190 
194 
Sub-process 4:  
Risk evaluation 
D.4 Risk evaluation – overview of the section 
D.4.1 Activity 4.1 Identification of risks values 
D.4.2 Activity 4.2 Update of risks values 
D.4.3 Activity 4.3 Categorisation of risks into 
risk treatment categories 
D.4.4 Activity 4.4 Specification of priorities of 
risk treatment categories 
207 
207 
208 
 
210 
 
210 
Sub-process 5:  
Risk treatment 
D.5 Risk treatment – overview of the section 
D.5.1 Activity 5.1 Identification of treatment 
options 
D.5.2 Activity 5.2 Specification of risks 
treatment priorities 
212 
 
212 
 
223 
Summary of main conclusions 
 
D.6 234 
Table D.1: The overview of Appendix D 
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D.1 Context identification 
 
This section documents the results from the Context identification of the chat service. The 
section is structured into five sub-sections. Sub-section D1.1 describes the Activity 1.1 Risk 
management context specification. Sub-section D1.2 describes the Activity 1.2 Specification of 
the target of evaluation. Activity 1.3 Identification of stakeholders of the target system is 
presented in sub-section D1.3. Sub-section D1.4 presents Activity 1.4 Identification of assets. 
Activity 1.5 Identification of the risk acceptance criteria is described in sub-section D1.5 
 
 
D.1.1 Activity 1.1: Risk management context specification 
 
Objective Establish the risk assessment objectives and identify needed risk assessment processes, 
activities and resources as well as risk assessment records to be kept. 
 
This activity consists of the following four sub-activities: 
 
▪ Specification of risk assessment objectives and needed studies 
▪ Identification of relevant roles for a risk assessment 
▪ Specification of risk assessment plan  
▪ Identification of applied value categories  
 
 
Specification of risk assessment objectives and needed studies 
 
During the meeting with the system owner, the risk assessment objectives were specified and 
different system and risk assessment aspects were discussed.  It was decided that all sub-
processes of the MODA risk management process should be applied. The risk assessment 
objectives are shown in the Figure D.1.1. 
 
 
Risk assessment objectives 
• The risk assessment should identify all possible risks to the 
system availability 
• The risk assessment should suggest possible treatment for 
identified availability risks  
Figure D.1.1: Risk assessment objectives 
   
Because of the little size of the system and the fact that the risk assessment should be done by 
one person we decided to skip the documentation of the risk assessment plan and the roles of 
participants of the risk assessment.  
 
 
Identification of applied value categories 
 
Prior to the risk assessment, we identified value categories that should be applied in the risk 
assessment. The set of frequency and consequence values agreed with the system owner is 
documented in tables D.1.1 and D.1.2. Frequency values were defined with the help of the 
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Qualitative and quantitative frequency values table (Table 5.7). It was decided that frequency 
values should be measured in terms of occurrences per month. We defined two categories of 
consequence values. In the first category the consequence is measured in the impact of service 
lost time on the PDA user. In the second category we use the Total income consequence values 
table (Table 5.11) to define the consequences of risks.  The consequence is defined by comparing 
the lost income caused by a risk to the total income of organisation.  
 
 
Table D.1.1: Frequency values table 
 Frequency Values 
Category Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Almost certain
Measured in terms 
of occurrences per   
month 
0.00 – 0.01 
less often then 
1% 
 
 
0.01 – 0.05 
between 1%
and 5% 
0.05 – 0.20 
between 5% 
and 20% 
0.20 – 0.50 
between 20% 
and 50% 
0.50 – 1.00 
between 50% 
and 100% 
 
 
Table D.1.2: Consequence values table 
 Consequence Values 
Category Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic
Lost hours of service usage 
Measured in the impact of 
service lost time (during 1 
month) on the user 
 
<1hour 
 
less than 
1 hour 
 
1 - 2 hours 
 
between 
1 and 2 hours 
 
2 - 4 hours 
 
between 
2 and 4 hours 
 
4 - 6 hours 
 
between 
4 and 6 hours 
 
>6 
 
more than 
6 hours 
Lost income 
Lost income compared to 
the total income of 
organisation  
 
0-01% 
 
0.1-1% 
 
1-2% 
 
2-10% 
 
10-100% 
 
 
The agreed set of risk values and their mode of computation are documented in the Risk values 
table shown in Table D.1.3. We assigned risk values with the help of the Risk Matrix shown in 
Table D.1.4. 
 
 
Table D.1.3: Risk values table 
Chosen risk 
value category 
Computation
mode 
Level Risk 
value 
Risk value 
description 
0 N No risk 
1 L Low risk 
2 M Moderate risk 
3 H High risk 
Qualitative risk 
values 
Risk Matrix 
4 E Extreme risk 
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Table D.1.4: Risk Matrix 
                        Frequency values  
Consequence 
     Values 
    Rare  Unlikely  Possible  Likely   Certain 
Insignificant N N L L M 
Minor N L L M M 
Moderate L L M M H 
Major L M M H H 
Catastrophic M M H H E 
 
 
We decided that the priority of a risk treatment action should be based on the level of treatment 
action value that should be assigned with the help of the Risk treatment action priority matrix 
shown in Table D.1.5. Identification of treatment action values implies an assignment of values 
to treatment action benefits and costs. The agreed scale for benefit, cost and action values is 
documented in the Treatment action values table shown in Table D.1.6. 
 
 
Table D.1.5: Risk treatment action priority matrix 
 Cost of risk treatment action 
Risk treatment 
action benefit 
Very low Low Moderate High Very high 
Very low L VL VL VL VL 
Low L L L VL VL 
Moderate H M M L L 
High VH H H M M 
Very high VH VH H H M 
 
 
Table D.1.6: Treatment action values table 
Level Benefit 
Value 
Benefit value
description 
Cost 
Value
Cost value 
description
Treatment 
Action Value 
Treatment action
value description
0 VL Very low VL Very low VL Very low 
1 L Low L Low L Low 
2 M Moderate M Moderate M Moderate 
3 H High H High H High 
4 VH Very high VH Very high VH Very high 
 
 
D.1.2 Activity 1.2: Specification of the target of evaluation 
 
Objective Define boundaries of the system that has to be assessed. 
 
 
The AMIGOS chat service users communicate with the service through the Internet and use 
PDA terminals with wireless Internet access to log into the service. We assume that PDA 
terminals have installed Windows for Pocket PC operating system and do not have installed 
antivirus software. A service user pays 1$ for each hour of service usage and the average use of 
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service is 30000 hours per month. The chat service is implemented on two nodes: UnixSuper and 
UnixSuperDuper. These two nodes have similar hardware components and they do not have 
redundant hardware and software components that automatically can take over the activities of 
failed components. Operating system Unix and antivirus software are installed on both nodes. 
The UnixSuper node is connected to the Internet and has firewall and two network cards. The 
UnixSuperDuper node has one network card and is connected to the UnixSuper by a cable. The 
chat service is implemented on four software components: PDA component, UserAgent 
component, MeetingPlaceLogic component, and ChatLogic component. The PDA component is 
installed on PDA terminal and provides user interface. The UserAgent component is installed on 
UnixSuper and responsible for service access control. The MeetingPlaceLogic and ChatLogic 
components are installed on UnixSuperDuper and responsible for a chat room access control 
(MeetingPlaceLogic) and chat functionality of the service (ChatLogic).  
 
Figures D.1.2, D.1.3 and D.1.4 show sequence diagrams of the chat service. 
 
 
sd AMIGOS_Login
Terminal UserAgent
uname/pwd
Login()
loop(0,3) LoginNotAccepted()
Try_again
uname/pwd
Login()
alt
[sum(queue)>5]
User_refused
authorize user
authorize user
LoginAccepted():UserProfile
UserProfile_displayed
alt [nonauthorized user]
[else]
User_acccount _locked
UserLocked()
NotLoggedIn
LoggedIn
NotLoggedIn
[sum(queue)<=5]
 
Figure D.1.2: AMIGOS login (sd1) 
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sd AMIGOS_MeetingPlaceSelection
Terminal UserAgent
select MeetingPlace
joinMP()
joinMPAck()
AccessGranted
alt
MeetingPlaceLogic
joinMP(UserProfile)
joinMPAck()
joinMPNAck()
joinMPNAck()
AccessDenied
LoggedIn
MeetingPlaceSelected
LoggedIn
 
Figure D.1.3: AMIGOS Meeting place (chat room) selection (sd2) 
 
 
sd AMIGOS_Chat
Terminal UserAgent
Chattext_Entered
chatText()
textChatted()
Chattext_Displayed
ChatLogic
chatText()
textChatted()
opt
 
Figure D.1.4: AMIGOS chat (sd3) 
 
 
Figure D.1.5 shows domain picture. 
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Internet
StudentUser 2StudentUser 1 Wireless
network
Chat system
UnixSuper UnixSuperDuper
Wireless
network  
 
Figure D.1.5: Domain picture 
 
 
The identified actors and use cases are shown in Figure D.1.6 and the Target of evaluation table 
is shown in Table D.1.7. We identified two main functions that should be provided by the chat 
service system: 
• The chat service should provide the authentication control of users. 
• The chat service should provide chat service functionality. 
 
 
User
Login
Chat
 
Figure D.1.6: Use cases 
 
 
Table D.1.7: Target-of-evaluation table 
Target:  Chat system & User PDA 
Objective: 1. Online interactive chat service 
Service/Function: Chat service 
1. Provide the authentication control of users  
2. Provide chat service functionality 
PDA 
1. Provide wireless access to the chat service 
Security Aspects: Availability should be the main concern 
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D.1.3 Activity 1.3: Identification of stakeholders of the target system 
 
Objective Identify stakeholders of the target system. 
 
 
We identified two stakeholders – system owner and PDA user. The first owns the chat system 
and defines the business policy of the chat service; the second uses the chat service. The 
identified stakeholders are documented in the Stakeholder table that is shown in Table D.1.8 
below. 
 
 
Table D.1.8: Stakeholders table 
Stakeholder ID Stakeholder (Role) Stakeholder (Name) Description 
01 System owner  Owns the chat system and defines business
policy of the chat service 
02 PDA user  Uses the chat service  
 
 
D.1.4 Activity 1.4: Identification of assets 
 
Objective Identify and value assets. 
 
 
The Asset diagram and the Asset table are shown in Figure D.1.7 and Table D.1.9. The Asset 
table documents stakeholders, asset categories and assets together with the description of assets 
and their values. The Asset diagram depicts stakeholders along with assets that they have. Both 
the system owner and the PDA user have availability of service as an asset that is very important 
to them. The PDA user pays 1$ for 1 hour of service usage and the system owner estimates that 
the system is used about 30000 hours per month.  
 
 
Availability
of service
1$
for 1 hour
<<Asset category>>
Organizational assets
PDA user
<<ownership>>
System owner
<<ownership>>
<<Asset category>>
Organizational assets
Availability
of service
30000$
per month
 
Figure D.1.7: Asset diagram 
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Table D.1.9: Asset table 
ID Stakeholder Asset 
Category 
Asset Description Value 
01 System owner Organizational Availability  
of service 
The highly available service is one of the 
main sources of income for the system 
owner 
30000$ per 
month  
02 PDA user Organizational Availability 
of service 
The PDA user pays 1$ for each hour of 
service usage 
1$ for 1 hour 
of service 
usage  
 
 
D.1.5 Activity 1.5: Identification of the risk acceptance criteria 
 
Objective Identify the risk acceptance criteria that will be used to determine whether a given risk 
is acceptable or not. 
 
 
The Risk acceptance table is shown in Table D.1.10 and documents stakeholders, asset 
categories and assets along with the description of the risk acceptance criteria. Both the system 
owner and the PDA user may accept risks that have the risk value equal or less than “Low”.  
 
 
Table D.1.10: Risk acceptance table 
Stakeholder Asset category Asset Risk acceptance criteria 
System owner    Organizational Availability of service No risks that have a risk value > Low
PDA user    Organizational Availability of service No risks that have a risk value > Low
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D.2 Risk identification 
 
This section describes the results from the Risk identification of the chat service. The section is 
structured into two sub-sections. Sub-section D2.1 describes the Activity 2.1 Identification of 
risks to availability aspects. Activity 2.2 Fault tree analysis is presented in sub-section D2.2.  
 
D.2.1 Activity 2.1: Identification of risks to availability aspects  
 
Objective Identify availability aspects risks that are relevant for the target of evaluation. 
 
 
The chat service is implemented on two nodes UnixSuper (US) and UnixSuperDuper (USD) that 
communicate with each other through a cable. PDA users are connected to a wireless network 
and communicate with the chat service (UnixSuper node) through the Internet. Table D.2.1 
shows the Network availability risks table for the chat service.  
 
 
Table D.2.1: Network availability risks table 
Stakeholder 
 
Asset 
 
Availability aspect Risk Relevant 
entity 
System owner Availability of 
service 
Network availability Denial of Network 
availability 
Internet connection 
 
Cable connecting two 
chat nodes 
PDA user Availability of 
service 
Network availability Denial of Network 
availability 
Wireless network 
connection 
 
 
Without the chat software component installed on a PDA terminal, the user will not be able to 
use the chat service. If software component UserAgent is not function or malfunction, the users 
will not be able to log into the service. Without MeetingPlaceLogic component the users will not 
be able to choose a chat room. If software component ChatLogic is not available, the users will 
not be able to chat with each other. Table D.2.2 shows the Software availability risks table for 
the chat service.  
 
 
Table D.2.2: Software availability risks table 
Stakeholder 
 
Asset 
 
Availability aspect Risk Relevant 
entity 
System owner Availability of 
service 
Host (US) application 
software availability 
 
 
Host (USD) application 
software availability 
Denial of Host (US) 
application software 
availability 
 
Denial of Host (USD) 
application software 
availability 
UserAgent 
 
 
 
MeetingPlaceLogic  
 
ChatLogic 
PDA user Availability of 
service 
Host (PDA) application 
software availability 
Denial of Host (PDA) 
application software 
availability 
PDA chat software 
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The chat service nodes UnixSuper and UnixSuperDuper are connected by a cable and have 
similar hardware components that are important for the chat service functionality: processor, 
network card and hard disk. The UnixSuper has two network cards: one is used to connect the 
node to the Internet, and another one is used to connect the node to the UnixSuperDuper. PDA 
terminal connects to the Internet with the help of network card and has removable flash memory 
card and lithium battery. Table D.2.3 shows the Hardware availability risks table for the chat 
service.  
 
 
Table D.2.3: Hardware availability risks table 
Stakeholder 
 
Asset 
 
Availability aspect Risk Relevant 
entity 
System owner Availability of 
service 
Host (US) internal 
hardware availability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Host (USD) internal 
hardware availability 
Denial of Host (US) 
internal hardware 
availability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Denial of Host (USD) 
internal hardware 
availability 
Network card 1 
 
Network card 2 
 
Hard disk 
 
Processor 
 
 
Network card 
 
Hard disk 
 
Processor 
PDA user Availability of 
service 
Host  (PDA) internal 
hardware availability 
Denial of Host (PDA) 
internal hardware 
Network card 
 
Memory flash card 
 
Lithium battery 
 
 
The chat service availability also depends on the availability of network administrator that is 
responsible for installation of new components, configuration and maintenance of chat service. 
Table D.2.4 shows the Human availability risks table for the chat service. 
 
 
Table D.2.4: Human availability risks table 
Stakeholder 
 
Asset 
 
Availability aspect Risk Relevant 
entity 
System owner Availability of 
service 
Human availability Denial of Human 
availability 
Chat service network 
administrator 
     
 
 
D.2.2 Activity 2.2: Fault tree analysis 
 
Objective Identify causes that may lead to the availability aspects risks identified in the Activity 
2.1 
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The availability of chat service can be affected by the denial of availability of chat service nodes, 
availability of network and availability of network administrator. Figure D.2.1 shows fault tree 
that depicts risks that may lead to the denial of service availability.  
 
 
Denial of
service
availability
OR
1
Denial of Host
node
(UnixSuper)
availability
Denial of Host
node
(UnixSuperDuper)
availability
Denial of
Human
availability
(NetAdmin)
2 3
Denial of
Network
availability
4  
Figure D.2.1: Fault tree for Denial of service availability 
 
 
The availability of wireless access to the chat service can be affected by the denial of availability 
of wireless network and availability of PDA. Figure D.2.2 shows fault tree that depicts risks that 
may lead to the denial of wireless access to the chat service. 
 
 
OR
1 2
Denial of
Wireless access
to service
availability
Denial of
PDA
availability
Denial
of wireless
network
availability
 
Figure D.2.2: Fault tree for Denial of wireless access to service 
 
 
The network availability can be decomposed into the availability of Internet connection and 
availability of cable connecting the two chat service nodes. Figure D.2.3 shows fault tree that 
depicts risk that may lead to the denial of network availability. 
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OR
1 2
Denial of
Network
availability
Denial of
Internet
connection
availability
Denial of
cable
availability
 
Figure D.2.3: Fault tree for Denial of network availability 
 
 
To build the fault trees that have the top events Denial of Host node (PDA) availability, Denial 
of Host node (UnixSuper) availability, and Denial of Host node (UnixSuperDuper) availability, 
we have used the template from Figure 4.15 (chapter 4.7). Figure D.2.4 shows fault tree that was 
build for each of top events. 
 
 
4
Denial of Host
hardware
availability
OR
Denial of Host
internal
hardware
availability
Denial of Host
external
hardware
availability
6 8
Denial of Host
storage device
availability
(hard disc)
7
Denial of Host
authorization
availability
5
1
Denial of Host
software
availability
2
OR
Denial of Host
application
software
availability
Denial of Host
operating
system
availability
3
Denial of
Power supply
service
availability
Denial of Host
node
availability
OR
Denial of Host
Security
service
availability
 
Figure D.2.4: Fault tree for Denial of Host node (PDA, UnixSuper, UnixSuperDuper) availability 
 
 
Figures D.2.5, D.2.6 and D.2.7 show fault trees for the availability risks Denial of Host (PDA) 
application software availability, Denial of Host (UnixSuper) application software availability, 
and Denial of Host (UnixSuperDuper) application software availability. These fault trees were 
constructed with the help of template from Figure 4.16. 
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OR
1 2 3
Denial of
PDA
chat software
availability
Denial of
PDA
chat software
functionality
Denial of
PDA
chat software
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation
and use by
user
 
Figure D.2.5: Fault tree for Denial of Host (PDA) application software availability 
 
 
OR
1 2 3
Denial of
UserAgent
availability
Denial of
UserLogic
functionality
Denial of
UserLogic
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation
and use by
user
 
 
Figure D.2.6: Fault tree for Denial of Host (UnixSuper) application software availability 
 
 
OR
OR
1 2 3
Denial of
ChatLogic
availability
Denial of
ChatLogic
functionality
Denial of
ChatLogic
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation
and use by
user
OR
4 5 6
Denial of
MeetingPlaceLogic
availability
Denial of
MeetingPlaceLogic
functionality
Denial of
MeetingPlaceLogic
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation
and use by
user
Denial of
UnixSuperDuper
application
software
availability
 
Figure D.2.7: Fault tree for Denial of Host (UnixSuperDuper) application software availability 
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Figures D.2.8, D.2.9 and D.2.10 show fault trees for the availability risks Denial of Host (PDA) 
operating system availability, Denial of Host (UnixSuper) operating system availability, and 
Denial of Host (UnixSuperDuper) operating system availability. These fault trees were 
constructed with the help of template from Figure 4.17. 
 
 
OR
1 2 3
Denial of Host
(PDA)
operating system
availability
Denial of
operating
system
functionality
Denial of
operating
system
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation
and use by
user
 
Figure D.2.8: Fault tree for Denial of Host (PDA) operating system availability 
 
 
OR
1 2 3
Denial of Host
(UnixSuper)
operating system
availability
Denial of
operating
system
functionality
Denial of
operating
system
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation
and use by
user
 
Figure D.2.9: Fault tree for Denial of Host (UnixSuper) operating system availability 
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OR
1 2 3
Denial of Host
(UnixSuperDuper)
operating system
availability
Denial of
operating
system
functionality
Denial of
operating
system
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation
and use by
user
 
Figure D.2.10: Fault tree for Denial of Host (UnixSuperDuper) operating system availability 
 
 
Figure D.2.11 shows fault tree for the availability risk Denial of Host (PDA) hardware 
availability. The denial of PDA memory flash card availability will be considered under Denial 
of Host storage device availability in the fault tree for Denial of Host node (PDA) availability. 
Figures D.2.12 and D.2.13 show fault trees that are constructed for the availability risks Denial 
of Host (UnixSuper) hardware availability, and Denial of Host (UnixSuperDuper) hardware 
availability. We constructed hardware availability fault trees with the help of template from 
Figure 4.18. 
 
 
Denial of Host
(PDA)
hardware
availability
OR
OR
Denial of
memory flash
card
availability
Denial of
memory card
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation and
use by user
Denial of
memory card
functionality
5 6 7
OR
Denial of
network card
availability
Denial of
network card
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation and
use by user
Denial of
functionality of
network card
hardware
5 6 7  
Figure D.2.11: Fault tree for Denial of Host (PDA) hardware availability 
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Denial of Host
(UnixSuper)
hardware
availability
OR
OR
Denial of
network card 1
availability
Denial of
network card
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation and
use by user
Denial of
functionality of
network card
hardware
1 2 3
OR
Denial of
network card 2
availability
Denial of
network card
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation and
use by user
Denial of
functionality of
network card
hardware
4 5 6
OR
Denial of hard
disk
availability
Denial of
hard disk
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation and
use by user
Denial of
functionality of
hard disk
hardware
7 8 9
Denial of
processor
availability
OR
Denial of
processor
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation and
use by user
Denial of
functionality of
processor
hardware
11 12 13
Denial of
functionality of
motherboard
10  
Figure D.2.12: Fault tree for Denial of Host (UnixSuper) hardware availability 
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Denial of Host
(UnixSuperDuper)
hardware
availability
OR
Denial of
processor
availability
OR
Denial of
network card
availability
Denial of hard
disk
availability
OR
Denial of
network card
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation and
use by user
Denial of
functionality of
network card
hardware
1 2 3
Denial of
hard disk
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation and
use by user
Denial of
functionality of
hard disk
hardware
8 9 10
OR
Denial of
processor
authorization
functionality
Incorrect
installation and
use by user
Denial of
functionality of
processor
hardware
5 6 7
Denial of
functionality of
motherboard
4
 
Figure D.2.13: Fault tree for Denial of Host (UnixSuperDuper) hardware availability 
 
 
Figure D.2.14 shows fault tree that is constructed for the availability risk Denial of Host (PDA) 
security service availability. The similar trees were constructed for the risks Denial of Host 
(UnixSuper) security service availability, and Denial of Host (UnixSuperDuper) security service 
availability. We constructed fault tree with the help of template from Figure 4.19. 
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Denial of Host
Security service
availability
OR
1
Denial of
Firewall
functionality
Denial of
availability
due to firewall
problems
Lack of
antivirus
software - virus
attack
4
Denial of
antivirus
software
funcionality
Lack of
Firewall - attack
from network
Denial of
availability
due to antivirus
software problems
XOR XOR
AND
5
Antivirus
software doesn't
function
Virus
attack
62
Firewall
doesn’t
function
Attack
from
network
3
AND
 
Figure D.2.14: Fault tree for Denial of Host (PDA) security service availability 
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D.3 Risk analysis 
 
This section presents the results from the Risk analysis of the chat service. The section is 
structured into two sub-sections. Sub-section D3.1 describes the Activity 3.1 Consequence 
evaluation. Sub-section D3.2 presents the Activity 3.2 Frequency evaluation.  
 
 
D.3.1 Activity 3.1: Consequence evaluation 
 
Objective Analyse risks consequences 
 
 
In the activity 1.1 we decided that consequence values for the PDA user and the system owner 
should be determined with the help of the Consequence values table shown in Table D.1.2. Both 
PDA users and the system owner have agreements with service companies about software and 
hardware support. The consequence values for the system owner were determined in the 
following way: 
- First we determined the hour income of the chat service (month income/number of hours 
in month): 30000/730 = 41$ per hour 
- Then we determined the lost income (downtime*hour income) 
- Then the lost income was compared to the monthly income of the chat service and the 
resulted percent was used to determine the consequence value with the help of the 
Consequence values table (Table D.1.2). 
 
The consequence tables for the chat service are depicted below and show identified consequence 
values together with their description. 
 
 
Table D.3.1: Consequence table for software availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence 
value 
Consequence 
description 
Denial of host (PDA) 
operating system availability 
The Host (PDA) 
operating system 
doesn’t function or  
malfunction 
Major Service company 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 5 hours to fix 
operating system 
problems  
PDA user 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Availability 
of service 
Denial of  
host (PDA) 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
Host (PDA) 
application 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
PDA chat 
software 
functionality 
PDA chat software 
doesn’t function or  
malfunction 
Minor Service company 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 2 hours to fix chat 
application software 
problems 
System 
owner 
 
Availability 
of service 
 
Denial of  
host (US) 
software 
availability 
 
 
 
 
Denial of host (US) operating 
system availability 
The Host (US) 
operating system 
doesn’t function or  
malfunction 
Moderate Service company 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 8 hours to fix 
operating system 
problems 
((41*8)/30000)*100 = 
1,09% 
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Denial of  
Host (US) 
application 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
UserAgent 
software 
component 
functionality 
UserAgent software 
component doesn’t 
function or 
malfunction 
Minor Service company 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 5 hours to fix chat 
application software 
problems 
((41*5)/30000)*100 = 
0,68% 
Denial of host (US) operating 
system availability 
The Host (USD) 
operating system 
doesn’t function or  
malfunction 
Moderate Service company 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 8 hours to fix 
operating system 
problems 
((41*8)/30000)*100 = 
1,09% 
Denial of  
MeetingPlace
Logic 
software 
component 
functionality 
MeetingPlaceLogic 
software component 
doesn’t function or 
malfunction 
Minor Service company 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 5 hours to fix chat 
application software 
problems 
((41*5)/30000)*100 = 
0,68% 
Denial of  
host (USD) 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
Host (USD) 
application 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
ChatLogic 
software 
component 
functionality 
ChatLogic software 
component doesn’t 
function or 
malfunction 
Minor Service company 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 5 hours to fix chat 
application software 
problems 
((41*5)/30000)*100 = 
0,68% 
 
 
Table D.3.2: Consequence table for hardware availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence 
value 
Consequence 
description 
Denial of host (PDA) memory 
flash card availability 
The Host (PDA)  
memory flash card 
doesn’t function or  
malfunction 
Moderate PDA user hasn’t an 
additional memory flash 
card. It takes him no 
longer than 4 hours to 
get a new memory flash 
card and install it. 
PDA user 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host (PDA) 
hardware 
availability  
Denial of  
Host (PDA) 
internal 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of 
network card 
availability 
Network card doesn’t 
function or  
malfunction 
Major PDA user hasn’t an 
additional network card. 
It takes him 5 hours to 
get a new memory flash 
card and install it. 
Denial of host (US & USD) 
storage device 
availability 
The host hard disk  
doesn’t function or  
malfunction 
Moderate Service company 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 10 hours to fix hard 
disk problems 
((41*10)/30000)*100 = 
1,36% 
System 
owner 
 
Availability 
of service 
 
Denial of 
host (US) 
and host 
(USD) 
hardware 
availability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Denial of host
(US & USD) 
internal 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of 
network card 
availability 
Network card doesn’t 
function or 
malfunction 
Major Service company 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 15 hours to fix 
network card problems 
((41*15)/30000)*100 = 
2,05% 
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Denial of 
processor 
availability 
Processor doesn’t 
function or 
malfunction 
Major Service company 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 18 hours to fix 
processor problems 
((41*18)/30000)*100 = 
2,46% 
    
 
 
Table D.3.3: Consequence table for host security service availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence 
value 
Consequence 
description 
Lack of firewall – host is 
attacked from the Internet 
The host node is 
attacked from the 
Internet  
Catastrophic Service company 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 8 hours to recover 
PDA from a network 
attack 
PDA user Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host (PDA) 
security 
service 
availability 
Lack of antivirus software – 
host is attacked by computer 
virus 
The host node is 
attacked by  
computer virus 
Major Service company 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 6 hours to recover 
PDA from a virus attack 
Host (US) is attacked from the 
Internet 
The host node (US) is 
attacked from the 
Internet 
Moderate Service company 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 10 hours to recover 
host from network 
attack 
((41*10)/30000)*100 = 
1,36% 
System 
owner 
Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host (US & 
USD) 
security 
service 
availability 
Host (US & USD) is attacked 
by computer virus 
The host node (US & 
USD) is attacked by  
computer virus 
Major Service company 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 15 hours to recover 
host from virus attack 
((41*15)/30000)*100 = 
2,05% 
 
 
Table D.3.4: Consequence table for host availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence 
value 
Consequence 
description 
Denial of host software 
availability 
The host software 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
 The consequence of 
denial of availabilities of 
host operating system 
and chat software 
Denial of host hardware 
availability 
The host hardware 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
 The consequence of 
denial of  
availabilities of memory 
flash card and network 
card 
Denial of power supply 
service availability 
Lithium battery 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
Moderate 
 
PDA user has not an 
additional lithium 
battery. It takes him no 
longer than 4 hours to 
get a new lithium battery 
and install it. 
PDA user Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host (PDA)  
availability 
Denial of host security service 
availability 
The host is 
attacked from 
the internet and/or by 
computer virus 
 The consequence of lack 
of firewall and antivirus 
software 
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Denial of host authorization 
availability 
PDA is stolen  Catastrophic As a result of theft of 
PDA, user has to buy a 
new PDA and install 
operating system along 
with application 
programs. It takes him 1 
day to buy a new PDA 
Denial of host software 
availability 
The host software 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
 The consequence of 
denial of availabilities of 
host (US & USD) 
operating system and 
chat software 
Denial of host hardware 
availability 
The host hardware 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
 The consequence of 
denial of  
availabilities of host (US 
& USD) hard disc, 
network card and 
processor 
Denial of power supply 
service availability 
The local  provider of  
electricity has  
technical problems 
and can’t provide 
electricity 
Moderate Provider of electricity 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 10 hours to recover 
from electricity 
problems 
((41*10)/30000)*100 = 
1,36% 
Denial of host security service 
availability 
The host is 
attacked from 
the internet and/or by 
computer virus 
 The consequence of 
attack from Internet or 
virus attack 
System 
owner 
Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host (US & 
USD)  
availability 
Denial of host authorization 
availability 
The chat service nodes 
are stolen or damaged  
Catastrophic It takes the system 
owner 5 days to recover 
from theft/damage of 
service nodes 
 
 
Table D.3.5: Consequence table for service availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Consequence 
value 
Consequence 
description 
Denial of host (US & USD) 
availability 
The host (US & USD) 
is not available 
 The consequence of 
denial of  
availabilities of hosts 
software, hardware, 
power supply service, 
host authorization and 
security service  
The local Internet 
provider has technical 
problems and can’t 
provide access to the 
Internet 
Minor Internet provider 
guarantees that it takes 
for company no longer 
than 3 hours to recover 
from network problems 
((41*3)/30000)*100 = 
0,41% 
Denial of Network 
availability 
The cable connecting 
two chat service nodes 
is damaged or doesn’t 
function 
Minor The chat company has an 
additional cable. It takes 
netadmin 2 hours to 
change the cable. 
((41*2)/30000)*100 = 
0,27% 
System 
owner 
Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
Service 
availability 
Denial of Human availability The network 
administrator makes 
fail during 
maintenance of chat 
service 
Minor Usually it takes 1 hour 
for network administrator 
to recover the chat 
service from fail  
((41*1)/30000)*100 = 
0,13% 
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Denial of PDA availability PDA is not available  The consequence of 
denial of availabilities of 
memory flash card, 
network card , lithium 
battery, host 
authorization and security 
service 
PDA user Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
wireless 
access to 
service 
availability 
Denial of wireless network  
availability 
Wireless network is 
not available 
Minor Wireless network 
provider guarantees that 
it takes for company no 
longer than 2 hours to 
recover from network 
problems 
 
 
D.3.2 Activity 3.2: Frequency evaluation 
 
Objective Evaluate risks frequencies 
 
 
Figure D.3.1 shows the fault tree with frequencies of risks that may lead to the Denial of Host 
(PDA) security service availability. The probabilities of basis events were defined with the help 
of information provided by the PDA user support company.  
 
 
Denial of Host
(PDA)
Security service
availability
OR
1
Denial of
Firewall
functionality
Denial of
availability
due to firewall
problems
Lack of
antivirus
software - virus
attack
4
Denial of
antivirus
software
funcionality
Lack of
Firewall - attack
from network
Denial of
availability
due to antivirus
software problems
XOR XOR
AND
5
Antivirus
software doesn't
function
Virus
attack
62
Firewall
doesn’t
function
Attack
from
network
3
AND
0,02
0,02
0,07
0,07
0,0886
 
Figure D.3.1: Determination of frequency for Denial of PDA security service availability 
 
 
Figures D.3.2, D.3.3 and D.3.4 show the fault trees with frequencies of risks that may lead to the 
Denial of Host (PDA) software availability, Denial of Host (PDA) hardware availability and 
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Denial of Host (PDA) availability. The probabilities of basis events were defined with help of 
information provided by the PDA user support company. 
 
 
0,0651544
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availability
OR
OR
4 5 6
Denial of Host
(PDA)
operating system
availability
Denial of
operating
system
functionality
Denial of
operating
system
authorization
functionality
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installation
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user
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1 2 3
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PDA chat
software
availability
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UserAgent
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and use by
user
0,030,0180,05 0,012
0,05412778
0,11575552
0,0070,004  
Figure D.3.2: Determination of frequency for Denial of PDA software availability 
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OR
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availability
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Figure D.3.3: Determination of frequency for Denial of PDA hardware availability 
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Denial of PDA
software
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Denial of PDA
hardware
availability
Denial of PDA
operating system
availability
3
Denial of PDA
chat software
availability
OR
1
Denial of PDA
memory flash
card
availability
9
Denial of PDA
network card
availability
OR
7
Denial of PDA
Power supply
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(Lithium battery)
Denial of PDA
Security service
availability
Denial of PDA
authorization
availability
OR
Denial of Host
(PDA)
availability
4 65
0,0886
0,0651544
0,014 0,012
0,05412778
0,11575552
0,0244051 0,01137002
0,03549764
0,24278617
 
Figure D.3.4: Determination of frequency for Denial of PDA availability 
 
 
Figures D.3.5 and D.3.6 show the fault trees with frequencies of risks that may lead to the Denial 
of Host (US) security service availability and Denial of Host (USD) security service availability. 
The probabilities of basis events were defined with the help of information provided by the 
software support company used by the chat service administration. 
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antivirus
software - virus
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Figure D.3.5: Determination of frequency for Denial of Host (US) security service availability 
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Figure D.3.6: Determination of frequency for Denial of Host (USD) security service availability 
 
 
Figures D.3.7, D.3.8, D.3.9 and D.3.10 show the fault trees with frequencies of risks that may 
lead to the Denial of Host (US) software availability, Denial of Host (USD) software availability, 
Denial of Host (US) hardware availability and Denial of Host (USD) hardware availability. The 
probabilities of basis events were defined with the help of available statistical information and 
the information provided by the software and hardware support companies used by the chat 
service administration.  
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Figure D.3.7: Determination of frequency for Denial of Host (US) software availability 
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Figure D.3.8: Determination of frequency for Denial of Host (USD) software availability 
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Figure D.3.9: Determination of frequency for Denial of Host (US) hardware availability 
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Figure D.3.10: Determination of frequency for Denial of Host (USD) hardware availability 
 
 
Figures D.3.11 and D.3.12 show the fault trees with frequencies of risks that may lead to the 
Denial of Host (US) availability and Denial of Host (USD) availability. The frequency of risk 
Denial of power supply service availability was defined with the help of information provided by 
the local power supply company. The probability of risk Denial of host authorization availability 
was defined with the help of available statistical information and the information provided by the 
local police office. 
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Figure D.3.11: Determination of frequency for Denial of Host (US) availability 
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Figure D.3.12: Determination of frequency for Denial of Host (USD) availability 
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Figures D.3.13, D.3.14 and D.3.15 show the fault trees with frequencies of risks that may lead to 
the Denial of Network availability, Denial of wireless access to service availability and Denial of 
chat service availability. Frequencies of risks Denial of Internet connection availability and 
Denial of wireless network availability were defined with the help of information provided by 
the network provider used by PDA users and chat service.  
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Figure D.3.13: Determination of frequency for Denial of Wireless access to service availability 
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Figure D.3.14: Determination of frequency for Denial of Wireless access to service availability 
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Figure D.3.15: Determination of frequency for Denial of Chat service availability 
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The identified risks frequencies were documented in frequency tables shown below. 
 
 
Table D.3.6: Frequency table for software availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency 
value 
Frequency 
description 
Denial of host (PDA) 
operating system availability 
The Host (PDA) 
operating system 
doesn’t function or  
malfunction 
0,05412778 
Possible 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of information 
provided by PDA user 
support company 
PDA user 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Availability 
of service 
Denial of  
host (PDA) 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
Host (PDA) 
application 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
PDA chat 
software 
functionality 
PDA chat software 
doesn’t function or  
malfunction 
0,0651544 
Possible 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of information 
provided by PDA user 
support company 
Denial of host (US) operating 
system availability 
The Host (US) 
operating system 
doesn’t function or  
malfunction 
0,1080928 
Possible 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of available statistical 
information and 
information provided by a 
software support company 
used by chat service 
administration 
Denial of  
host (US) 
software 
availability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Denial of  
Host (US) 
application 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
UserAgent 
software 
component 
functionality 
UserAgent software 
component doesn’t 
function or 
malfunction 
0,0297672 
Unlikely 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of information 
provided by a software 
support company used by 
chat service administration 
Denial of host (USD) 
operating system availability 
The Host (USD) 
operating system 
doesn’t function or  
malfunction 
0,1080928 
Possible 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of available statistical 
information and 
information provided by a 
software support company 
used by chat service 
administration 
Denial of  
MeetingPlace
Logic 
software 
component 
functionality 
MeetingPlaceLogic 
software component 
doesn’t function or 
malfunction 
0,0297672 
Unlikely 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of information 
provided by a software 
support company used by 
chat service administration 
System 
owner 
 
Availability 
of service 
 
Denial of  
host (USD) 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
Host (USD) 
application 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
ChatLogic 
software 
component 
functionality 
ChatLogic software 
component doesn’t 
function or 
malfunction 
0,0297672 
Unlikely 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of information 
provided by a software 
support company used by 
chat service administration 
 
 
Table D.3.7: Frequency table for hardware availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency 
value 
Frequency 
description 
PDA user 
 
 
 
 
Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host (PDA) 
hardware 
availability  
Denial of host (PDA) memory 
flash card availability 
The Host (PDA)  
memory flash card 
doesn’t function or  
malfunction 
0,01137002 
Unlikely 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of information 
provided by PDA user 
support company 
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Denial of  
Host (PDA) 
internal 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of 
network card 
availability 
Network card doesn’t 
function or  
malfunction 
0,0244051 
Unlikely 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of information 
provided by PDA user 
support company 
Denial of host (US & USD) 
storage device 
availability 
The host hard disc  
doesn’t function or  
malfunction 
0,01795303 
Unlikely 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of available 
statistical information 
and information provided 
by hardware support 
company used by chat 
service administration 
Denial of 
network card 
availability 
Network card doesn’t 
function or 
malfunction 
0,01794104 
Unlikely 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of available 
statistical information 
and information provided 
by hardware support 
company used by chat 
service administration 
Denial of host
(US & USD) 
internal 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of 
processor 
availability 
Processor doesn’t 
function or 
malfunction 
0,00777823 
Rare 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of available 
statistical information 
and information provided 
by hardware support 
company used by chat 
service administration 
System 
owner 
 
Availability 
of service 
 
Denial of 
host (US) 
and host 
(USD) 
hardware 
availability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
Table D.3.8: Frequency table for host security service availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency 
value 
Frequency 
description 
Lack of firewall – host is 
attacked from the Internet 
The host node is 
attacked from the 
Internet  
0,02 
Unlikely 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of information 
provided by PDA user 
support company 
PDA user Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host (PDA) 
security 
service 
availability 
Lack of antivirus software – 
host is attacked by computer 
virus 
The host node is 
attacked by  
computer virus 
0,07 
Possible 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of information 
provided by PDA user 
support company 
Host (US) is attacked from 
the Internet 
The host node (US) is 
attacked from the 
Internet 
0,00022 
Rare 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of available 
statistical information 
and information provided 
by software and 
hardware support 
company used by chat 
service administration 
System 
owner 
Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host (US & 
USD) 
security 
service 
availability 
Host (US & USD) is attacked 
by computer virus 
The host node (US & 
USD) is attacked by  
computer virus 
0,00098 
Rare 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of available 
statistical information 
and information provided 
by software and 
hardware support 
company used by chat 
service administration 
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Table D.3.9: Frequency table for host availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency 
value 
Frequency 
description 
Denial of host software 
availability 
The host software 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
0,11575552 
Possible 
The frequency is based 
on frequencies of denial 
of availabilities of host 
operating system and 
chat software 
Denial of host hardware 
availability 
The host hardware 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
0,03549764 
Unlikely 
The frequency is based 
on frequencies of denial 
of availabilities of 
memory flash card and 
network card 
Denial of power supply 
service availability 
Lithium battery 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
0,014 
Unlikely 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of information 
provided by PDA user 
support company 
Denial of host security service 
availability 
The host is 
attacked from 
the internet and/or by 
computer virus 
0,0886 
Possible 
The probability is 
determined by analysing 
statistical information 
that shows percentage of 
PDA terminals attacked 
from the Internet or by 
computer virus 
PDA user Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host (PDA)  
availability 
Denial of host authorization 
availability 
PDA is stolen  0,012 
Unlikely 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of information 
provided by PDA user 
support company 
Denial of host (US) software 
availability 
The host software 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
0,13464238 
Possible 
The frequency is based 
on frequencies of denial 
of availabilities of host 
(US ) operating system 
and chat software 
Denial of host (USD) 
software 
availability 
The host software 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
0,16040166 
Possible 
The frequency is based 
on frequencies of denial 
of availabilities of host 
(USD ) operating system 
and chat software 
Denial of host (US) hardware 
availability 
The host hardware 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
0,06024177 
Possible 
The frequency is based 
on frequencies of denial 
of availabilities of host 
(US) hard disc, two 
network cards and 
processor 
Denial of host (USD) 
hardware 
availability 
The host hardware 
doesn’t function 
or malfunction 
0,04307351 
Unlikely 
The frequency is based 
on frequencies of denial 
of availabilities of host 
(USD) hard disc, 
network card and 
processor 
Denial of power supply 
service availability (US & 
USD) 
The local  provider of  
electricity has  
technical problems 
and can’t provide 
electricity 
0,010 
Unlikely 
The probability is 
determined with help of 
statistical information 
provided by the local 
electricity provider 
System 
owner 
Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
host (US & 
USD)  
availability 
Denial of host (US) security 
service  
availability 
The host is 
attacked from 
the internet and/or by 
computer virus 
0,00119978 
Rare 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of available 
statistical information 
and information provided 
by support company 
used by chat service 
administration 
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Denial of host (USD) security 
service  
availability 
The host is 
attacked from 
the internet and/or by 
computer virus 
0,00098 
Rare 
Probabilities of basis 
events were defined with 
help of available 
statistical information 
and information provided 
by support company 
used by chat service 
administration 
Denial of host (US & USD) 
authorization 
availability 
The chat service nodes 
are stolen or damaged  
0,001 
Rare 
Probability was defined 
with help of available 
statistical information 
 
 
Table D.3.10: Frequency table for service availability risks 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Risk 
scenario 
Frequency 
value 
Frequency 
description 
Denial of host (US) 
availability 
The host (US) is not 
available 
0,19667539 
Possible 
The frequency is based 
on frequencies of denial 
of availabilities of host 
(US) software, hardware, 
power supply service, 
host authorization and 
security service  
Denial of host (USD) 
availability 
The host (USD) is not 
available 
0,20617456 
Likely 
The frequency is based 
on frequencies of denial 
of availabilities of host 
(USD) software, 
hardware, power supply 
service, host 
authorization and 
security service 
Denial of 
Internet 
connection 
availability 
The local Internet 
provider has technical 
problems and can’t 
provide access to the 
Internet 
0,05 
Possible 
The frequency is defined 
with help of available 
statistical information 
and information provided 
by Internet provider 
Denial of 
Network 
availability 
Denial of 
cable 
availability 
The cable connecting 
two chat service nodes 
is damaged or doesn’t 
function 
0,002 
Rare 
The frequency is defined 
with help of available 
statistical information 
and information provided 
by support company 
System 
owner 
Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
Service 
availability 
Denial of Human availability The network 
administrator makes 
fail during 
maintenance of chat 
service 
0,07 
Possible 
Usually it takes 1 hour 
for network 
administrator to recover 
the chat service from fail 
((41*1)/30000)*100 = 
0,13% 
Denial of PDA availability PDA is not available 0,24278617 
Likely 
The frequency is based 
on frequencies of denial 
of availabilities of 
memory flash card, 
network card , lithium 
battery, host 
authorization and 
security service 
PDA user Availability 
of service 
Denial of 
wireless 
access to 
service 
availability 
Denial of wireless network  
availability 
Wireless network is 
not available 
0,09 
Possible 
The frequency is based 
on information provided 
by wireless network 
provider 
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D.4 Risk evaluation 
 
This section presents the results from the Risk evaluation of the chat service. The section is 
structured into four sub-sections. Sub-section D4.1 describes the Activity 4.1 Identification of 
risks values. Activity 4.2 Update of risks values is presented in sub-section D4.2. Sub-section 
D4.3 documents the Activity 4.3 Categorisation of risks into risk treatment categories. Sub-
section D4.4 describes the Activity 4.4 Specification of priorities of risk treatment categories. 
 
 
D.4.1 Activity 4.1: Identification of risks values 
 
Objective Determine the risk value for each risk 
 
 
Table D.4.1 documents all risks along with their identified risk values. For the identification of 
risk values we applied the Risk Matrix (Table D.1.4) 
 
 
Table D.4.1: Risk levels table 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Consequence 
value 
Frequency 
value 
Risk 
value 
Denial of host (PDA) 
operating system availability 
Major Possible Moderate Denial of  
host (PDA) 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
Host (PDA) 
application 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
PDA chat 
software 
availability 
Minor Possible Low 
Denial of host (PDA) memory 
flash card availability 
Moderate Unlikely Low Denial of 
host (PDA) 
hardware 
availability  
Denial of  
Host (PDA) 
internal 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of 
network card 
availability 
Major Unlikely Moderate 
Lack of firewall – host is 
attacked from the Internet 
Catastrophic Unlikely Moderate Denial of 
host (PDA) 
security 
service 
availability 
 
Lack of antivirus software – 
host is attacked by computer 
virus 
Major Possible Moderate 
Denial of Host (PDA) power supply 
service availability 
 
Moderate 
 
Unlikely Low 
Denial of Host (PDA) authorization 
Availability 
 
Catastrophic Unlikely Moderate 
PDA user 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Availability 
of service 
 
Denial of wireless network  
Availability 
 
Minor Possible Low 
Denial of host (US) operating 
system availability 
Moderate Possible Moderate System 
owner 
 
Availability 
of service 
 
Denial of  
host (US) 
software 
availability 
 
 
 
Denial of  
Host (US) 
application 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
UserAgent 
software 
component 
availability 
Minor Unlikely Low 
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Denial of host (USD) 
operating system availability 
Moderate Possible Moderate 
Denial of  
MeetingPlace
Logic 
software 
component 
availability 
Minor Unlikely Low 
Denial of  
host (USD) 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
Host (USD) 
application 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
ChatLogic 
software 
component 
availability 
Minor Unlikely Low 
Denial of host (US & USD) 
storage device 
availability 
Moderate Unlikely Low 
Denial of 
network card 
availability 
Major Unlikely Moderate 
Denial of 
host (US) 
and host 
(USD) 
hardware 
availability 
 
 
 
 
Denial of host
(US & USD) 
internal 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of 
processor 
availability 
Major Rare Low 
Host (US) is attacked from 
the Internet 
Moderate Rare Low Denial of 
host (US & 
USD) 
security 
service 
availability 
Host (US & USD) is attacked 
by computer virus 
Major Rare Low 
Denial of Host (US & USD) power supply 
service availability  
 
Moderate Unlikely Low 
Denial of Host (US & USD) authorization 
availability 
Catastrophic Rare Moderate 
Denial of Internet 
connection 
availability 
 
Minor Possible Low Denial of Network 
availability 
 
 
 
Denial of cable 
availability 
Minor Rare No risk 
Denial of Human availability 
 
Minor Possible Low 
 
 
D.4.2 Activity 4.2: Update of risks values 
 
Objective Update risks values in order to eliminate risks that have acceptable risk values 
 
 
We compared the risk values documented in the Risk levels table (Table D.4.1) with the risk 
evaluation criteria and concluded that we can accept all risks that have the risk value equal or 
less than “Low”. We documented updated risk values in the Updated risk levels table shown in 
Table D.4.2 
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Table D.4.2: Updated risk levels table 
Stakeholder Asset Risk Consequence 
value 
Frequency 
value 
Updated 
Risk 
value 
Denial of host (PDA) 
operating system availability 
Major Possible Moderate Denial of  
host (PDA) 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
Host (PDA) 
application 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
PDA chat 
software 
availability 
Minor Possible Accepted 
Denial of host (PDA) memory 
flash card availability 
Moderate Unlikely Accepted Denial of 
host (PDA) 
hardware 
availability  
Denial of  
Host (PDA) 
internal 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of 
network card 
availability 
Major Unlikely Moderate 
Lack of firewall – host is 
attacked from the Internet 
Catastrophic Unlikely Moderate Denial of 
host (PDA) 
security 
service 
availability 
Lack of antivirus software – 
host is attacked by computer 
virus 
Major Possible Moderate 
Denial of Host (PDA) power supply 
service availability 
 
Moderate 
 
Unlikely Accepted 
Denial of Host (PDA) authorization 
Availability 
 
Catastrophic Unlikely Moderate 
PDA user 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Availability 
of service 
 
Denial of wireless network  
availability 
Minor Possible Accepted 
Denial of host (US) operating 
system availability 
Moderate Possible Moderate Denial of  
host (US) 
software 
availability 
 
 
 
 
 
Denial of  
Host (US) 
application 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
UserAgent 
software 
component 
availability 
Minor Unlikely Accepted 
Denial of host (USD) 
operating system availability 
Moderate Possible Moderate 
Denial of  
MeetingPlace
Logic 
software 
component 
availability 
Minor Unlikely Accepted 
Denial of  
host (USD) 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
Host (USD) 
application 
software 
availability 
Denial of  
ChatLogic 
software 
component 
availability 
Minor Unlikely Accepted 
Denial of host (US & USD) 
storage device 
availability 
Moderate Unlikely Accepted 
Denial of 
network card 
availability 
Major Unlikely Moderate 
Denial of 
host (US) 
and host 
(USD) 
hardware 
availability 
 
 
 
Denial of host
(US & USD) 
internal 
hardware 
availability 
Denial of 
processor 
availability 
Major Rare Accepted 
System 
owner 
 
Availability 
of service 
 
Denial of 
host (US & 
Host (US) is attacked from 
the Internet 
Moderate Rare Accepted 
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USD) 
security 
service 
availability 
Host (US & USD) is attacked 
by computer virus 
Major Rare Accepted 
Denial of Host (US & USD) power supply 
service availability  
Moderate Unlikely Accepted 
Denial of Host (US & USD) authorization 
availability 
Catastrophic Rare Moderate 
Denial of Internet 
connection 
availability 
Minor Possible Accepted Denial of Network 
availability 
 
Denial of cable 
availability 
Minor Rare Accepted 
Denial of Human availability 
 
Minor Possible Accepted 
 
 
D.4.3 Activity 4.3: Categorisation of risks into risk treatment categories 
 
Objective Organise risks into risk treatment categories to make the risk treatment more effective 
 
 
We categorised risks into risk treatment categories with the help of the Possible risk treatment 
categories table (Table 5.48). Table D.4.3 shows the categorization of risks into risk treatment 
categories.  
 
 
Table D.4.3: Risk treatment category table 
Risk Treatment Category 
 
Risks 
Host operating system availability risks 1. Denial of host (PDA) operating system availability 
2. Denial of host (US) operating system availability 
3. Denial of host (USD) operating system availability 
Host hardware availability risks 1. Denial of network card availability (PDA) 
2. Denial of network card availability (US) 
3. Denial of network card availability (USD) 
Host security service availability risks (firewall) 1. Lack/Denial of firewall – host (PDA) is attacked 
    from the Internet 
Host security service availability risks (antivirus 
software) 
1. Lack/Denial of antivirus software – host (PDA) is 
    attacked by computer virus 
Host authorization availability risks 1. Denial of Host (PDA) authorization availability 
2. Denial of Host (US) authorization availability 
3. Denial of Host (USD) authorization availability    
 
 
D.4.4 Activity 4.4: Specification of priorities of risk treatment categories 
 
Objective Organise risks into risk treatment categories to make the risk treatment more effective 
 
 
The risk treatment category value was calculated with the help of the highest risk value approach 
(see the MODA Activity 4.4):  
The risk treatment category value consists of two elements: 
• The highest risk value represented in this risk treatment category. 
• The number of risks with the highest risk level. 
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For example, M3 means that the highest risk value represented in this category is “Moderate” 
(M) and 3 is the number of risks with this risk value. The identified values and priorities of risk 
treatment categories are shown in Table D.4.4. 
 
 
Table D.4.4: Risk treatment category priority table 
Risk Treatment Category 
 
Risks Risk Treatment 
Category Value 
Risk Treatment 
Category Priority 
Host operating system availability 
risks 
1. Denial of host (PDA) operating 
    system availability 
2. Denial of host (US) operating  
    system availability 
3. Denial of host (USD) operating  
    system availability 
M3 1 
Host hardware availability risks 1. Denial of network card (PDA) 
    availability 
2. Denial of network card (US) 
    availability 
3. Denial of network card (USD) 
    availability 
M3 1 
Host authorization availability 
risks 
1. Denial of Host (PDA) 
    authorization availability 
2. Denial of Host (US) authorization 
    availability 
3. Denial of Host (USD)  
    authorization availability 
M3 1 
Host security service availability 
risks (antivirus software) 
1. Lack/Denial of antivirus software –
    host (PDA) is attacked by  
    computer virus 
M1 2 
Host security service availability 
risks (firewall) 
1. Lack/Denial of firewall – host 
    (PDA) is attacked from the Internet
M1 2 
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D.5 Risk treatment 
 
This section presents the results from the Risk treatment of the chat service. The section is 
structured into two sub-sections. Sub-section D.5.1 describes the Activity 5.1 Identification of 
treatment options. Sub-section D.5.2 presents the Activity 5.2 Specification of risks treatment 
priorities. 
 
 
D.5.1 Activity 5.1: Identification of treatment options 
 
Objective Identify risk treatment options and risk treatment actions for each risk treatment 
category  
 
The risk treatment options and risk treatment actions were identified with the help of templates 
for risk treatment. The identified treatment options and treatment actions are documented in the 
risk treatment tables that were constructed for each risk treatment category. Figure D.5 shows 
how templates from appendix B were used to identify treatment options and treatment actions for 
each risk treatment category. This figure also shows treatment tables that we constructed to 
document chosen risk treatment options and risk treatment actions. 
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Host
Operating system
availability risks
Figure B4:
Treatment of risk
Denial of operating
system functionality
Templates from the
figures
Corresponding
risk treatment table
Figure D5.1:
Treatment table for the risk treatment category
Host operating system availability risks
Figure B5:
Treatment of risk
Incorrect installation
and use of operating
system
Figure B6:
Treatment of risk
Denial of operating
system authorization
functionality
Host
Hardware
availability risks
Figure B8:
Treatment of risk
Denial of hardware
component
functionality
Templates from the
figures
Corresponding
risk treatment table Figure D5.2:Treatment table for the risk treatment category
Host hardware availability risks
Figure B9:
Treatment of risk
Incorrect installation
and use of hardware
component
Figure B10:
Treatment of risk
Denial of hardware
authorization
functionality
Host
authorization
availability risks
Figure B16:
Treatment of risk
Denial of Host authorization availability
Templates from the
figures
Corresponding
risk treatment table Figure D5.3:Treatment table for the risk treatment category
Host authorization availability risks
Host
Security service
availability risks
(firewall)
Figure B14:
Treatment of risk
Lack of firewall/attack from the network
Templates from the
figures
Corresponding
risk treatment table Figure D5.5:Treatment table for the risk treatment category
Host security service availability risks (firewall)
Host
Security service
availability risks
 (antivirus software)
Figure B15:
Treatment of risk
Lack of antivirus software/Virus attack
Templates from the
figures
Corresponding
risk treatment table Figure D5.4:Treatment table for the risk treatment category
Host security service availability risks (antivirus software)
 
Figure D.5: Templates and the corresponding risk treatment tables 
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Table D.5.1: Chat Service Treatment table for host operating system availability risks 
ID        Risk  Approach Treatment 
   option 
       Treatment action                   Benefit              Cost 
1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
1) Operating system must be 
kept updated  
More stable and effective 
operating system 
 
Cost of work time of 
user (update) and cost 
of update 
2) Upgrade to the more reliable 
version of OS 
More reliable and stable 
functionality of OS 
Cost of work time of 
user (update) and cost 
of update 
3) Regular tests of operating 
system 
Early discovering and 
preventing of operating 
system problems 
Cost of work time of 
user (tests) and cost of 
tests 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of operating 
system functionality 
Early discovering and 
preventing of operating 
system problems 
Cost of work time of 
user (installation) and 
cost of software 
Daily full data and system 
backup  
Insure possibility for 
recovery from operating 
system problems 
Cost of work time of 
user (backup) and cost 
of backup software 
and hardware 
1) 
Have compact discs with 
operating system, diagnostic 
and recovery tools available 
Insure possibility for 
recovery from operating 
system problems 
Cost of OS, diagnostic 
and recovery tools 
2) Install OS and application 
programs on additional work 
station 
Insure possibility for 
recovery from operating 
system problems – use of 
additional work station in 
case of denial of OS 
functionality on the main 
workstation 
Cost of additional 
work station and cost 
of work time of user 
(installation) 
3) Regular tests of OS installed 
on additional work station  
Insure correct functionality of 
OS on additional work station 
- use of additional work 
station in case of denial of OS 
functionality on the main 
workstation 
Cost of work station, 
installation (user work 
hours) and cost of 
tests 
c) 
4) Install software on additional 
work station for monitoring 
of operating system 
functionality  
Insure correct functionality of 
OS on additional work station 
- use of additional work 
station in case of denial of OS 
functionality on the main 
workstation 
Cost of installation 
(user work hours) and 
cost of software 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
denial of operating system 
functionality 
Reduce financial 
consequences of denial of 
operating system 
functionality  
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Denial of 
operating 
system 
functionality 
e) 
4)    
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1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
Introduce the strict rules for 
choosing and changing of 
password 
Insure strong protection 
against unauthorized access 
to OS 
Cost of work time of 
user/specialist to 
formulate the rules  
Use the screensaver with 
password protection  
Better protection of OS 
against unauthorized access 
Cost of time to change 
screensaver options 
1) 
Users should always logout 
whenever they leave 
computer for any period of 
time 
Better protection of OS 
against unauthorized access 
Cost of time to logout 
2)    
3) Regular update and tests of 
employees/users security 
awareness  
Better protection of OS 
against unauthorized access  
Cost of update and 
tests 
b) 
4)    
1) Recovery from operating 
system problems should be 
done only by a specialized 
company (technical support) 
Quick recovery from OS 
problems 
Cost of technical 
support 
2)    
3)    
c) 
4)    
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
unauthorized access to 
operating system 
Reduce financial 
consequences of unauthorized 
access to operating system 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Denial of 
operating 
system 
authorization 
functionality 
e) 
4)    
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1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
1)  The competence of personnel 
responsible for 
use/installation of OS should 
be updated regularly (regular 
training courses) 
More correct use of operating 
system  
Cost of training course
2) Help in installation and use of 
OS from a software support 
service 
More correct and efficient use 
of operating system  
Cost of software 
support service 
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book and self testing of 
knowledge 
More correct and efficient use 
of operating system 
Cost of book/teaching 
program 
b) 
4)    
1) Use software support service 
for recovery from OS 
problems 
Quick recovery from OS 
problems 
Cost of software 
support service 
2) Have a backup competent 
user available  
Possible more efficient use of 
operating system. OS user 
can always get quick help 
from competent user 
Cost of work time of 
backup user 
3)    
c) 
4)    
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
incorrect use of OS 
Reduce financial 
consequences of incorrect use 
of operating system. 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Incorrect 
installation and 
use of 
operating 
system 
e) 
4)    
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Table D.5.2: Chat Service Treatment table for host hardware availability risks 
 
ID        Risk  Approach Treatment 
   option 
       Treatment action                   Benefit              Cost 
1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
1)    
2) Install another more reliable 
hardware component 
Possible more reliable and 
effective functionality of  
hardware component 
Cost of work time of 
user (installation) 
and cost of hardware 
component 
3) Regular tests of hardware 
component 
Early discovering and 
preventing of hardware 
component problems 
Cost of work time of 
user (tests) and cost of 
tests 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of hardware 
component functionality 
Early discovering and 
preventing of hardware 
component problems 
Cost of work time of 
user (installation) and 
cost of software 
1) Have an additional hardware 
component available  
Use additional hardware 
component in case of denial 
of main hardware component 
Cost of additional 
hardware component 
2) Install an additional hardware 
component with the same 
functionality  
Use additional hardware 
component in case of denial 
of main hardware component 
Cost of installation 
(work hours) and cost 
of additional hardware
3) Regular tests of additional 
hardware component 
functionality  
Insure correct functionality of 
additional hardware 
component -insure possibility 
for its use in case of denial of 
main hardware component 
Cost of additional 
hardware component 
and cost of tests 
c) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of additional 
hardware component 
functionality 
Early discovering and 
preventing of additional 
hardware component 
problems - insure possibility 
for its use in case of denial of 
main software 
Cost of installation 
(work hours) and cost 
of software 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
denial of basic hardware 
component functionality 
Reduce financial 
consequences of denial of 
basic hardware component 
functionality 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Denial of 
hardware 
component 
functionality 
e) 
4)    
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1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
1) Provide regular security 
awareness training of 
employees who use/install 
hardware components 
Better protection of hardware 
component against 
unauthorized access 
Cost of training 
2)    
3) Regular update and tests of 
security personal competence 
Better protection of hardware 
component against 
unauthorized access  
Cost of update and 
tests 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and detection of 
access to the room/area where 
HC is installed 
Insure access to hardware of 
only authorized users 
Cost of work time of 
user (installation) and 
cost of software 
1) Recovery from hardware 
problems should be done only 
by a specialized company 
(technical support) 
Quick recovery from 
hardware problems 
Cost of technical 
support 
2)    
3)    
c) 
4)    
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
unauthorized access to 
hardware component 
Reduce financial 
consequences of unauthorized 
access to hardware 
component 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Denial of 
hardware 
component 
(HC) 
authorization 
functionality 
e) 
4)    
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1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
1) The competence of personnel 
responsible for 
use/installation of hardware 
components should be 
updated regularly 
More correct use of hardware 
component  
Cost of regular update 
of user competence 
(e.g. cost of computer 
magazine 
subscription) 
2) Help in installation and use of 
hardware component from a 
hardware support service 
More correct and efficient use 
of hardware component 
Cost of hardware 
support service 
Self study of user manual/text 
book and self testing of 
knowledge 
More correct and efficient use 
of hardware component 
Cost of book/user 
manual 
3) 
Use of interactive teaching 
program with tests of 
knowledge 
More correct and efficient use 
of hardware component 
Cost of interactive 
teaching program 
b) 
4)    
1) Use hardware support service Quick recovery from 
hardware problems 
Cost of hardware 
support service 
2) Have a backup competent 
user available  
User can always get quick 
help from competent user  
Cost of work time of 
backup user 
3)    
c) 
4)    
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
incorrect use of hardware 
component 
Reduce financial 
consequences of incorrect use 
of hardware component 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Incorrect 
installation and 
use of 
hardware 
e) 
4)    
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Table D.5.3: Chat Service Treatment table for host authorization availability risks 
 
ID        Risk  Approach Treatment 
   option 
       Treatment action                   Benefit              Cost 
1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
Host node should be fastened 
with screws to a wall, floor or 
table and physical access to 
the host node should be 
secured with a lock 
Improve protection against 
unauthorized access to host 
node 
Cost of work time of 
user (installation) 
and cost of equipment 
(screws, lock) 
1) 
Access to the room where 
host node is installed should 
be protected by door with a 
lock 
Improve protection against 
unauthorized access to host 
node 
Cost of work time of 
user/specialist to 
formulate the rules  
2) Install host node in an other 
room/area with more strong 
access control 
Improve protection against 
unauthorized access to host 
node 
Cost of work time of 
user (installation)  
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book about host security and 
self testing of knowledge  
Better protection of host node 
against unauthorized access  
Cost of book/manual 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and detection of 
access to the room/area where 
host node is installed 
Insure access to the host node 
of only authorized users  
Cost of work time of 
user (installation) and 
cost of software 
1) Have an additional host node 
with installed operating 
system and application 
programs available 
Better availability of service 
in case of damage (denial) of 
original host node 
Cost of additional host 
node 
2) Install and fasten with screws 
an additional host node with 
installed OS and application 
programs in another room 
with more strong access 
control 
Improve protection against 
unauthorized access to 
additional host node – insure 
possibility of its use in case 
of denial of the main host 
node 
Cost of work time of 
user (installation) and 
cost of additional host 
node 
3) Test regularly (monthly) the 
functionality of OS and 
application programs 
installed on additional host 
node 
Insure correct and effective 
functionality of additional 
host node – denial of 
functionality of original host 
node will not affect service 
availability 
Cost of work time of 
user (tests)  
c) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and detection of 
access to the room/area where 
additional host node is 
installed 
Insure access to additional 
host node of only authorized 
users – insure possibility of 
its use in case of denial of the 
main host node 
Cost of work time of 
user (installation) and 
cost of software 
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
unauthorized access to host 
node 
Reduce financial 
consequences of unauthorized 
access to host node 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Denial of Host 
authorization 
availability 
e) 
4)    
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Table D.5.4: Chat Service Treatment table for host security service availability risks (antivirus software) 
ID        Risk  Approach Treatment 
   option 
       Treatment action                   Benefit              Cost 
1)    
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
Attachments from unknown 
sources should not be opened 
Reduce the possibility for 
virus attack 
No cost 
Compact disks and diskettes 
should be virus checked 
before they can be used 
Reduce the possibility for 
virus attack 
No cost 
1) 
Antivirus software should be 
regularly updated 
Reduce the possibility for 
virus attack 
Cost of update 
2) Install antivirus software Reduce the possibility for 
virus attack 
Cost of software 
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book about host security and 
self testing of knowledge  
Better protection of host node 
against virus attack  
Cost of book/manual 
b) 
4)    
1) Recovery from a virus attack 
should be done by specialized 
company (technical support) 
Quick recovery from virus 
attack 
Cost of technical 
support 
2) Install OS, application 
programs and antivirus 
software on additional work 
station  
Use of additional work 
station in case of denial of 
functionality of the main 
work station  
Cost of additional 
work station and cost 
of work time of user 
(installation) 
3) Regular tests of OS and 
application programs 
installed on additional work 
station  
Insure possibility for use of 
additional work station in 
case of denial of functionality 
of the main work station 
Cost of work station, 
installation of OS and 
application programs 
(work hours) and cost 
of tests 
c) 
4)    
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
virus attack 
Reduce financial 
consequences of virus attack 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Lack of 
antivirus 
software/virus 
attack  
e) 
4)    
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Table D.5.5: Chat Service Treatment table for host security service availability risks (firewall) 
ID        Risk  Approach Treatment 
   option 
       Treatment action                   Benefit              Cost 
1) Remove connection from the 
Internet  
Eliminate the possibility of 
attack from the Internet 
Possible reduction of 
service availability 
and revenue  
2)    
3)    
a) 
4)    
1) Firewall should be regularly 
updated 
Reduce the possibility for 
virus attack 
Cost of update 
2) Install firewall  Better protection of host node 
against network attacks 
Cost of work time of 
user (installation) and 
cost of software 
3) Self study of user manual/text 
book about host security and 
self testing of knowledge  
Better protection of host node 
against network attacks  
Cost of book/manual 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of network traffic 
Early discovering and 
preventing of network 
problems – better protection 
against possible network 
attack 
Cost of work time of 
user (installation) and 
cost of software 
1) Daily full data and system 
backup 
Higher availability of 
operating system, application 
programs and data –reduction 
of network attack 
consequence 
Cost of work time of 
user (backup) and cost 
of backup software 
and hardware 
2) Install OS, application 
programs and antivirus 
software on additional work 
station  
Use of additional work 
station in case of denial of 
functionality of the main 
work station  
Cost of additional 
work station and cost 
of work time of user 
(installation) 
3) Regular tests of OS and 
application programs 
installed on additional work 
station  
Insure possibility for use of 
additional work station in 
case of denial of functionality 
of the main work station 
Cost of work station, 
installation of OS and 
application programs 
(work hours) and cost 
of tests 
c) 
4)    
1) Have an insurance that covers 
the financial consequences of 
network attack 
Reduction of financial 
consequences of network 
attack 
Cost of insurance 
2)    
3)    
d) 
4)    
1)    
2)    
3)    
 Lack of 
firewall/attack 
from the 
network  
e) 
4)    
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D.5.2 Activity 5.2: Specification of risk treatment priorities  
 
Objective Define priority among risk treatment actions  
 
 
The PDA user and the system owner assigned costs and benefits for treatment actions according 
to the following scale: “very low” (VL), “low” (L), “moderate” (M), “high” (H), “very high” 
(VH). Treatment actions priorities were identified with the help of the Risk treatment action 
priority matrix (Table D.1.5). Both the PDA user and the chat system owner assigned costs to the 
treatment actions according to the scale shown in Table D.5.6. To define the cost value, the total 
monthly income of the system owner/PDA user was compared to the cost of treatment action.  
 
 
Table D.5.6: Cost values scale 
Cost of treatment action  
Very low Low Moderate High Very high 
Cost of treatment 
action compared to the 
total income of the 
system owner/PDA 
user 
 
0 – 1% 
 
1 – 3% 
 
3 – 6% 
 
6 – 10% 
 
> 10% 
more than 
10% 
 
The identified priorities of treatment actions are documented in the treatment priorities tables 
shown below. 
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Table D.5.7: Chat Service Treatment priority table for host operating system availability risks 
 
ID Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit
(PDA) 
Benefit
(chat) 
Cost 
(PDA) 
Cost 
(chat) 
Treatment 
action 
priority 
(PDA) 
Treatment 
action 
priority 
(chat) 
1)        
2)        
3)        
a) 
4)        
1) Operating system 
must be kept 
updated  
High High Low Very 
low 
High Very high 
2) Upgrade to the 
more reliable 
version of OS 
Mode 
rate 
High High Low Low High 
3) Regular tests of 
operating system 
Low Mode 
rate 
Mode 
rate 
Low Low Moderate 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of 
operating system 
functionality 
Low Mode 
rate 
Mode 
rate 
Mode 
rate 
Low Moderate 
Daily full data and 
system backup  
Mode 
rate 
High Low Low Moderate High 1) 
Have compact discs 
with operating 
system, diagnostic 
and recovery tools 
available 
Mode 
rate 
High Very 
low 
Very 
low 
High Very high 
2) Install OS and 
application 
programs on 
additional work 
station 
N/A High N/A High N/A Moderate 
3) Regular tests of OS 
installed on 
additional work 
station  
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A High N/A Low 
c) 
4) Install software on 
additional work 
station for 
monitoring of 
operating system 
functionality  
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A High N/A Low 
1) Have an insurance 
that covers the 
financial 
consequences of 
denial of operating 
system functionality
Low Mode 
rate 
Very 
high 
Very 
high 
Low Low 
2)        
3)        
d) 
4)        
1)        
2)        
3)        
 Denial of 
operating 
system 
functionality 
e) 
4)        
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1)        
2)        
3)        
a) 
4)        
Introduce the strict 
rules for choosing 
and changing of 
password 
High High Very 
low 
Very 
low 
Very high Very high 
Use the screensaver 
with password 
protection  
High High Very 
low 
Very 
low 
Very high Very high 
1) 
Users should always 
logout whenever 
they leave computer 
for any period of 
time 
High High Very 
low 
Very 
low 
Very high Very high 
2)        
3) Regular update and 
tests of 
employees/users 
security awareness  
Mode 
rate 
High Low Low Moderate High 
b) 
4)        
1) Recovery from 
operating system 
problems should be 
done only by a 
specialized 
company (technical 
support) 
Mode 
rate 
High Mode 
rate 
Low Moderate High 
2)        
3)        
c) 
4)        
1) Have an insurance 
that covers the 
financial 
consequences of 
unauthorized access 
to operating system 
Low Mode 
rate 
Very 
high 
Very 
high 
Very low Low 
2)        
3)        
d) 
4)        
1)        
2)        
3)        
 Denial of 
operating 
system 
authorization 
functionality 
e) 
4)        
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1)        
2)        
3)        
a) 
4)        
1) The competence of 
personnel 
responsible for 
use/installation of 
OS should be 
updated regularly 
(regular training 
courses) 
High Very 
high 
Mode 
rate 
Low High Very high 
2) Help in installation 
and use of OS from 
a software support 
service 
Mode 
rate 
High Mode 
rate 
High Moderate Moderate 
3) Self study of user 
manual/text book 
and self testing of 
knowledge 
Low Mode 
rate 
Low Mode 
rate 
Low Moderate 
b) 
4)        
1) Use software 
support service for 
recovery from OS 
problems 
Mode 
rate 
High Mode 
rate 
High Moderate Moderate 
2) Have a backup 
competent user 
available  
Mode 
rate 
Low High High Low Very low 
3)        
c) 
4)        
1) Have an insurance 
that covers the 
financial 
consequences of 
incorrect use of OS 
Low Mode 
rate 
Very 
high 
Very 
high 
Low Low 
2)        
3)        
d) 
4)        
1)        
2)        
3)        
 Incorrect 
installation 
and use of 
operating 
system 
e) 
4)        
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Table D.5.8: Chat Service Treatment priority table for host hardware availability risks 
 
ID Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit
(PDA) 
Benefit
(chat) 
Cost 
(PDA) 
Cost 
(chat) 
Treatment 
action 
priority 
(PDA) 
Treatment 
action 
priority 
(chat) 
1)        
2)        
3)        
a) 
4)        
1)        
2) Install another more 
reliable hardware 
component 
Mode 
rate 
High Mode 
rate 
Mode 
rate 
Moderate High 
3) Regular tests of 
hardware 
component 
Low Mode 
rate 
Low Low Moderate Moderate 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of 
hardware 
component 
functionality 
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A Moderate 
1) Have an additional 
hardware 
component 
available  
High Very 
high 
Mode 
rate 
Low High Very high 
2) Install an additional 
hardware 
component with the 
same functionality  
N/A Very 
high 
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A High 
3) Regular tests of 
additional hardware 
component 
functionality  
N/A Low N/A Low N/A Low 
c) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of 
additional hardware 
component 
functionality 
N/A Low N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A Low 
1) Have an insurance 
that covers the 
financial 
consequences of 
denial of basic 
hardware 
component 
functionality 
Low Mode 
rate 
Very 
high 
Very 
high 
Very low Low 
2)        
3)        
d) 
4)        
1)        
2)        
3)        
 Denial of 
hardware 
component 
functionality 
e) 
4)        
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1)        
2)        
3)        
a) 
4)        
1) Provide regular 
security awareness 
training of 
employees who 
use/install hardware 
components 
High High Very 
low 
Very 
low 
Very high Very high 
2)        
3) Regular update and 
tests of security 
personal 
competence  
N/A High N/A Low N/A High 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and 
detection of access 
to the room/area 
where HC is 
installed 
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A Moderate 
1) Recovery from 
hardware problems 
should be done only 
by a specialized 
company (technical 
support) 
Mode 
rate 
High Mode 
rate 
Mode 
rate 
Moderate High 
2)        
3)        
c) 
4)        
1) Have an insurance 
that covers the 
financial 
consequences of 
unauthorized access 
to hardware 
component 
Low Mode 
rate 
Very 
high 
Very 
high 
Very low Low 
2)        
3)        
d) 
4)        
1)        
2)        
3)        
 Denial of 
hardware 
component 
authorization 
functionality 
e) 
4)        
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1)        
2)        
3)        
a) 
4)        
1) The competence of 
personnel  
responsible for 
use/installation of 
hardware 
components should 
be updated regularly 
High Very 
high 
Mode 
rate 
Low High Very high 
2) Help in installation 
and use of hardware 
component from a 
hardware support 
service 
Mode 
rate 
High Mode 
rate 
High Moderate Moderate 
Self study of user 
manual/text book 
and self testing of 
knowledge 
Low Mode 
rate 
Low Mode 
rate 
Low Moderate 3) 
Use of interactive 
teaching program 
with tests of 
knowledge 
Low Mode 
rate 
Low Mode 
rate 
Low Moderate 
b) 
4)        
1) Use hardware 
support service 
Mode 
rate 
High Mode 
rate 
High Moderate Moderate 
2) Have a backup 
competent user 
available  
Mode 
rate 
Low High High Low Very low 
3)        
c) 
4)        
1) Have an insurance 
that covers the 
financial 
consequences of 
incorrect use of 
hardware 
component 
Low Mode 
rate 
Very 
high 
Very 
high 
Low Low 
2)        
3)        
d) 
4)        
1)        
2)        
3)        
 Incorrect 
installation 
and use of 
hardware 
e) 
4)        
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Table D.5.9: Chat Service Treatment priority table for host authorization availability risks 
ID Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit
(PDA) 
Benefit
(chat) 
Cost 
(PDA) 
Cost 
(chat) 
Treatment 
action 
priority 
(PDA) 
Treatment 
action 
priority 
(chat) 
1)        
2)        
3)        
a) 
4)        
Host node should be 
fastened with 
screws to a wall, 
floor or table and 
physical access to 
the host node 
should be secured 
with a lock 
N/A High N/A Very 
low 
N/A Very high 1) 
Access to the room 
where host node is 
installed should be 
protected by door 
with a lock 
N/A High N/A Very 
low 
N/A Very high 
2) Install host node in 
an other room/area 
with more strong 
access control 
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A Moderate 
3) Self study of user 
manual/text book 
about host security 
and self testing of 
knowledge  
High High Very 
low 
Very 
low 
Very high Very high 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and 
detection of access 
to the room/area 
where host node is 
installed 
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A Moderate 
1) Have an additional 
host node with 
installed operating 
system and 
application 
programs available 
High High Very 
high 
High Moderate Moderate 
2) Install and fasten 
with screws an 
additional host node 
with installed OS 
and application 
programs in another 
room with more 
strong access 
control 
N/A High N/A High N/A Moderate 
3) Test regularly 
(monthly) the 
functionality of OS 
and application 
programs installed 
on additional host 
node 
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A Moderate 
 Denial of 
Host 
authorization 
availability 
c) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring and 
detection of access 
to the room/area 
where additional 
host node is 
installed 
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A Moderate 
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1) Have an insurance 
that covers the 
financial 
consequences of 
unauthorized access 
to host node 
High High Very 
high 
Very 
high 
Moderate Moderate 
2)        
3)        
d) 
4)        
1)        
2)        
3)        
  
e) 
4)        
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Table D.5.10: Chat Service Treatment priority table for host security service availability risks (antivirus 
software) 
 
ID Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit
(PDA) 
Benefit
(chat) 
Cost 
(PDA) 
Cost 
(chat) 
Treatment 
action 
priority 
(PDA) 
Treatment 
action 
priority 
(chat) 
1)        
2)        
3)        
a) 
4)        
Attachments from 
unknown sources 
should not be 
opened 
High High Very 
low 
Very 
low 
Very high Very high 
Compact disks and 
diskettes should be 
virus checked 
before they can be 
used 
High High Very 
low 
Very 
low 
Very high Very high 
1) 
Antivirus software 
should be regularly 
updated 
High High Very 
low 
Very 
low 
Very high Very high 
2) Install antivirus 
software 
Very 
high 
N/A Low N/A Very high N/A 
3) Self study of user 
manual/text book 
about host security 
and self testing of 
knowledge  
High High Low Low High High 
b) 
4)        
1) Recovery from a 
virus attack should 
be done by 
specialized 
company (technical 
support) 
High High Low Low High High 
2) Install OS, 
application 
programs and 
antivirus software 
on additional work 
station  
N/A High N/A High N/A Moderate 
3) Regular tests of OS 
and application 
programs installed 
on additional work 
station  
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A High N/A Low 
c) 
4)        
1) Have an insurance 
that covers the 
financial 
consequences of 
virus attack 
Low Mode 
rate 
Very 
high 
Very 
high 
Very low Low 
2)        
3)        
d) 
4)        
1)        
2)        
3)        
 Lack of 
antivirus 
software/ 
virus attack 
e) 
4)        
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Table D.5.11: Chat Service Treatment priority table for host security service availability risks (firewall) 
 
ID Risk Approach Treatment 
option 
Treatment action Benefit
(PDA) 
Benefit 
(chat) 
Cost 
(PDA) 
Cost 
(chat) 
Treatment 
action 
priority 
(PDA) 
Treatment
action 
priority 
(chat) 
1) Remove connection 
from the Internet  
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2)        
3)        
a) 
4)        
1) Firewall should be 
regularly updated 
N/A High N/A Very 
low 
N/A Very high 
2) Install firewall  Very 
high 
N/A Low N/A Very high N/A 
3) Self study of user 
manual/text book 
about host security 
and self testing of 
knowledge  
Mode 
rate 
Mode 
rate 
Low Low Moderate Moderate 
b) 
4) Install software for 
monitoring of 
network traffic 
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A Moderate 
1) Daily full data and 
system backup 
High High Low Very 
low 
High Very high 
2) Install OS, 
application 
programs and 
antivirus software 
on additional work 
station  
N/A High N/A High N/A Moderate 
3) Regular tests of OS 
and application 
programs installed 
on additional work 
station  
N/A Mode 
rate 
N/A High N/A Low 
c) 
4)        
1) Have an insurance 
that covers the 
financial 
consequences of 
network attack 
Low Mode 
rate 
Very 
high 
Very 
high 
Very low Low 
2)        
3)        
d) 
4)        
1)        
2)        
3)        
 Lack of 
firewall/ 
attack from 
the network 
e) 
4)        
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D.6 Summary of main conclusions 
 
The availability risk assessment has covered the following functionality of the chat service: 
 
• The authentication control of users 
• The chat service functionality 
• The wireless access to the chat service 
 
The goal of this availability risk assessment has been to identify and analyse risks that represent 
a risk towards availability for the above-mentioned functionality of the chat service. 
 
In order to focus on the most important risks, the stakeholders along with the assets that are of 
value for them were identified. Table D.6.1 shows the stakeholders and the assets that were 
identified in the availability risk assessment of the chat service. 
 
 
Table D.6.1: The stakeholders along with the assets 
Stakeholder Asset Category Asset Description Value 
System owner Organizational Availability  
of service 
The highly available service is one of the 
main sources of income for the system 
owner 
30000$ per 
month  
PDA user Organizational Availability 
of service 
The PDA user pays 1$ for each hour of 
service usage 
1$ for 1 hour 
of service 
usage  
 
 
Twenty-four risks were identified. Further analysis of these risks resulted in the identification of 
nine risks with risk level “Moderate”, fourteen risks with risk level “Low” and one risk with risk 
level “No risk”. All risks with risk level “Moderate” were organised into the following five risk 
treatment categories:  
 
• Host operating system availability risks 
• Host hardware availability risks 
• Host authorization availability risks 
• Host security service availability risks (firewall) 
• Host security service availability risks (antivirus software) 
 
The management of the chat service should consider carefully whether the chat service might be 
continued/used if sufficient treatment of risks with risk level “Moderate” is not implemented. In 
order to achieve an acceptable risk level for the chat service, we recommend implementing a 
treatment that reduces the risk level of the risks with risk level “Moderate” to risk level “Low”.  
Figure D.6.2 summarizes the treatment proposals of priority “Very high” that will reduce the risk 
level of the relevant risks in an adequate manner. 
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Table D.6.2: The summary of the treatment proposals of priority “Very high” 
Risk Treatment action 
Denial of host operating system 
availability 
• Operating system must be kept updated 
• Have compact discs with operating system, 
diagnostic and recovery tools available 
• Introduce the strict rules for choosing and 
changing  of password 
• Use the screensaver with password protection 
• Users should always logout whenever they 
leave computer for any period of time 
• The competence of personnel responsible for 
use/installation of operating system should be 
updated regularly (regular training courses) 
Denial of host hardware availability • Have an additional hardware component 
available 
• Provide regular security awareness training of 
employees who use/install hardware 
components 
• The competence of personnel responsible for 
use/installation of hardware components 
should be updated regularly  
Denial of host authorization 
availability 
• Host node should be fastened with screws to a 
wall, floor or table and physical access to the 
host node should be secured with a lock 
• Access to the room where the host node is 
installed should be protected by door with a 
lock 
• Self study of user manual/text book about host 
security and self testing of knowledge 
Lack of antivirus software/virus attack • Install antivirus software 
• Attachments from unknown sources should 
not be opened 
• Compact disks and diskettes should be virus 
checked before they can be used 
• Antivirus software should be updated 
regularly  
Lack of firewall/attack from the 
network 
• Install firewall 
• Firewall should be updated regularly 
• Daily full data and system backup 
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